Hot Rod Hill Motor Park and Roger Deewayne Brown v. Donmichael Lucas Triolo ( 2008 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-06-00092-CV
HOT ROD HILL MOTOR PARK AND
ROGER DEEWAYNE BROWN,
Appellants
v.
DONMICHAEL LUCAS TRIOLO,
Appellee
From the 361st District Court
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court No. 04-001812-CV-361
OPINION
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park is a race track located on Roger Deewayne Brown’s
property. Donmichael Lucas Triolo sued Brown and Hot Rod Hill, alleging that the
track constitutes a nuisance. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order
prohibiting races and subsequently issued a temporary injunction that allowed Brown
to conduct races, but ordered that races end by 11:00 p.m. and imposed noise level
restrictions.
A jury later determined that the track constitutes a nuisance and awarded Triolo
$3,000 in damages for loss and enjoyment of his property, but no damages for loss of
market value. The trial court entered a final judgment permanently enjoining Brown
from conducting any races of motorized vehicles for either competition or practice.
Brown and Hot Rod Hill challenge the permanent injunction on grounds that (1) the
trial court failed to properly balance the equities before issuing the injunction; and (2)
the injunction is more restrictive than justified by the evidence. We affirm.
BALANCING THE EQUITIES
In his first issue, Brown contends that the trial abused it discretion by imposing a
permanent injunction because: (1) the trial court failed to balance the equities; and (2)
the equities do not support a permanent injunction.
Whether the Trial Court Failed to Balance the Equities
Question two of the jury charge asked whether Brown and Hot Rod Hill should
be permanently enjoined from “directly or indirectly conducting or allowing any races
of motorized vehicles, both practice and competitive,” to which the jury answered,
“Yes.” According to Brown, this was an issue for the trial court, not the jury, but the
trial court merely adopted the jury’s finding without balancing the equities. Triolo
concedes that the question was improper, but argues that (1) Brown failed to preserve
the issue for appeal, having failed to object to the question at trial; and (2) the record
does not support a finding that the trial court failed to balance the equities.
Regardless of whether the question was proper or the issue was preserved, the
record is devoid of evidence indicating that the trial court issued an injunction without
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 2
balancing the equities. See Winfield v. Lamoyne, No. 05-94-01851-CV, 1995 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2553, at *15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 16, 1995, writ dism’d) (not designated for
publication) (Winfield alleged that the trial court failed to balance the equities, but
provided no evidence of such a failure, arguing instead that he “suffers more harm
from the injunction than LaMoyne suffers from the violations”); see also Estancias Dallas
Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(“[T]here is an implied finding that the trial court balanced the equities in favor of
plaintiffs by entering the judgment granting the injunction.”). Neither did Brown seek a
hearing or request findings of fact. See Lee v. Bowles, 397 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. Civ.
App.—San Antonio 1965, no writ) (trial court held a separate hearing on the issue of
balancing the equities); see also Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52
(Tex. 2003) (“When neither party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
implied that the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support its judgment”);
Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood, 937 S.W.2d 60, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996), aff’d as modified by 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998) (“When part of a cause is
decided by a jury and part by the court, the party appealing the court-decided issue
should request findings of fact and conclusions of law.”). The record before us does not
establish that the trial court failed to balance the equities.
Whether the Equities were Properly Balanced
Abatement of a nuisance is a “discretionary decision for the judge after the case
has been tried and the jury discharged.” Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147
S.W.3d 264, 286 (Tex. 2004). The trial court must balance the equities before issuing an
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 3
injunction, considering injury to (1) the defendant and the public were the injunction
granted and (2) the complainant were the injunction denied. See Storey v. Cent. Hide &
Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Tex. 1950). An injunction will ordinarily be
denied if the “injury to the complainant is slight in comparison to the injury caused the
defendant and the public.” Id. at 619. Conversely, an injunction may issue if the injury
to the defendant and the public is slight when compared to injury suffered by the
complainant. See id. “Public convenience or necessity, economic burden to the
defendant, and the adequacy of a legal remedy may affect this balance.” McAfee MX v.
