Leroy Stroman v. Roxann Martinez ( 2015 )


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  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 5, 2015.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-13-01143-CV
    LEROY STROMAN, Appellant
    V.
    ROXANN MARTINEZ, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 & Probate Court
    Brazoria County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CI49950
    MEMORANDUM                      OPINION
    In this appeal from a forcible detainer action, appellant Leroy Stroman
    appeals the justice court’s award of possession of a property adjoining Stroman’s
    residence to appellee Roxann Martinez. Stroman contends that the justice court
    lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and that Martinez could not maintain a forcible
    detainer action against him. We affirm.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    This case involves real property located at 109 Sweeney Avenue in West
    Columbia, Texas (the Property). Stroman and Judy Danford originally purchased
    the Property in 1996 from Jennifer Hester, Julie Hester, and the estate of Johnnie
    Bob Hester. Stroman executed a promissory note in favor of the Hesters, which
    was secured by a deed of trust.
    After Stroman defaulted on the note, the Property was deeded back to the
    Hesters in 1997. Sometime later, the Hesters conveyed the Property to John and
    Wanda Trevino. The Trevinos resided on the Property until September 2006, when
    a fire destroyed their home. The home was demolished by the City of West
    Columbia and the lot was cleared. Stroman, who resided at the adjoining property
    at 105 Sweeney Avenue, began to use the Property as his own, moving a shed onto
    the Property and storing lawn equipment and other items there.
    In March 2010, Brazoria County, along with other taxing authorities, filed a
    suit for delinquent taxes on the Property, apparently naming the Trevinos, the
    Hesters, and Stroman as owners of the Property. 1 On October 2, 2012, the Property
    was sold at a sheriff’s sale to Martinez.
    Martinez filed her eviction action in the justice court after making a written
    demand to Stroman for possession. The justice court entered a judgment in
    Martinez’s favor. Stroman appealed the judgment to the county court, where a
    bench trial was held. On October 31, 2013, the county court entered a final
    judgment awarding possession to Martinez. Stroman filed a motion for rehearing,
    which the county court denied. This appeal followed.
    1
    Stroman alleges, without reference to evidence, that he was sued as an owner in the tax
    suit. Although Stroman testified below that he was named as an owner, the tax suit is not a part
    of our record.
    2
    ANALYSIS OF STROMAN’S ISSUES
    In his first issue, Stroman contends that the justice court and the county
    court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Stroman had filed a trespass to
    try title case in the district court. In his second issue, Stroman contends that
    Martinez could not maintain a forcible detainer action against him because
    Stroman was never Martinez’s tenant.
    I.     Jurisdiction over the Forcible Detainer Action
    Stroman first asserts that the justice court lacked jurisdiction to hear
    Martinez’s forcible detainer suit because the case involves title to the Property.
    Because title was at issue, Stroman argues, the trial court should have dismissed
    the forcible detainer suit. Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
    question of law we review de novo. Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 
    264 S.W.3d 431
    , 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
    Jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice
    court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to the county
    court at law for trial de novo. Rice v. Pinney, 
    51 S.W.3d 705
    , 708 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 2001, no pet.); see Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004. The appellate jurisdiction of
    the county court at law is confined to the jurisdictional limits of the justice
    court. 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708
    ; Goggins v. Leo, 
    849 S.W.2d 373
    , 375 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
    Although a justice court has jurisdiction over forcible detainers, the justice
    court, and the county court at law on appeal, lack jurisdiction to resolve title
    disputes. Black v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 
    318 S.W.3d 414
    , 417 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). The only issue in an action for forcible
    detainer is the right to actual and immediate possession; the merits of title are not
    3
    adjudicated. 
    Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 435
    . To prevail in a forcible detainer action,
    a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient
    evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate
    possession. 
    Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417
    ; 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709
    ; 
    Goggins, 849 S.W.2d at 377
    ; see Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002.
    At trial, Martinez presented undisputed evidence that she purchased the
    Property at a tax sale in October 2012 and obtained a Sheriff’s Deed, which was
    recorded in the county records on October 19, 2012. Martinez also presented
    undisputed evidence that she gave Stroman notice to vacate, but he refused.
    Documentary evidence showed that Stroman had not been the record owner of the
    Property since 1997.
