Tamishea Lanette Williams ( 2006 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 7, 2006

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 7, 2006.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-05-00673-CR

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EX PARTE TAMISHEA LANETTE WILLIAMS

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1006218

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant, Tamishea Lanette Williams, appeals from the denial of an application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that collateral estoppel prohibits her prosecution for capital murder.  We affirm.

Appellant is charged with murdering the complainant, Amin Fields, while in the course of committing a robbery.  Shortly after the complainant was killed, $4999 in cash was found in a hotel room rented by appellant.  The State filed a forfeiture action requesting forfeiture of the $4999 because the money was contraband as defined by article 59.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The notice of seizure and intended forfeiture alleged appellant was the Aowner and possessor@ of the money.  A notice of seizure attached to the notice of intended forfeiture stated the money fell under the definition of contraband because it was Amade buying and selling drugs.@  Appellant did not contest the forfeiture.

After appellant was indicted for the capital murder of the complainant, she filed an application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus in the trial court alleging the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited her prosecution for capital murder.  Appellant alleged that, in the forfeiture action, the State obtained a judicial determination that appellant was the owner of the money; therefore, the State cannot prosecute appellant for attempting to steal the money during the murder of while killing the complainant. 

The trial court denied appellant=s application and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined the parties in the civil forfeiture action were the same as the parties in the capital murder case. The court further found there was no testimonial record or findings of fact or conclusions of law entered by the trial court in the forfeiture action to assist the court in determining what facts were determined adversely to the State by the civil forfeiture.  Other than a finding that approximately $4999 was contraband, the trial court in the forfeiture case made no finding as to the owner of the money.  The trial court concluded appellant failed to prove that the matter to be re-litigated dictated the previous resolution in the civil forfeiture proceeding. Therefore, the trial court found collateral estoppel did not prevent the State from alleging that $4999 was stolen from the complainant during the course of a robbery that resulted in his death.

Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel is the principle that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties.  Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970).  In reviewing a collateral estoppel claim, we must examine the record of the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matters, to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have grounded its decision on a fact other than the specific fact the party now claims has been resolved in her favor.  Guajardo v. State, 109 S.W.3d 456, 459B60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate, by examination of the record in the first proceeding, that the factual issue she seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.  Id. at 460.

In reviewing a trial court=s decision to grant or deny relief on a writ of habeas corpus, we afford almost total deference to the trial court=s determination of the historical facts supported by the record, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.  See Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  If the trial court=s findings, however, are not supported by the record, we may reject its findings.  Id.

In this case, the record reflects that the Houston Police Department detective investigating the death of the complainant determined that the complainant and another person went to appellant=s hotel room for the purpose of purchasing controlled substances.  The complainant brought $4999 to the hotel room for this purpose.  The money was seized as contraband and was described in the forfeiture pleadings as having been used to buy and sell drugs.  The assistant district attorney who filed the forfeiture proceeding testified that the issue of who owned the money was not litigated in the forfeiture proceeding.  Appellant testified that she did not contest the forfeiture proceeding because the allegations in the pleadings were true.

Collateral estoppel precludes a subsequent prosecution only if the matter to be re-litigated dictated the previous resolution, and the fact-finder could not have rationally have based its decision on anan issues other than the issue the defendant seeks to foreclose.  State v. Nash, 817 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 1991, pet. ref=d).  The mere possibility that a fact may have been determined in a former trial or proceeding is insufficient to bar re-litigation of the same fact in a subsequent proceeding.  Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  In this case, the trial court specifically found the issue of whether appellant owned the money did not dictate the resolution in the forfeiture proceeding.  Further, the court found the fact-finder in the forfeiture proceeding could have rationally have based its decision on forfeiture without determining who owned the money.  The testimonial record and the pleadings in this case support the trial court=s finding.  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant=s application for writ of habeas corpus.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/      John S. Anderson

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed February 7, 2006.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Yates and Anderson. (Yates, J. concurs in results only).

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).