Foster, No. 02-07-00080-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 968, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Feb. 7, 2008, pet. denied), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-639 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2008). We
review a trial court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion.
See Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d
546, 560 (Tex. 1998).
Factual Background
In 1999, Brown began building Hot Rod Hill, a sole proprietorship, working
twelve to sixteen hours a day for three years to complete it. He sold rental properties
and racing equipment to fund construction. He purchased other equipment that he had
to repair to build the track.
The track is affiliated with the International Motor Contest Association. The
racing season begins in March and ends in October. Races are held on nineteen or
twenty dates out of thirty-two potential dates, approximately 160 hours of racing per
year. Sixty to eighty cars usually participate, but there can be up to one hundred.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 4
Triolo’s current home is about one-half to three-quarters of a mile from the track.
When suit was filed, he resided in a home located half a mile from the track. He
testified that races run as late as 1:30 a.m. and resume around 7:30 a.m. on Sunday.
Triolo complained that the noise is loud, excessive, irritating, annoying, constant,
sounds like it is in his backyard, prevents him from sleeping or enjoying dinner with his
family, and requires him to increase the volume of the television. He hears motors
revving and cars backfiring. He cannot escape the noise and can hear it any day of the
week. On weekends, he and his family leave home to avoid the noise. He has
measured the noise with a decibel meter and took readings in excess of eighty decibels.
Triolo purchased nine lots in the area for $69,000. He sold eight lots at $20,000
each and built his new home on lot nine. He said that he could have made more money
if not for the track, losing approximately $3,000 to $5,000 per lot. He cannot remain in
his home if the track remains open. If forced to sell, the track will limit the potential
market. He would have no reason to sell if the track is closed.
Several homeowners in the area testified that the noise from the track is
excessive.1 They described the noise as constant, nerve-racking, unbelievable,
intolerable, and inconvenient. It echoes, sounds like a “locomotive coming through the
house,” and causes windows and light fixtures to shake. Residents have difficulty
1 Brown argues that the trial court could not consider this evidence because: (1) this is a suit for
private nuisance, for which an injunction is intended to eliminate harm to Triolo, not the public at large;
and (2) the harm to non-parties, were the injunction denied, is not a proper consideration. However, the
testimony of non-parties has been considered in injunction suits. See McAfee MX v. Foster, No. 02-07-
00080-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 968, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 7, 2008, pet. denied) (testimony
from plaintiffs and two other neighbors not parties to the suit); see also Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500
S.W.2d 217, 221-22 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (several neighbors provided
testimony similar to that of the plaintiffs who alleged that an air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance
and should be enjoined). Nor did Brown object to this evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 5
sleeping, having a conversation at home or over the telephone, watching television, and
spending time outdoors. The noise has even driven some residents from their homes on
Saturday nights. Joyce Watkins testified that her family no longer visits because her
grandchildren cannot sleep at night. Felicia Boegner built a privacy fence to block out
the noise and lights, but can still hear the noise. Darrell Luedke can hear the noise even
though his home consists of walls with twelve inches of insulation and is separated
from the track by a forest of trees.
The Sheriff’s Department has received numerous complaints and issued several
warnings or citations regarding the noise and lateness of the races. Deputies described
the noise as “somewhat deafening,” loud, excessive, disturbing, and irritating. It made
conversing with complainants difficult. On one occasion, Brown was issued a citation
after receiving a warning approximately one hour earlier. On another occasion, he
received a citation approximately one hour before races ended around 12:30 a.m. The
deputies’ noise measurements often revealed levels exceeding eighty or ninety decibels.
The Department has received numerous complaints in a single night.
Brown recalled one occasion where races ran until 1:30 or 1:45 a.m., claming that
an ambulance, which he requires to be present during races, left the scene and did not
return until late. He also admitted running past 12:00 a.m. on about five occasions.
Since the temporary injunction, he has implemented procedures for completing races by
11:00 p.m. He procured an ambulance that will be available during the races. Each race
ends within a certain time period, regardless of whether all laps are completed. Racers
must control their cars to avoid delaying the races and must be on time. Brown no
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 6
longer holds the show for racers who have been rained out at other tracks or are
running late. Cars are lined up waiting to begin the next race. Racers Michael Pitts and
James Spear testified that Brown has not exceeded the time limit and races have been
cut short due to time constraints.
