Caspian Oil Services, Inc. and James W. Reynolds v. SE Management, LLC ( 2013 )


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  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 29, 2013.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-12-00535-CV
    CASPIAN OIL SERVICES, INC. AND JAMES W. REYNOLDS, Appellants
    V.
    SE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 270th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2010-16599
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In six issues, appellants Caspian Oil Services, Inc. (―COS 1‖) and James W.
    Reynolds contend the trial court erred by rendering judgment in favor of appellee
    SE Management, LLC (―SEM‖). We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    COS 1 was a corporation located in Azerbaijan, a country bordering the
    Caspian Sea. COS 1 leased a yard where oil and gas equipment could be stored
    and provided certain services such as equipment repair. Reynolds was president
    and founder of COS 1. SEM was an American company involved in the oil and
    gas industry with offices in Houston and interested in expanding to Azerbaijan. In
    2005 and early 2006, SEM personnel met with Reynolds in Houston to discuss the
    possibility of SEM purchasing a portion of COS 1.
    On May 3, 2006, SEM and COS 1 entered into a ―Letter of Intent,‖
    commemorating their understanding that SEM was interested in purchasing 75% of
    COS 1‘s shares. In the Letter of Intent, COS 1 agreed to refrain from entertaining
    or negotiating the sale of its shares to another party for a period of 90 days from
    May 3, 2006. The parties agreed SEM would conduct ―a due diligence review‖ of
    COS 1‘s assets, financial statements, and other information. The Letter of Intent
    was signed by Reynolds and Mark Sadykhov, president of SEM, but neither signed
    in his individual capacity.
    Pertinent to this litigation, the Letter of Intent included the following
    provisions pertaining to SEM advancing money to COS 1:
    Section 4 Advances to Seller Upon written request from [COS 1]
    setting forth the specific amount of funds requested and the intended
    use thereof, [SEM] may, in its discretion, advance all or portions of
    the Purchase Price to [COS 1] in immediately available funds, as shall
    be agreed between the parties in writing at the time of such advance
    by executing documents to include a revolving secured promissory
    note and a securities pledge agreement[.] Each such advance,
    notwithstanding the amount thereof, shall be secured by a first priority
    continuous lien on the Shares in favor of [SEM.] [COS 1] shall owe
    interest to [SEM] over the aggregate amount of all advances made
    pursuant to the preceding sentences[.] Such interest shall be
    calculated as LIBOR + three percent (3%) per year consisting of
    twelve (12) months and three hundred and sixty (360) days, and shall
    be payable monthly in arrears until the earlier of (I) repayment of the
    advances to [SEM], or (II) Closing[.] Upon Closing, and unless
    otherwise agreed between the parties, all advances and all interest
    2
    thereon shall be returned to [SEM.] Subject to applicable law, if the
    provisions contained in the preceding sentences of this [section] are
    found to be unenforceable for any reason whatsoever, [SEM] shall
    have the option, at its discretion, to sell the Shares to any third party,
    at a price determined in bona fide arms-length negotiations between
    [SEM] and such third party, and retain such portion of the proceeds as
    are sufficient to cover [COS 1‘s] obligation for repayment of the
    principal and interest on the advances, and the remainder of such
    proceeds shall be disbursed to [COS 1] promptly thereafter[.]
    Section 5 Repayment of Advances All advances pursuant to Section
    4, and all interest due thereon, shall be payable by [COS 1] to [SEM]
    or its authorized representatives and assigns upon written demand[.]
    If the parties do not effect Closing of the Proposed Transaction within
    sixty (60) calendar days from the date of the Letter, and [COS 1] fails
    to repay in full all advances made by [SEM] within fifteen (15)
    calendar days of receiving a written demand for such repayment,
    [SEM] shall become owner of the Shares, and shall be entitled to all
    rights, title and interests appurtenant to such Shares, and [COS 1]
    shall be obligated to take all necessary actions to institute [SEM] as
    the record holder of the Shares for all corporate purposes[.]
    [COS 1] shall be obligated to take any actions and to execute any
    additional documents and instruments as may be required by [SEM] to
    document the either or any of the (I) security interest in the Shares in
    favor of [SEM], (II) the transfer of the Shares to [SEM], (III) the
    Closing of the Proposed Transaction (if applicable)[.]
