Israel Williams, Jr. v. State ( 2004 )

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

Israel Williams, Jr.

            Appellant

Vs.                  No. 11-03-00154-CR -- Appeal from Dallas County

State of Texas

            Appellee

            The trial court convicted Israel Williams, Jr., upon his plea of guilty, of sexual assault. A plea bargain agreement was not reached. Appellant also entered a plea of true to the enhancement allegation. The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for life. We affirm.

Background Facts

            Appellant was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child. He pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of sexual assault. He gave a judicial confession and entered a plea of true to the allegation that he was convicted in 1991 of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.

            At the punishment phase, the victim testified that she was 16 years old at the time of the offense. She knew appellant by his street name, “Old School.” At 4:00 p.m. as she was walking to her sister’s friend’s house, appellant stopped her. She got into his car, and he took her to his house. Inside, appellant pulled a gun and forced her to have sexual intercourse.

            Appellant testified at the punishment phase that he did have sex with the victim but that he thought she was 18 years old because someone had told him she worked in a club. He stated that the victim consented and that he not only paid her $20 but also gave her some cocaine. Appellant further testified that he was 53 years old, that he “ain’t never had no problems with no girls,” and that he did not “mess with kids.” On cross-examination, appellant testified that he had an 11-year-old daughter and that, “[i]f she went on her own and if the guy did not know,” appellant “wouldn’t want him to go to prison, you know, because he made a mistake and he was duped.”

            Appellant admitted that he had been confined in a state prison for 19 years for murder, that he had a prior federal conviction for robbery, and that he had been in a state prison for a drug conviction. At the time of the offense, appellant stated that he was using cocaine and alcohol every day and that his home was a “bootleg house” for beer, wine, cigarettes, candy, and “stuff.”

Issue on Appeal

            Appellant was indicted by the 363rd District Court and tried, convicted, and sentenced by Criminal District Court No. 4. In his sole ground of error, appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, appellant argues that trial counsel’s representation fell far below any objective standard of reasonableness because a formal transfer order moving his case from the 363rd District Court to Criminal District No. 4 was not entered.

The Appellate Record Before This Court

            The clerk’s record does not contain a formal transfer order, and the reporter’s record makes no mention of a transfer. However, a supplemental clerk’s record has been filed in this court, and it contains the district clerk’s record of the the 363rd District Court’s order transferring this case and Criminal District Court No. 4’s order of receiving.

Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel

            TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.303(a) (Vernon 1988) provides that, in any county where there are two or more district courts, one of the trial court’s may exercise its discretion and transfer one of its cases to another district court. We note that the record reflects that a transfer order was entered and does not reflect that the trial court abused its discretion by transferring the case. Therefore, trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective as alleged in appellant’s brief. Moreover, we note that, after reviewing the entire record before us, trial counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1999). The record does not reflect that counsel’s representation was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases or that there is a reasonable probablity that, but for any error on counsel’s part, appellant would have insisted on going to trial and would not have pleaded guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. den’d, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). The ground of error is overruled.

This Court’s Ruling

            The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                    PER CURIAM

February 5, 2004

Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.