Brown has also taken measures to reduce the noise. He requires all racers to use
a muffler on their cars. Mufflers may be packed or equipped with a turn-down, which
directs sound towards the ground, to reduce noise. Failure to adhere to muffler
requirements results in penalties or disqualification. Spear has observed Brown enforce
the muffler requirement and has noticed a significant reduction in the noise level at the
track. Dawn Pitts testified that the mini-sprint racers all use mufflers and pack the
mufflers if the cars are still too loud. Michael testified that the track has more
restrictions than any other track where he races.
Brown has also brought in trailer houses, enlarged the ponds on his property,
planted foliage, installed various barriers around the track, prohibited the use of parts
that create excessive noise, changed the body styles on some cars, and limited the types
of cars that may be raced, all in an effort to reduce the noise. Chris Kehl, an employee
with O’Reilly Auto Parts, testified that Brown has declined to race certain classes of cars
because of the noise they make. Brown also plans to install fountains, require racers to
purchase a stall for their cars, and add more bleachers. He has already begun building
a carport cover along the edge of the property.
David Cooper, Triolo’s sound expert, conducted two tests at the Luedke home.
The first test revealed readings of 88 and 89 decibels. The second test revealed a
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 7
reading of 90 decibels three different times during the same race. These tests were
conducted after the temporary injunction became effective. Cooper provided the jury
with a recording of various decibel levels.
Cooper also provided opinions regarding Brown’s noise-reduction measures. He
testified that bodies of water on the ground will not prevent the noise from traveling.
Fountains will affect higher frequencies, but not the lower frequencies that travel
farther. Some of Brown’s barriers, specifically a wooden catch fence and billboards,
vibrate easily and would not have much impact. Depending on its depth, foliage could
affect lower frequencies; yet, Cooper was surprised at the noise levels he received at the
Luedke home, given the forest of trees located between the home and the track. Turn-
downs on the mufflers would probably reduce the sound. Brown had reduced some
sound, but not that of the race cars. Cooper testified that a football stadium berm
would reduce the sound a “pretty good bit.”
Several witnesses testified that the noise has been reduced since the temporary
injunction. Ricky Denman can barely hear the noise unless the wind blows in a certain
direction. Tim Dockery testified that the noise has been reduced and is not
unreasonable. Christie Bomnskie testified that the track is quieter now and races no
longer run past 11:00 p.m. Her three children, who did not reside in the home before
suit, are able to sleep and the noise has never forced her to leave home. She cannot hear
the noise over the television. Clifford Crenshaw had signed a petition alleging that the
track is a nuisance. He now believes the problems have been corrected. He has noticed
a substantial reduction in noise and barely notices the noise.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 8
Brown testified that the track is surrounded by industrial buildings, an industrial
park, electric building, oil field with pump jacks that run twenty-four hours a day,
airport, livestock barn, auction barn, highway, and club. Spear testified that about ten
oil-field businesses operate in the area 24/7. Denman testified that the highway is
louder than the track. Dockery testified that an oil well located two properties to the
east of his property is louder than the track and runs 24/7. He identified other noises
originating from highway traffic and oil-field trucks. Boegner testified that she is not
bothered by the oil-well noise. Luedke testified that he can occasionally hear cows from
the livestock barn, but not at 1:00 a.m.
Michael testified that he has raced at other tracks that are similarly situated to
Hot Rod Hill. Kehl testified that the track is essentially the same as the other ten or
fifteen tracks he has visited, i.e., a dirt oval track, and for the most part is similarly
situated to these other tracks. Michael, Kehl, Spear, Denman, and Bomnskie all testified
that the track is in an appropriate location. Spear believed that people would still
complain even if Brown moved the track elsewhere.
Brown and other witnesses testified that the track benefits the community.