    Stroman claims, however, that title was placed in issue because he informed
    the trial court that he had filed a trespass to try title suit, he had once possessed the
    Property, and the county’s tax suit named him as an owner. Stroman also believed
    the Property was his homestead because it was contiguous to his land and he used
    it as one continuous property. Martinez also acknowledged that Stroman had a
    building, tools, and equipment on the Property. However, Stroman did not make
    the pleadings in his trespass to try title suit an exhibit and they are not in the record
    for our review. Moreover, on appeal, Stroman does not argue or cite to any
    authorities to support the viability of his title theories.
    To the extent Stroman is arguing that merely filing a trespass to try title suit
    or raising the issue of property ownership is sufficient to divest the justice and
    county courts of jurisdiction in an eviction suit, we disagree. See 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709
    –710 (rejecting argument that issues of title and possession are necessarily
    inseparable and require that title issue be resolved first). A justice court is deprived
    of jurisdiction only if resolution of the title dispute is a prerequisite to determining
    4
    the right to immediate possession. See 
    Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417
    ; Salaymeh, 264 S
    .W.3d at 435–36; 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 713
    . In other words, “it is only when the
    justice or county court must determine title issues that it is without jurisdiction to
    adjudicate a forcible detainer case.” 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 713
    ; see Haith v. Drake,
    
    596 S.W.2d 194
    , 196 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
    (a justice or county court is deprived of jurisdiction only if “the right to immediate
    possession necessarily requires the resolution of a title dispute”).
    Moreover, the cases Stroman cites as support for his position involved title
    disputes that necessarily required resolution before either party’s superior right to
    immediate possession could be determined. For example, in Saihat Corp. v. Miller,
    Saihat acquired a property that was sold at a constable’s sale to satisfy a judgment
    Miller had obtained against Edwards, who was living in the house on the property.
    See No. 01-11-00119-CV, 
    2013 WL 4634814
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Saihat later learned that Edwards
    claimed the property was his homestead, which would have voided the sale. See 
    id. at *3.
    Saihat filed suit in the county court at law to set aside the sale and also filed
    a forcible detainer suit in the justice court, which was appealed to a different
    county court at law. 
    Id. at *1.
    Saihat appealed from adverse decisions in both cases
    and the two suits were consolidated for appeal. 
    Id. The court
    dismissed Saihat’s
    appeal of the forcible detainer action, holding that the lower courts lacked
    jurisdiction because neither could have determined whether Saihat had a superior
    right to possession based on the deed it acquired at the constable’s sale without
    first determining whether the constable’s sale was void. 
    Id. at *6–7.
    In Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., Armstrong Capital acquired
    Mitchell’s property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale based on Mitchell’s alleged
    default on a builder’s and mechanic’s lien contract. See 
    911 S.W.2d 169
    , 170 (Tex.
    5
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). On appeal from Armstrong
    Capital’s eviction action, the court held that Mitchell raised a title issue that
    deprived the court of jurisdiction because she asserted that non-judicial foreclosure
    was an improper means of foreclosing on a mechanic’s and materialmen’s lien, and
    she specifically gave notice that litigation to set aside the sale was pending in a
    particular district court. 
    Id. at 171.
    In Yarto v. Gilliland, on which Stroman also
    relies, the court reviewed several cases, including Mitchell, and determined that a
    party claiming the existence of a title issue must at least “assert[] a basis for title
    ownership that is not patently ineffective under the law and [that] is intertwined
    with the issue of immediate possession.” See 
    287 S.W.3d 83
    , 92–93 (Tex. App.—
    Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.).
    Here, Stroman has not challenged the validity of either the tax sale or
    Martinez’s deed. Instead, Stroman alleged at trial that he had a statutory right to
    redeem the property. See Tex. Tax Code § 34.21(a) (providing that an owner of
    real property sold at a tax sale may redeem the property by paying the purchase
    price at the tax sale plus a premium and additional costs). However, Stroman
    presented no evidence that he had, in fact, redeemed the Property or obtained a
    deed. Stroman also testified that he believed he owned the property because he had
    paid back taxes on the Property at some point after the Trevinos’ house burned.