    COS 1 requested cash advances from SEM.             An SEM officer testified
    Reynolds represented that COS 1 had many receivables due over the next few
    months which would provide money to repay SEM. The officer also testified an
    affiliated entity, Smith Eurasia, Ltd., advanced $110,000 to COS 1 on behalf of
    SEM. Specifically, Smith Eurasia advanced $50,000 via a check signed May 10,
    2006, $20,000 via a check signed July 13, 2006, and $40,000 via a check signed
    August 3, 2006, for a total of $110,000. Smith Eurasia made the advances on
    behalf of SEM because SEM lacked sufficient funds. It is undisputed COS 1 never
    gave SEM or Smith Eurasia a promissory note or any security for the advances, nor
    3
    did Reynolds personally guarantee the advances.          SEM personnel testified
    Reynolds stated COS 1 needed the advances to purchase equipment and for
    business opportunities. Contrarily, Reynolds testified COS 1 used the advances to
    pay bank debts.
    After Smith Eurasia made the first advance, SEM began its due-diligence
    review of COS 1. SEM officers testified that COS 1 was not entirely cooperative
    in producing documents for review and answering questions. In July and early
    August 2006, SEM employees visited the COS 1 facilities in Azerbaijan. Based on
    their review, SEM decided not to purchase COS 1‘s shares. On August 16, 2006,
    SEM‘s attorneys sent a letter to COS 1 demanding repayment of the $110,000
    advances plus interest as agreed in the Letter of Intent. Reynolds testified that he
    received this demand letter.
    On September 3, 2006, Reynolds sent an email to Sergey Malygin, who was
    CFO of both SEM and Smith Eurasia. In the email, Reynolds explained COS 1 did
    not have funds to repay the advances and needed additional time to find investors
    because SEM‘s decision not to invest in COS 1 hindered COS 1‘s ability to solicit
    a sale. Reynolds also stated COS 1 had already begun talking with other potential
    investors and, ―I am not trying to not pay you but just need the time and need to
    protect my interest in [Azerbaijan.]‖
    On February 17, 2007, Reynolds sent another email to Malygin in which he
    proposed four options regarding the unpaid $110,000:
    (1) the parties could treat the money as a purchase of 10% of COS 1‘s
    stock until COS 1 was sold or otherwise had funds to buy back the
    stock;
    (2) the parties could renew the original proposal with some
    modifications;
    4
    (3) the parties could continue treating the money as a loan but on
    terms less burdensome to COS 1; or
    (4) SEM could pursue legal remedies to force payment.
    Reynolds warned against the fourth option, explaining he believed SEM engaged
    in unethical actions during the due-diligence process. Reynolds also stated he was
    ―very diligently‖ trying to sell COS 1 and ―[SEM‘s] figure is included in the
    purchasing agreement with whomever I discuss this with.‖
    It is undisputed COS 1 never repaid the advances. SEM filed an initial suit
    against COS 1 and Reynolds on July 8, 2007.          However, around this time,
    Reynolds set up a transfer of COS 1‘s assets to a new corporation, Caspian Oilfield
    Services, Inc. (―COS 2‖). COS 2 was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on
    June 18, 2007 and registered in Azerbaijan on August 17, 2007.
    Reynolds testified two of his employees from COS 1, Ilkin Agayev and
    Babek Karimli, became the owners of COS 2. SEM presented a July 1, 2007
    agreement between COS 1 and COS 2 which provided for the transfer of COS 1‘s
    equipment to COS 2. According to Reynolds, he actually signed this agreement
    later and someone back-dated it to July 1, 2007. SEM also presented an August
    30, 2007 agreement in which COS 1 sold its assets to COS 2 for approximately
    121,000 manta (Azerbaijan currency).
    Reynolds testified that, despite these agreements, COS 1 did not actually
    receive any consideration from COS 2 for COS 1‘s assets. Reynolds testified he
    simply ―gave‖ the assets to COS 2 because COS 1 did not own any equipment but
    was leasing equipment from another company.           Reynolds also testified he
    transferred the assets for no value because was tired of living in Azerbaijan and
    wanted to return to the United States. Nevertheless, COS 1 and COS 2 signed tax
    documents reflecting the asset sale. Additionally, when COS 1 was still active, it
    5
    applied for a valuable certification needed to perform certain equipment work. It
    takes several years for the governing body to grant this certification. Eventually,
    this certification was granted to COS 2.
