Robert Edward Barrientez v. State ( 2005 )


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  •                                    NO. 07-04-0417-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL B
    JANUARY 5, 2005
    ______________________________
    ROBERT EDWARD BARRIENTEZ,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
    NO. 14,041-A; HON. HAL MINER, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Memorandum Opinion
    _______________________________
    Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ.
    Appellant Robert Edward Barrientez appeals his conviction for failing to comply with
    the sex offender registration requirements. His sole issue concerns whether he was denied
    the effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to the lack of a
    punishment hearing. The adjudication of his guilt had originally been deferred, and the trial
    court placed him on community supervision. Per the State’s second motion to revoke
    probation, the trial court convened a hearing whereat appellant pled true to each of the 12
    allegations in the motion. Thereafter, the trial court asked the State for its recommendation
    as to punishment.      The prosecutor informed the court that it previously agreed to
    recommend a six year sentence. The trial court refused the recommendation, informed
    appellant that it would assess eight years confinement, and ultimately assessed seven
    years upon the urging of appellant’s attorney. Because no separate punishment hearing
    was conducted and since his counsel failed to complain about that, appellant asserts that
    he was denied effective counsel. We affirm the judgment.
    One claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must establish not only that his
    counsel was deficient but also that the deficiency was prejudicial. Bone v. State, 
    77 S.W.3d 828
    , 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). To be prejudicial, the record must show that there exists
    a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would
    have been different.    
    Id. And, this
    occurs when the circumstances undermine our
    confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. 
    Id. Next, the
    entry of a guilty plea in a bench trial results in a unitary trial where the
    issues of guilt and punishment are submitted at the same time. Lopez v. State, 
    96 S.W.3d 406
    , 412 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). Although a defendant should be accorded
    an opportunity to offer evidence in mitigation of punishment after an adjudication of guilt,
    there is no absolute right to a separate hearing on the matter. Hardeman v. State, 
    1 S.W.3d 689
    , 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The trial court need only afford the defendant
    opportunity to present evidence sometime during the proceedings. Pearson v. State, 
    994 S.W.2d 176
    , 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Lopez v. 
    State, 96 S.W.3d at 414
    .
    Here, the record illustrates that while no separate punishment hearing was
    convened, the trial court did inquire about the punishment to be levied. It not only solicited
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    information from the State (i.e. the recommendation resulting from plea negotiations), but
    also entertained the comments of defense counsel. Moreover, the latter’s comments
    resulted in the trial court reducing the length of the sentence from eight years to seven.
    What other evidence, if any, appellant proposed to offer went unmentioned in his brief. So
    too did appellant fail to inform us of how this unknown evidence may have altered the
    result.
    Given that the trial court did solicit and entertain information and argument about
    punishment, that the trial court reduced the prison term it initially decided to levy due to
    defense counsel’s arguments, and that appellant failed to argue or illustrate that he had
    other relevant evidence which he was unable to present, we cannot say that he established
    the prejudice required by Bone. Indeed, appellant did not even argue that he was
    prejudiced by the purported omission. See Ladd v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 547
    , 570 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1999) (holding that because appellant made “no effort to prove the prejudice prong,”
    he was not entitled to relief).
    Accordingly, we overrule the issue and affirm the judgment.
    Brian Quinn
    Justice
    Do not publish.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 07-04-00417-CR

Filed Date: 1/5/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2015