    But Stroman provided no documentation to support his claim, explaining that he
    lost much of his paperwork when his home flooded.2 He also admitted that he did
    not receive a deed from the county at that time. On appeal, Stroman does not make
    any argument that an unexercised, purported right to redeem or a payment of back
    2
    Additionally, the record transferred from the justice court includes a screenshot of
    Brazoria County tax office payment information on the Property, which does not show that
    Stroman ever paid any taxes on the Property. Stroman’s original answer in justice court also
    alleges that Stroman “has attempted or by the time of the hearing in this cause, will have paid the
    funds due . . . .” (handwritten interlineation emphasized).
    6
    taxes alone raises an issue of title that necessarily must be determined before the
    superior right to possession can be determined.
    Stroman further testified that he believed the Property was part of his
    homestead because it adjoined his residence at 105 Sweeney and he had placed a
    shed on the Property where he kept lawn equipment and other personal property.
    He also suggested that he owned the Property because Brazoria County named him
    as an owner in the tax suit. But Stroman makes no argument and provides no
    supporting authorities to explain how these facts provide a legal basis for title
    ownership that must be resolved before either the justice court or the county court
    could have determined which party had the superior right of possession. On these
    facts, Stroman has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine title dispute that
    necessarily had to be resolved before Martinez’s superior right to immediate
    possession could be determined. See 
    Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 713
    ; 
    Haith, 596 S.W.2d at 196
    .
    Because the justice and county courts were not required to resolve a genuine
    issue of title before determining whether Martinez had a superior right to
    immediate possession, we conclude that the courts had jurisdiction to award the
    Property to Martinez. We overrule Stroman’s first issue.
    II.   Martinez’s Standing to Bring a Forcible Detainer Action
    In his second issue, Stroman contends that Martinez could not maintain a
    forcible detainer action against him. Martinez’s form petition for eviction alleged
    that “Defendant has breached the terms of the agreement by holding the leased
    premises after termination of the agreement and written demand by Plaintiff for
    return of same.” Stroman argues that, contrary to Martinez’s petition, he was never
    Martinez’s tenant or a holdover tenant. Therefore, Stroman urges, “the cause of
    action was in all things wrongfully brought” and Martinez “lacked standing to
    7
    bring such a cause of action.” Stroman also argues that Martinez “could not show
    that she met the statutory requirements” to bring either a forcible detainer or a
    forcible entry and detainer action. See 
    Yarto, 287 S.W.3d at 87
    n.3 (explaining that
    forcible detainer and forcible entry and detainer are distinct causes of action that
    are often used interchangeably).
    It is unclear exactly what Stroman is contending, but to the extent he is
    claiming that Martinez lacks standing to bring a forcible detainer action because
    Stroman was not her tenant, proof of a landlord-tenant relationship is an
    evidentiary issue, not a jurisdictional one. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002; Academy
    Corp. v. Sunwest N.O.P., Inc., 
    853 S.W.2d 833
    , 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 1993, writ denied). And as discussed above, it is undisputed that Martinez
    demonstrated that she acquired the Property at a tax sale and gave Stroman notice
    to vacate, but he refused. Therefore, Martinez has standing to bring an eviction suit
    against Stroman. Further, the record contains evidence from which the trial court
    could have determined that Stroman, an “an occupant in naked possession after his
    right to possession has ceased,” was a tenant at sufferance. See 
    Goggins, 849 S.W.2d at 377
    ; Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002(a)(2); see also Jackson v. Mohammed,
    No. 03-10-00763-CV, 
    2013 WL 1955862
    , at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin May 10,
    2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (holding that occupant was a tenant at
    sufferance when the record reflected no evidence of how occupant came to occupy
    the property and there was no evidence of forcible entry or a prior lease).
    Finally, to the extent Stroman alleges a variation between the cause of action
    pleaded and the relief granted, he did not object to Martinez’s pleadings or file
    special exceptions in the court below. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 90 (defects in the form or
    substance of pleadings are waived if not brought to the court’s attention); see also
    8
    Tex. R. Civ. P. 67 (issues not raised in pleadings may be tried by express or
    implied consent). We overrule Stroman’s second issue.
    Conclusion
    We overrule Stroman’s issues and affirm the county court’s judgment.
    /s/       Ken Wise
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices McCally, Brown, and Wise.
    9