    On June 29, 2007, Reynolds sent SEM a letter in which he reiterated COS
    1‘s inability to repay the advances. He also expressed that COS 1 ―acknowledges
    the debt which you mentioned in you lawsuit‖ and made the following offer, ―[I]f
    you care to prepare a formal judgment for the amount which is owed, [COS 1]
    stands ready[,] willing, and able to sign such confession of Judgment for the
    appropriate amount.‖ SEM did not agree to this offer.
    In September and October 2007, Reynolds—despite not being an owner of
    COS 2—discussed selling COS 2 with Independent Oil Tools-DOSCO B.V.
    (―IOT‖).1 In 2008, IOT purchased a majority of COS 2‘s shares. Reynolds began
    working for IOT as a vice-president of international business development,
    although Reynolds testified he was always an independent contractor of IOT.
    After SEM nonsuited its original suit, it refiled suit against Reynolds, COS
    1, and COS 2.2 Following a bench trial, the trial court found the following:
    COS 1 is liable for breach of the Letter of Intent contract;
    COS 1, COS 2,3 and Reynolds conspired to fraudulently transfer the assets
    of COS 1 to COS 2; and
    1
    Reynolds testified he had been discussing a potential sale of COS 1 with IOT for around
    two years. When Reynolds resumed talks with IOT in the fall of 2007, he explained, ―I have
    passed [COS 1] in [Azerbaijan] to my previous employees.‖
    2
    SEM also sued IOT. After SEM presented its case, the trial court granted IOT‘s motion
    for a take-nothing judgment on SEM‘s claims. SEM does not appeal this ruling.
    3
    COS 2 appeared in the litigation but did not attend trial. The trial court granted SEM‘s
    motion for post-answer default judgment against COS 2. COS 2 is not a party to this appeal.
    6
    These three defendants are jointly and severally liable for fraudulent
    transfer.4
    The trial court rendered judgment that SEM recover from COS 1, COS 2, and
    Reynolds $110,000 in ―liquidated damages‖ plus $54,804.70 in prejudgment
    interest, and recover from COS 1 $70,000 in attorney‘s fees.
    II. STANDING
    In their first issue, appellants contend SEM lacked standing to bring claims
    because Smith Eurasia, not SEM, advanced the $110,000 to COS 1. Standing is a
    prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. Bland I.S.D. v. Blue, 
    34 S.W.3d 547
    ,
    553–54 (Tex. 2000).          Standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient
    relationship with a lawsuit to have a ―justiciable interest‖ in its outcome. Austin
    Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 
    171 S.W.3d 845
    , 848 (Tex. 2005). A plaintiff has
    standing when it is personally aggrieved. 
    Id. The standing
    doctrine requires that
    there be a real controversy between the parties that actually will be determined by
    the judicial declaration sought. 
    Id. at 849.
    Standing is a question of law subject to
    de novo review. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 
    369 S.W.3d 137
    , 150 (Tex. 2012).
    Appellants refer to a check-history ledger for Smith Eurasia, showing Smith
    Eurasia made the three payments to COS 1. Appellants also rely on the following
    testimony of Glenda Jackson, office manager and bookkeeper for SEM:
    (1) SEM and Smith Eurasia are affiliated but separate companies;
    (2) Smith Eurasia made the advances on behalf of SEM because SEM
    lacked sufficient funds to make the advances;
    (3) COS 1 did not give a promissory note or security for the advances,
    despite the Letter of Intent requiring COS 1 to provide such items if
    an advance was made;
    4
    The trial court also found that these defendants were liable for ―breach of constructive
    trust.‖ We need not address this finding to adjudicate this appeal.
    7
    (4) SEM never repaid Smith Eurasia; and
    (5) Jackson is not aware of whether there are documents reflecting
    that Smith Eurasia had attempted to collect the debt from SEM.
    Appellants argue the foregoing evidence conclusively establishes that Smith
    Eurasia made the advances and never requested repayment from SEM. Appellants
    contend no evidence connects the funds provided by Smith Eurasia to SEM or
    supports a finding that COS 1 is liable to SEM for the funds. According to
    appellants, SEM suffered no damages when COS 1 failed to repay the funds and
    therefore lacks standing. In support of their argument, appellants cite cases in
    which courts determined plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims based on
    injuries suffered by separate parties. See R2 Enters., Inc. v. Whipple, No. 02-07-
    00257, 
    2008 WL 2553444
    , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 26, 2008, pet.
    denied) (mem. op.) (holding general and limited partner did not have standing
    because direct injury was to partnership which actually contracted with land seller
    and was to profit from the contract); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Responsive Terminal
    Sys., Inc., 
    790 S.W.2d 738
    , 746–47 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied)
    (holding national group lacked standing to bring breach-of-contract claim against
    company on behalf of affiliated local groups because the local groups and
    company were the only parties in privity of contract).
