in the Interest of T.U., K.U., and K.U., Children ( 2007 )


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  •                                    NO. 07-07-0213-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL B
    NOVEMBER 8, 2007
    ______________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF T.U., K.U., and K.U.
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 72nd DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2005-530,783; HON. KEVIN HART, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Memorandum Opinion
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
    Appellant Jennifer Upton appeals from a final order terminating her parental
    rights to her three minor children, T.U., K.U., and K.U. In doing so, she challenges the
    legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds for
    termination; she does not contest the decision that termination was in the best interests
    of the children, however. We affirm the order of the trial court.
    Standard of Review
    The applicable standards of review are found in In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    , 266-
    67 (Tex. 2002) and In re C.H., 
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 25 (Tex. 2002). We refer the parties to
    them.
    Application of Standards
    The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Upton 1) knowingly placed
    or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which
    endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children, 2) engaged in conduct
    or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which
    endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children, and 3) failed to comply
    with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary
    for her to obtain the return of the children. Sufficient evidence supporting the existence
    of any one of those three statutory grounds obligates us to affirm the judgment. See In
    re A.V., 
    113 S.W.3d 355
    , 362 (Tex. 2003) (so recognizing).
    Of record is evidence of Upton’s living with physically violent men. One killed a
    child of hers. Another physically abused her. Expert testimony revealed that exposure
    to such behavior can have “serious” impact upon her children.            Other evidence
    disclosed 1) that another child was sexually abused by another youth’s father while in
    Upton’s care, 2) that a child had died from medical conditions while in her care, 3) that
    two of her children previously had been removed from her care, 4) that Upton had
    habitually ingested controlled substances (as did one or more of the men with whom
    she and her children lived), 5) that she drove while intoxicated and succumbed to an
    accident with at least one child in the car, 6) that she had been incarcerated over 20
    times for such crimes as possession of controlled substances, public intoxication, DWI,
    credit card abuse, and theft with a credit card, 7) that repeated criminal conduct can
    have an adverse affect upon the well-being of children, 8) that she could not provide a
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    stable home, 9) that she knew of her deficiencies and could not correct, but only repeat,
    them, 10) that she had left her young children alone in a motel room while working
    (though she purportedly asked another motel guest to watch them), 11) that she had left
    her children unsupervised in a bath tub while knowing that one enjoyed playing with the
    faucet, 12) that one of her children was severely burned when left unsupervised in the
    bathtub, 13) that she would not have taken her burned child to obtain medical treatment
    had she known that the State was to become involved in the incident, 14) that she was
    not capable of making decisions necessary to successfully raise children, 15) that she
    had already relinquished her rights to three of her children, 16) that she routinely left her
    children in the care of her physically violent 17 year old, drug abusing boyfriend (Upton
    was over thirty), 17) that Upton and her children were evicted from an apartment after
    engaging in a domestic disturbance with her 17 year old boyfriend, 18) that she would
    change addresses without notifying CPS, 19) that she failed to complete a drug and
    alcohol assessment as required, 20) that she would focus on only one of the children
    while leaving the others unsupervised during visitations by CPS workers, 21) that her
    children had emotional/behavioral problems, and 22) that she failed to attend the final
    hearing to decide termination although she had been notified of its date. Finally, the
    evidence indicates that the children in question were four, two, and two years old.
    As previously mentioned, one of the grounds found to justify termination involved
    Upton’s engaging in conduct or knowingly placing the children with persons who
    engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the
    children. See TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . §161.001(1)(E) (Vernon Supp. 2006). To satisfy it,
    the State need not have proved that the children at issue here were the focus of the
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    conduct or that they were actually harmed by it. In re C.J.F. 
    134 S.W.3d 343
    , 351 (Tex.
    App.–Amarillo 2003, pet. denied).     Rather, proof that Upton pursued a course of
    conduct having the effect of endangering her children sufficed.     See 
    id. And, the
    evidence we itemized above does just that. In other words, it provided the trial court
    ample basis upon which to form a firm conviction and belief that Upton engaged in
    conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct
    endangering the physical or emotional well-being of T.U., K.U. and K.U. See In re S.P.,
    
    168 S.W.3d 197
    , 204-05 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, no pet.) (finding the evidence legally
    sufficient when there were incidents of domestic violence, the mother lacked parenting
    skills and judgment and failed to take her medication, and there was evidence one or
    two children not the subject of the termination had been sexually molested by the father
    but the mother did not believe the children were endangered). And, while it may be that
    other evidence showed that she of late maintained employment, attended visitations
    with her children, and actively participated in therapy and counseling when she
    attended, that evidence did not require the trial court to ignore the history of
    endangerment to which the children had been exposed.
    In sum, legally and factually sufficient evidence supported at least one statutory
    ground upon which termination was based. Accordingly, the order of termination is
    affirmed.
    Brian Quinn
    Chief Justice
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Document Info

Docket Number: 07-07-00213-CV

Filed Date: 11/8/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021