Families visit the track for entertainment and recreation. They barbecue, visit, and
camp-out. The track does not charge for camping. Patrons must adhere to certain
behavioral standards and alcohol is not sold at the track. School-age drivers must
maintain passing grades at school and proper conduct at home. When a racer damages
another racer’s car, the racers handle the situation without fighting. Brown holds a
driving school on Sunday afternoons. Spear testified that the track provides
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 9
opportunities for children to ride in and drive the race cars. Michael testified that
racing has changed the lives of a couple of young men whom he knows.
The track has also assisted with charitable events. Without the track, Spear did
not believe that racers would be able to participate in charitable works and programs.
Michael and his wife Dawn are members of the Brazos Mini-Sprint Association, which
donates money and participates in benefits and other community events.
Brown testified that racers come from all over Texas and even out of state. He
testified that the track attracts new businesses, such as chassis, fabrication, machine,
graphics, lettering, manufacture, design, molds, and fiberglass shops. Local parts and
fuel businesses sell their products at the track. A local performance shop provides
pieces, gauges, seats, etc. Michael testified that out-of-town patrons conduct business
with the locals. Dockery attends races at the track and testified that out-of-town
patrons spend money at local convenience stores, eat at restaurants, buy gas, and buy
food. Kehl testified that O’Reilly sponsors events at the track and will continue to be
involved even if it is not actually a sponsor. He testified that several national series are
interested in racing at the track and O’Reilly would not sponsor an event that is
detrimental either to its business or to the community.
Michael testified that he is unsure of whether the Mini-Sprint Association could
exist without the track. Although the mini-sprint racers race at both Hot Rod Hill and
other tracks, Dawn testified that closing the track could take away the hobby for some
members. Michael testified that some racers do not want to travel because of the fuel
and traveling more often would increase expenses.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 10
On a good night, the track grosses $18,000 to $25,000, but Brown does not make a
profit because of expenses for employees, fuel, fire crews, emergency crews, lighting,
power, insurance, purse money, insurance, prizes, gifts, office supplies, and a website.
The track is a business, not a hobby, and he hopes to eventually make a profit. It is his
“lifetime dream” and he enjoys working. He does not race or own a race car. He is not
certain of what he will do financially if the track is closed.
Analysis
We first address the harm to Brown. Triolo argues that the only harm to Brown
is the “loss of uncertain potential income.” We disagree. The injunction will not only
interfere with Brown’s own use and enjoyment of his property, but will also deprive
him of his investment and business. See Lee, 397 S.W.2d at 925 (suit to enjoin planned
race track involved the “conflicting rights of two lawful owners”). Brown would
certainly suffer some harm as a result of the injunction.
As for harm to the public, Brown presents three primary reasons explaining why
the public benefits from the track’s existence. First, he suggests that the track provides a
family atmosphere and influences young racers. Triolo points to Brown’s testimony at a
hearing on his motion for new trial, wherein he expressed his intent to acquire a beer
license. However, Brown testified at trial that patrons may bring alcohol to the track in
a certain size cooler. That alcohol may be served, as opposed to being brought in by
patrons, does not automatically convert the track into a non-family atmosphere. Nor
does it negate other benefits provided by the track. Second, racers have participated in
raising money for charitable causes. Triolo argues that individual racers, not Brown,
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 11
raise money for charitable causes. Yet, the record contains testimony that the track
aided, to some extent, the racers’ participation in charitable events.
Third, the track promotes businesses and attracts racers from both the
community and out of town.2 Triolo maintains that the track is not a public necessity
and Brown’s evidence of economic value is not comparable to that in Lee, neither
providing an estimate of economic impact nor testimony from business owners
“attributing an economic impact to the track.”
Lee sued to enjoin a planned race track and drag strip on Bowles’s property. See
Lee, 397 S.W.2d at 924. An interstate highway, an air force base, and a few residences
were located in the area. Id. at 924-25. Experts testified that noise from the track would
“double the average noise level created by the highway traffic.” Id. at 925. Sounds from
airplane jets might be louder at times, but were “infrequent and of short duration.” Id.
“[O]rdinary conversation could not be accomplished on [Lee’s] patio during the races at
a greater distance than one to four feet, and [] sleep would be difficult.” Id. “[T]raffic
conditions would be very congested.” Id. Race cars were not equipped with mufflers.