    Although SEM is separate from Smith Eurasia, they are affiliated entities,
    and Jackson testified that Smith Eurasia made the advances on SEM‘s behalf.
    Consistent with this arrangement, Jackson testified SEM‘s accounting records
    showed the advances as cash out from Smith Eurasia, and they also reflected a
    $110,000 receivable owed by SEM to Smith Eurasia. Accordingly, Smith Eurasia,
    an affiliate of SEM, loaned SEM the money for the $110,000 and advanced this
    8
    amount to COS 1 on SEM‘s behalf. Thus, the evidence shows that the advance
    was made under the Letter of Intent by SEM to COS 1 by means of Smith Eurasia.5
    Consequently, SEM made the advances under the Letter of Intent and had
    standing to seek repayment from COS 1. We reject appellants‘ contention that the
    parties‘ failure to comply with the promissory note and security provisions of the
    Letter of Intent meant the advances were not made pursuant to the Letter of Intent.
    SEM‘s failure to require COS 1 to provide security for the advances may have
    made it more difficult for SEM to recover its debt but did not nullify the Letter of
    Intent.
    The fact that SEM would seek repayment of the funds even though SEM
    advanced the funds by means of its affiliate Smith Eurasia was not lost on COS 1.
    COS 1 understood Smith Eurasia was not gifting COS 1 $110,000—the money
    was an advance made pursuant to the Letter of Intent between SEM and COS 1. In
    response to SEM‘s demand for repayment of the advances, Reynolds
    acknowledged the debt was incurred pursuant to the Letter of Intent (to which only
    SEM and COS 1 were parties). Moreover, after SEM filed suit, Reynolds sent a
    letter to SEM (not Smith Eurasia) in which he stated that COS 1 acknowledges the
    debt ―mentioned in your lawsuit‖ and would sign a ―confession of Judgment for
    the appropriate amount.‖ Accordingly, the parties understood that SEM was not a
    stranger to the advances but was the party who made the advances and who had a
    right to demand repayment. We overrule appellants‘ first issue.
    5
    We acknowledge the Letter of Intent contained a provision that SEM ―shall become the
    owner‖ of 75% of COS 1‘s shares if COS 1 fails to repay advances within 15 days after written
    demand. At trial, the parties did not argue SEM received these shares. In fact, as noted above,
    Reynolds suggested in an email that SEM become holder of 10% (as opposed to 75%) of COS
    1‘s shares. On appeal, none of the parties contend SEM owns any of COS 1‘s shares.
    9
    III. APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINTS ON THE MERITS
    In their second through fifth issues, appellants argue the evidence is legally
    and factually insufficient to support certain of the trial court‘s implicit findings
    pertaining to damages, constructive trust, fraudulent transfer, and civil conspiracy.
    A. Standard of Review
    When the appellate record includes the reporter‘s record, the trial court‘s
    findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the
    same standards applied in reviewing the evidence supporting a jury‘s finding. See
    Catalina v. Blasdel, 
    881 S.W.2d 295
    , 297 (Tex. 1994). When a party challenges
    legal sufficiency of the evidence relative to an adverse finding on which he did not
    bear the burden of proof, we apply the ―no evidence‖ standard and may sustain the
    challenge only when the record shows (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital
    fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the
    only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital
    fact is no more than a mere scintilla, (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the
    opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 810 (Tex.
    2005). When considering a legal-sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable
    inference that would support it. 
    Id. We credit
    favorable evidence if a reasonable
    fact finder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder
    could not. 
    Id. at 827.
    The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable a
    reasonable and fair-minded person to reach the verdict under review. 
    Id. The fact
    finder is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to give their
    testimony. 
    Id. at 819.
    A party challenging factual sufficiency of the evidence relative to an adverse
    finding on which he did not bear the burden of proof must demonstrate the
    10
    evidence supporting the finding is so weak or so contrary to the overwhelming
    weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Mar. Overseas
    Corp. v. Ellis, 
    971 S.W.2d 402
    , 407 (Tex. 1998); Cain v. Bain, 
    709 S.W.2d 175
    ,
    176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). When considering a factual-sufficiency challenge,
    we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the
    finding.   See 
    Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 406
    –07.      We may not substitute our own
    judgment for that of the trier of fact or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.
