Donald Wayne Cope v. State ( 2005 )

                     NO. 12-04-00360-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

  TYLER, TEXAS

  DONALD WAYNE COPE,                                §     APPEAL FROM THE 173RD

APPELLANT

V.                                                                         §     JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                  §     HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLEE

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  MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Donald Wayne Cope appeals his conviction for murder. After finding him guilty, the jury assessed a sixty-year sentence. In a single issue, Appellant contends the State impermissibly commented on his post-arrest silence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Post-arrest Silence

            Appellant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by overruling his objection when the State commented on Appellant’s post-arrest silence. He complains that, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked him if he told the officers at the scene that the victim was attempting to get a shotgun out of his car. Appellant argues that, even if an exculpatory story is totally implausible, when a prosecutor, in an attempt to impeach a defendant, links the implausibility of a defendant’s exculpatory story to his seemingly inconsistent post-arrest silence, the error is reversible.

Applicable Law

            As a general rule, when a defendant voluntarily takes the stand before the jury, he is subject to the same rules as any other witness in that he may be impeached, contradicted, and cross-examined as to new matters, and treated in every respect as any other witness testifying in his behalf, except when there are overriding constitutional or statutory prohibitions. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-38, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2127-29, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980). Generally, the government may not impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story at the time of his arrest. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2241, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). When the State seeks to impugn the explanation of the defendant offered at trial by showing that the defendant failed to advance his position at the time of the arrest, the State is essentially impeaching the defendant through the use of prior inconsistent conduct. Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An arrestee is not expected to speak out while under arrest, and the fact that he does not do so should not be used against him as evidence of prior inconsistent conduct. Id. at 581. Merely having the opportunity to say something does not constitute a circumstance in which one would be expected to speak out. Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 848 (Tex. Crim. App.1979) (op. on reh’g). However, a defendant may be cross-examined about his post-arrest silence if it is first established that he made a post-arrest inconsistent statement. See Turner v. State, 719 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Sanchez, 707 S.W.2d at 582.

Discussion

            Appellant complains of the following colloquy:

[Prosecutor]:Okay. Why did you put the gun in the back of your pickup if the victim is laying over there by a .20 gauge shotgun in a car?

[Appellant]:Well, I was behind that pickup and I could still get to the gun, but I figured that the police would want that gun sooner or later and I knew where I’d put it.

[Prosecutor]:Did you tell the police when they arrived on the scene that there was a .20 gauge shotgun that belongs to the Defendant [sic] in the car?

[Appellant]:I really don’t know if I did or not.

[Prosecutor]:Do you think they would have put it in the report if you would have?

[Appellant]:Probably, yes.

[Prosecutor]:Do you think they would have tried to get it?

[Appellant]:I’m sure they would. They got mine.

[Prosecutor]:That’s really important Tower [sic] defense that the Defendant [sic] has a .20 gauge shotgun ten feet away?

[Counsel]:You Honor, I’m going to object to being argumentative.

The Court:Overruled.

[Counsel]:That’s indirectly whether it’s important to our defense or not.

The Court:Overruled. Follow it up with a question, not a statement.

[Prosecutor]:You didn’t tell the officers on the scene –

[Appellant]:I don’t remember telling the officer about the gun, and I didn’t see – he didn’t get the gun, he fell before he got the door open.

[Counsel]:Judge, I object to the line of questioning. I think it is clear from the video that he invoked his right to remain silent and and [sic] he had a right to remain silent and not make any statement, therefore any statement that he makes cannot be used against him.

The Court:I think this is called cross-examination. Overruled.

[Prosecutor]:So is it your testimony you did or did not tell the officers, or you don’t recall?

[Appellant] I did not tell him.

[Prosecutor]:You did not tell them?

[Appellant]:No.

            The State argues that Appellant gave up his right to remain silent and made statements to police and neighbors regarding his thoughts and actions on the day of the shooting. The State placed into evidence a videotape made at the scene. It shows Appellant and various officers standing by the squad car that contains the camera. The audio portion is of very poor quality. However, it is clear that although Appellant told the officers that he did not want to make a statement, he spoke about the victim and the incident while waiting to be taken to jail. Appellant talked to the neighbors across the street and to the officer standing next to him. He acknowledged that he was going to jail. He said he did not do anything wrong whatsoever. Appellant pointed out the woman whom the victim had recently beaten. He explained that the victim was going to jump on him and Appellant shot him. He said the victim had previously threatened to burn Appellant’s house and had knocked the air conditioner out of the window of his house the day before this incident because the victim wanted to pawn it. Appellant said he was just trying to protect his house and he did not do anything wrong because he was protecting himself. He was nonchalant and chuckled at times on the video.

            We disagree that the State was commenting on Appellant’s post-arrest silence. Appellant did not make a formal statement to police, but he did not remain silent. He made numerous comments to anyone near enough to hear. He indicated that there was ongoing friction between him and the victim. While he stated that he had to protect himself from the victim, with whom he had been friends, his general attitude was one of being fed up with the victim’s behavior. Appellant said nothing at the scene about believing the victim was trying to get a gun out of a car. At trial, Appellant explained that he thought the victim was going to get a sawed-off .20 gauge shotgun out of a car. Appellant wanted to make sure the victim did not get the gun and intended to shoot the victim again if he was going for the shotgun.

            Shooting someone for being a nuisance and potential threat is inconsistent with shooting him because he is attempting to retrieve a gun to shoot Appellant at that moment. Thus, Appellant’s trial testimony conflicted with his prior statements. The State was authorized to use this conflict to impeach Appellant. See Turner, 719 S.W.2d at 193; Sanchez, 707 S.W.2d at 582. The State was not referring to Appellant’s post-arrest silence but to his conflicting stories. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

Disposition

            We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                                     JAMES T. WORTHEN

                                                                                                                 Chief Justice

Opinion delivered October 31, 2005.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)