See id. Bowles testified that the season lasts five months, the track would operate
primarily on Saturday nights, and races would end by 10:00 p.m. Id. at 926.
Several witnesses, including three state representatives, the Sheriff, a hotel
manager, and a professional sports writer, testified that the track would benefit the
community. Id. The record showed that “automobile racing is the second most popular
2 Brown also notes that, at the temporary injunction hearing, the trial court expressed “no doubt
that there is some benefit to this track existing.”
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 12
sport in the United States from the standpoint of number of paid spectators, and is
gaining in popularity; that this track would help the economy of the area and stimulate
tourist trade; [and] that there were sufficient people in Bexar County interested in this
sport to support a race track.” Id. Several residents testified that the track would
“stimulate growth in their area.” Id.
The jury found that the track would “substantially interfere with the reasonable
use of [Lee’s] property…” Id. at 924. At a separate hearing, the trial court found that
the “contemplated use of [Bowles’s] property without a drag strip would be a
nuisance,” but “the equities were in favor of [Bowles] and the community.” Id. The
trial court permanently enjoined Bowles from “establishing, operating and maintaining
a drag strip upon [his] property,” but denied injunctive relief against the proposed
track. Id. The San Antonio Court affirmed the judgment. See id. at 927.
Although the evidence of economic impact in this case may not be as compelling
as that in Lee, the record does contain some evidence that the track has economic value.
Triolo does not point to any place in the record showing otherwise. Additionally, the
record shows that the track provides recreational benefits to the community, such as the
driving school, opportunities for children to participate in the racing experience,
recreation for families, improvement of the lives of young racers, and promotion of
groups like the Mini-Sprint Association. We cannot say that an injunction closing the
track would not cause some harm to the public. See id. at 926-27 (rejecting argument
that balancing test did not apply because Bowles had not shown a public necessity: the
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 13
evidence supported a finding that the public generally would benefit from the track,
“both from a standpoint of recreational value and as an economic asset”).
Brown next contends that the harm to Triolo is slight in comparison to the harm
that he and the public will suffer if the track is closed, arguing that: (1) the track’s
operation will not destroy Triolo’s home; (2) the noise is not constant, as races take
place a few months each year, once a week, and last no more than six hours; (3) the
record contains no evidence that Triolo’s health was affected; (4) Triolo reaped a
substantial profit from selling property located near the track; and (5) the jury’s award
of only $3,000 to Triolo for loss and enjoyment that occurred over a two-year period, as
well as the disparity between the $10,000 supersedeas bond for Triolo and the $100,000
bond for Brown, demonstrates that the harm to Triolo is insignificant.
In McAfee, the Fort Worth Court considered the harm stemming from a
motocross course located on McAfee’s property. See McAfee, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 968,
at *2. The course consisted of two tracks and ran four days a week from 9:00 a.m. or
noon until dusk. Id. at *1. The noise sounded like “thirty chainsaws” and a “bunch of
jack hammers,” caused difficulty having a conversation outside, “prohibited
entertaining and reading outside,” prevented outdoor sports, spooked horses, forced
one neighbor to tranquilize his horse in order to shoe the horse, prevented “outdoor
picnic[s] ‘because you couldn’t speak to each other,’” “prevented [one neighbor’s]
grandchildren from fishing and playing outside,” and caused one business owner to
have difficulty working. Id. at *4-5. The noise was “so loud that on four days each
week appellees effectively could not use the land outside of their homes.” Id. at *9-10.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 14
Engineer Mike Fann testified that the types of engines used at the course would
“harm the community when the noise systemically exceeded fifty-five decibels.” Id. at
*5. Fann concluded that “twenty or more motorcycles a day on the tracks would exceed
the eighty-five decibel benchmark [identified by section 42.01 of the Penal Code] ‘on a
regular basis,’ and one of the loudest bikes would surpass eighty-five decibels even at a
distance of 1422 feet.” Id.
