Vincent Alonzo Corson v. State ( 2015 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-15-00054-CR
NO. 03-15-00055-CR
NO. 03-15-00056-CR
NO. 03-15-00057-CR
Vincent Alonzo Corson, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 426TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NOS. 71403, 72778, 72779 & 72780, HONORABLE FANCY H. JEZEK, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
These are appeals pursuant to Anders v. California.1 In trial court cause number
71403, appellant Vincent Alonzo Corson pleaded guilty to the state-jail-felony offense of abandoning
or endangering a child with intent to return.2 At the plea hearing, the district court found the
evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt but withheld that finding and placed Corson on
deferred-adjudication community supervision for a period of two years.
Subsequently, the State filed a motion to adjudicate, alleging that Corson had violated
the terms and conditions of his community supervision by committing three subsequent criminal
offenses for which he was separately charged: (1) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
1
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2
See Tex. Penal Code § 22.041(b), (d)(1).
(trial court cause number 72778); (2) aggravated kidnapping (trial court cause number 72779); and
(3) burglary of a habitation (trial court cause number 72780). At a consolidated plea hearing, Corson
pleaded true to the State’s allegations in the motion to adjudicate and guilty to each of the charged
offenses. The district court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding that Corson had
violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision as alleged and had committed
the subsequent offenses as charged. The district court withheld its findings, ordered a presentence
investigation report, and reset the cases for sentencing.
Prior to sentencing, Corson filed a motion to withdraw his pleas, asserting that he was
“insane” at the time he entered them. Following a hearing, at which Corson presented no evidence
of any such insanity, the district court denied the motion and proceeded to sentencing.
At the hearing on sentencing, the district court heard evidence pertaining to the
charged offenses. Regarding the child-abandonment offense, Corson’s ex-wife, Janeka Wiggins,
testified that on one occasion, Corson had left their two children—who were one and two years old
at the time of the offense—unattended, and one of the children was found by authorities in the
middle of a road. Regarding the other offenses, Wiggins testified that, after she and Corson had
separated, Corson came to her home one night (in violation of a protective order that Wiggins had
obtained against him), shot the front door open, and proceeded to shoot Wiggins multiple times in
her leg, stomach, hip, and arms while she was holding one of their children. Then, Wiggins recalled,
after she was no longer able to hold the child in her arms and had to place him on the floor, Corson
took the child and fled.
Corson testified in his defense. He admitted that he had gone to Wiggins’s residence
on the night in question “with the intent to force her to drop the protective order.” However, he
2
claimed that “[w]hat happened was not my intention.” Corson added, “I cannot recall the incident
planning out [sic] the way she says it was played out, but I do not disagree with it.” Corson
explained, “I remember shooting through the door once. And then stepping into the—pushing into
the apartment and then seeing her standing there, and my son standing on the floor beside her crying.
And then commencing to shoot[] her four more times.” However, according to Corson, “I didn’t
go there to shoot her. I didn’t go there to hurt her. Just something clicked. And it just—it just
happened.” Later, on cross-examination, Corson also admitted to taking the child and attempting
to flee to Florida, although he claimed that this was not kidnapping because the child was his son.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found the allegations in the State’s
motion to adjudicate true and adjudicated Corson guilty of committing the original offense of child
abandonment. The district court also found Corson guilty of committing each of the subsequent
offenses. The district court sentenced Corson to two years in state jail for the child-abandonment
offense, twenty years’ imprisonment for the aggravated-assault offense, forty years’ imprisonment
for the burglary offense, and forty years’ imprisonment for the aggravated-kidnapping offense, with
the sentences to run concurrently. These appeals followed.
In each cause, Corson’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
supported by a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced.3 Counsel has certified to the Court
3
See 386 U.S. at 744-45; see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State,
573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);
Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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that she has provided copies of the motion and brief to Corson, advised Corson of his right to
examine the appellate record and file a pro se response, and supplied Corson with a form motion for
pro se access to the appellate record.4 No pro se brief or other written response has been filed,
including a motion for access to the appellate record.
We have independently reviewed the record and have found nothing that might
arguably support the appeals.5 We agree with counsel that the appeals are frivolous. In each cause,
we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. We affirm the judgment adjudicating guilt in trial court
cause number 71403 and the judgments of conviction in trial court cause numbers 72778, 72779, and
72780.
__________________________________________
Bob Pemberton, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland
Affirmed
Filed: May 29, 2015
Do Not Publish
4
See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
5
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
4