Kathryn Louise Smiley v. State ( 2004 )


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  •                                      NO. 07-04-0269-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL D
    DECEMBER 31, 2004
    ______________________________
    KATHRYN LOUISE SMILEY, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
    NO. 14838-0302; HONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Kathryn Louise Smiley brings this appeal from the revocation of her
    community supervision and imposition of two years confinement in a state jail facility. We
    will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Appellant was indicted for the felony offense of burglary of a building. She was
    convicted on her plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement on May 19, 2003.
    Punishment was assessed in conformity with the plea agreement at two years confinement
    in a state jail facility, restitution, a $750 fine and payment of court costs, each suspended
    for a period of three years conditioned on appellant’s compliance with the terms of her
    community supervision. As relevant here, those conditions required appellant to report to
    the assigned community supervision officer on or before the tenth of each month and to
    keep the supervision officer advised of her correct residence address.
    The State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision June 26,
    2003, alleging she “failed to report for the month of May 2003 for her intake interview in
    this case” and “does not reside at 2514 Rochelle Street, Plainview, Texas, as she
    reported.”
    The trial court heard the State’s motion to revoke May 5, 2004 where appellant
    plead not true to both of the allegations. The State presented the testimony of Hale
    County probation officer Melinda Choate who stated appellant reported to the probation
    office after her release from jail on May 19, 2003 and began the intake process but did not
    complete it because Choate needed to return to court. Choate said she instructed
    appellant to return on May 22 but she failed to do so and had not reported to the probation
    department since May 19, 2003.
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    In support of the State’s allegation that appellant failed to provide her correct
    residence address, Choate testified a telephone call to the number provided by appellant
    was not answered and correspondence sent to the address was returned unclaimed.
    Neither Choate or another officer ever went to the address.
    Appellant testified that she returned to the probation department on May 20, 2003
    as she was instructed to do, and that she telephoned for Choate on May 21, but was not
    able to reach her on either occasion. Appellant further testified she was not able to call
    later because she was in a relationship with a man who was abusive and she was not
    permitted to use the only telephone in the house.
    The State sought to impeach appellant’s testimony by questioning her about records
    of the probation department showing the only date she was in that office was May 19,
    2003. Appellant challenged the accuracy of some of the probation department records
    based on information she provided to department employees.
    At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court found she had violated the conditions
    of her probation “as alleged in the motion to revoke” and imposed the original sentence
    of two years confinement in a state jail facility, fine of $750, court costs, and any restitution
    remaining unpaid. Appellant timely perfected appeal from this judgment.
    Appellant's counsel has filed a motion to withdraw supported by a brief pursuant to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
    (1967), in which he
    represents that he has searched the record and in the opinion of counsel, under the
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    controlling authorities and facts of this case, there is no reversible error or legitimate
    grounds for appeal. Counsel’s brief does not discuss any potential issues. Counsel has
    informed appellant by letter of her right to review the trial record and to file a pro se brief.
    Johnson v. State, 
    885 S.W.2d 641
    , 645 (Tex.App.–Waco 1994, pet. ref'd). This Court also
    notified appellant of her opportunity to submit a response to the Anders brief and motion
    to withdraw filed by her counsel. Appellant has not filed a brief or other response. Nor has
    the State filed a brief in this appeal.
    In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we will
    not rule on the motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record.
    Nichols v. State, 
    954 S.W.2d 83
    , 86 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1997, no pet.). If this court
    determines the appeal has merit, we will remand it to the trial court for appointment of new
    counsel. See Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).
    Our review of counsel’s brief and the record convinces us that appellate counsel
    conducted a thorough review of the record.           We must also make an independent
    examination of the entire record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds
    which might support the appeal. See 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511
    .
    In a proceeding to revoke community supervision, the State has the burden of
    proving by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his
    community supervision. Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 874 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). To
    meet this burden of proof, the greater weight of the evidence must create a reasonable
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    belief that the defendant violated a condition of probation as alleged. Torres v. State, 
    103 S.W.3d 623
    , 625 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2003, no pet.). We review the decision to revoke
    community supervision for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 
    645 S.W.2d 303
    , 305
    (Tex.Crim.App.1983). When more than one violation is alleged, proof of any one of them
    is sufficient to support the revocation.      Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1980).
    An allegation in a motion to revoke probation need not meet the particulars of an
    indictment or complaint, Mitchell v. State, 
    608 S.W.2d 226
    , 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), and
    is sufficient if it gives the person notice to enable him to prepare a defense. Labelle v.
    State, 
    720 S.W.2d 101
    , 108 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Here the State alleged appellant
    “failed to report for the month of May 2003 for her intake interview in this case” and “does
    not reside at 2514 Rochelle Street, Plainview Texas as she reported.”
    The State’s evidence established appellant did report to the community supervision
    department on her release from jail May 19, 2003. The evidence whether she returned to
    complete the intake process was disputed. Any variance between the allegation in the
    State’s motion and the proof was slight and fails to present a meritorious issue as to
    whether it deprived appellant of fair notice of the issues she would be required to defend
    at a hearing on the State’s motion.1
    1
    Appellant did not assert as an affirmative defense the failure of any officer to
    attempt to contact her in person at the address listed. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art.
    42.12, § 24 (Vernon pamph. 2004).
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    With regard to the second violation alleged, the State’s evidence showed only there
    was no answer at one telephone number appellant provided and mail sent to the address
    was returned unclaimed. There was no evidence of the service address of the telephone
    number called or that the returned letter showed appellant did not reside at the address
    to which it was sent. However appellant’s own testimony established she did not live at
    the address she reported during at least some of the probationary period. As the sole trier
    of fact the trial court was free to determine the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts
    in the evidence. 
    Id. The court
    did not accept appellant’s testimony that she was prevented
    from complying with the conditions of her community supervision by contacting her
    probation officer. We find no meritorious issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting the trial court’s judgment.
    Our review of the record establishes the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    revoking appellant's community supervision. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw and
    affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    James T. Campbell
    Justice
    Do not publish.
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