The trial court granted a permanent injunction. See id. at *1. On appeal, McAfee
raised several issues, including whether the evidence was legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s balancing of the equities. Id. at *7. After finding
that appellees presented evidence that the course “substantially interfered with their
use and enjoyment of their land by causing unreasonable discomfort and annoyance,”
the Fort Worth Court held that “the trial court could have concluded that a permanent
injunction would cause only slight injury to McAfee and the public or that such injury
would be disproportionate to appellees’ injuries because of the nuisance.” Id. at *7-8.
Here, the evidence similarly demonstrates that the track substantially interferes
with Triolo’s use and enjoyment of his property, even if it does not show either physical
harm to Triolo or destruction of Triolo’s home. Triolo and other witnesses testified that
the noise has been so loud as to drive them from their homes and cause them to
contemplate moving in the event the track remains open. See Storey, 226 S.W.2d at 618
(“the law does not allow one to be driven from his home or compelled to live in
substantial danger or discomfort even though the danger or discomfort is caused by a
lawful and useful business”). That the track may not always be in operation does not
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 15
reduce the harm to Triolo, as witnesses testified that the noise was constant whenever
the track was operating. See McAfee, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 968, at *9-10 (motocross
course was “so loud that on four days each week appellees effectively could not use the
land outside of their homes”). Nor does Triolo’s profit from the sale of property located
near the track negate the interference caused by the noise from the track. Triolo
testified that he could have charged approximately $3,000 to $5,000 more per lot if not
for the track. Brown did not present evidence controverting this testimony.
Nor are we persuaded that the amount of the jury’s damages award
demonstrates that the harm to Triolo is slight. The record simply does not disclose the
jury’s rationale for the specific amount awarded and we will not so speculate.
As for the bond amounts, Brown testified at the bond hearing that eighteen
months of no racing would cost him $718,810, an amount based on projected income
from the driving school, renting out the track, attendance, advertisements on t-shirts
and fliers, beer and concession sales, registration fees, and the sale of billboards. Brown
testified that the track had begun making a profit on the last three nights before it was
closed. However, the trial court did not have the benefit of this information at the time
the permanent injunction was imposed. The only such information available to the trial
court at that time came from Brown’s trial testimony that he had not yet profited from
the track, but had lost an unspecified amount of money.
In summary, the trial court heard evidence that the track seriously interferes with
Triolo’s use and enjoyment of his property. See Storey, 226 S.W.2d at 617 (“a lawful
business may become a nuisance in fact when it is operated in such a place or manner
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 16
as seriously to interfere with the enjoyment of life and property”). The trial court could
have concluded that a permanent injunction would cause only slight injury to Brown
and the public or that such injury would be disproportionate to Triolo’s injuries because
of the nuisance. See McAfee, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 968, at *8.
Brown next argues that: (1) Triolo was not entitled to injunctive relief merely
because it is the sole form of relief requested; and (2) damages would have been an
adequate remedy, but Triolo did not request such damages. However, the trial court
has discretion to award injunctive relief where the evidence demonstrates that a
nuisance is of a “recurring nature.” Holubec v. Brandenberger, 214 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); see Lamb v. Kinslow, 256 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Waco 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (Where a nuisance is of a “recurring nature,” an injunction
“will lie irrespective of [a] legal remedy at law”). In such circumstances, monetary
damages are not always adequate because “damages could be recovered only as of the
time of the bringing of the action, and a multiplicity of suits would be necessary.”
Holubec, 214 S.W.3d at 656 (citing Ellen v. Bryan, 410 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Waco 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
Although Brown plans to self-impose the time and noise guidelines outlined by
the temporary injunction, he does not intend to stop holding races. He plans to add
more stands and wants to run the most popular cars, i.e. sprint cars, if the noise can be
managed. He testified that the car count will increase. Before suit, he had planned to
conduct some two-day shows and he feels capable of doing so.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 17
Triolo and others testified that the noise from the track is constant during its
times of operation. Watkins testified that, despite the temporary injunction, the track is
still “quite noisy,” forcing her to leave home. Boegner testified that the noise initially
seemed under control, but became just as loud. She cannot have a conversation,
entertain guests, sit on the porch, or allow the children to catch fireflies outside. She
admitted that the noise is not as loud and has been reduced “somewhat.” Luedke
testified that he still hears noise from the track on Saturday nights, as well as some
Sunday and Tuesday nights. Denman, Dockery, Bomnskie, and Crenshaw all testified
that the noise level has been reduced.
Shortly before trial, Triolo filed a motion for contempt alleging several violations
of the temporary injunction: (1) Deputy Banks was dispatched to the Triolo and
Boegner homes where he measured the noise and received three readings of 87, 92, and
89 decibels outside the Boegner home, 87 outside the Triolo home, and 65 inside the
Triolo home; (2) Deputy Emig received a reading of 89 to 90 decibels at the home of a
complainant who could not hear his television over the noise; (3) Deputy Bachman
received several complaints, after which he measured the noise levels, which registered
in the low eighties and low sixties; and (4) Cooper’s two tests revealed readings over 80
decibels. Brown has received one citation since the temporary injunction, but claimed
that the citation was issued on the first night of races after the injunction and that the
problem was corrected. However, Cooper’s testimony shed some doubt as to the ability
of Brown’s sound-reduction measures to sufficiently reduce the noise.
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 18
In light of the evidence, the trial court could have concluded that the track would
continue to constitute a nuisance and that only injunctive relief would afford Triolo
complete relief and prevent the nuisance from recurring. See Holubec, 214 S.W.3d at 656.
Conclusion
Because Triolo presented evidence that the track interferes with the use and
enjoyment of his property and because that harm is not slight in comparison to the
harm to Brown and the public, the trial court properly balanced the equities and did not
abuse its discretion by granting a permanent injunction. See Storey, 226 S.W.2d at 619;
see also McAfee, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 968, at *7-10. We overrule Brown’s first issue.
RESTRICTIVENESS OF INJUNCTION
In his second issue, Brown contends that the permanent injunction is more
restrictive and comprehensive than justified by the evidence and usages of equity.
Triolo argues that Brown failed to preserve this issue for appeal. We agree.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the appellant must show that the
complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1. In his motion for new trial, Brown raised issues addressing newly
discovered evidence and the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury’s findings, but he did not challenge the scope of the permanent injunction. See id.;
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 321 (motion for new trial must “briefly refer to that part of the
ruling of the court…or other proceedings which are designated to be complained of, in
such a way that the objection can be clearly identified and understood by the court”).
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 19
In his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to disregard jury
findings, Brown argued that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish nuisance,
the evidence conclusively proves that the benefit of issuing the injunction outweighs the
harm to Brown and the public, any alleged damages were temporary and/or abated,
and the jury’s findings are not supported by the evidence. He did not challenge the
scope of the permanent injunction in this motion either. See Chappell Hill Bank v. Lane
Bank Equip. Co., 38 S.W.3d 237, 248 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied)
(“[B]ecause the Motion for Judgment N.O.V. did not request the court to grant the
motion for the reasons advanced in this issue on appeal, it did not preserve for appeal
this claimed trial court error”). Nor did Brown file a motion to modify the injunction.
Accordingly, he has failed to preserve his second issue for appellate review. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FELIPE REYNA
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Chief Justice Gray concurring with a note)*
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed December 3, 2008
[CV06]
* (Note by Chief Justice Gray: “Chief Justice Gray concurs only in the judgment of
the Court to the extent that it affirms the trial court’s injunction. A separate opinion
will not issue. He notes, however, that the Court erroneously states that “the trial court
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 20
properly balanced the equities and did not abuse its discretion by granting a permanent
injunction.” (Emphasis added). In our review we do not determine whether the trial
court properly balanced the equities. Our review is limited to whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Further, I can only hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by granting the permanent injunction. If the scope of the issue presented on
appeal could properly include the scope of the injunction, I would conclude that the
trial court’s injunction was overbroad. The appellant failed to preserve the issue of the
scope of the injunction and therefore the scope of the injunction is not properly before
us for resolution.”)
Hot Rod Hill Motor Park v. Triolo Page 21