    See 
    id. at 407.
    The amount of evidence necessary to affirm a judgment is far less
    than that necessary to reverse a judgment.       GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. L.P. v.
    Pascouet, 
    61 S.W.3d 599
    , 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
    denied).
    B. Analysis
    1. Damages
    In their second issue, appellants contend the evidence is legally and factually
    insufficient to support the trial court‘s implicit finding that SEM incurred damages
    as a result of its dealings with appellants because SEM did not advance the money
    and, thus, suffered no damages when COS 1 failed to repay the advances.          We
    already have determined SEM has standing to seek repayment of the funds based
    upon evidence that SEM advanced the money to COS 1 by means of its affiliate
    Smith Eurasia. Under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the
    evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that SEM sustained
    damages when COS 1 failed to repay the advances. Accordingly, we overrule
    appellants‘ second issue.
    11
    2. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
    In their fourth issue, appellants assert various arguments in support of the
    contention that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
    court‘s implicit findings relevant to SEM‘s claim under the Uniform Fraudulent
    Transfer Act (―UFTA‖).
    The UFTA is intended to prevent a debtor from defrauding its creditors by
    moving assets out of reach. Citizens Nat. Bank of Tex. v. NXS Const., Inc., 
    387 S.W.3d 74
    , 79–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also Tex.
    Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 24.001–.013 (West 2009) (UFTA). Numerous types
    of transactions are fraudulent for purposes of UFTA. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
    Ann. §§ 24.005, .006. ―‗Creditor‘ means a person . . . who has a claim.‖ 
    Id. § 24.002(4).
    ―‗Claim‘ means a right to payment or property, whether or not the right
    is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
    unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.‖ 
    Id. § 24.002(3).
    SEM pleaded, and the trial court impliedly found, that the transfer of assets
    from COS 1 to COS 2 constituted a fraudulent transfer under subsections (a)(1)
    and (a)(2) of section 24.005 of UFTA. See 
    id. § 24.005
    (West 2009) (stating that
    ―[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor .
    . . if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) with actual intent
    to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiving a
    reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the
    debtor . . . was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for
    which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the
    business or transaction‖).
    12
    Under their fourth issue, appellants argue there is no evidence SEM
    sustained damages because Smith Eurasia made the advances. For the reasons
    stated above, we reject this argument.
    Appellants also argue the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
    support recovery under SEM‘s UFTA claim because COS 1 was expressly
    permitted under the Letter of Intent to negotiate its sale with other parties 90 days
    after March 3, 2006. COS 1‘s assets were sold to COS 2 in 2007, more than 90
    days after March 3, 2006. Furthermore, appellants contend that, in Reynolds‘s
    September 2006 and February 2007 correspondences with SEM regarding the
    demand for repayment, he advised that COS 1 was actively looking for new
    investors, thus allegedly showing that SEM was aware appellants were trying to
    sell COS 1.
    However, evidence supporting the foregoing propositions would not
    preclude findings in SEM‘s favor regarding the UFTA claim. Even if this transfer
    is not prohibited by the Letter of Intent and even if SEM knew COS 1 was looking
    for new investors and that the sale had occurred, the transfer could still constitute a
    fraudulent transfer under section 24.005. See 
    id. § 24.005
    . Additionally, when
    Reynolds informed SEM that he was actively attempting to sell COS 1, he stated
    he was taking SEM‘s $110,000 advances into account when negotiating a purchase
    price. Nevertheless, Reynolds testified he ultimately transferred COS 1 to two of
    his employees for no consideration, despite the fact that an August 30, 2007
    agreement between COS 1 and COS 2 provided that COS 2 was paying
    approximately 121,000 manta (Azerbaijan currency) for COS 1‘s assets. Two
    SEM officers testified Reynolds never informed them he was transferring COS 1‘s
    assets to COS 2. Moreover, shares of COS 2 stock were later sold to IOT for
    13
    approximately $100,000.         Having concluded that all of appellants‘ arguments
    under their fourth issue lack merit, we overrule that issue.6
    3. Conspiracy
    Under their fifth issue, appellants assert various arguments in support of the
    contention that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
    court‘s conspiracy finding.
    Appellants first argue there is no evidence SEM sustained damages because
    Smith Eurasia made the advances. For the reasons stated above, we reject this
    argument.
    Appellants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the remaining
    elements of conspiracy.          As applied in the context of SEM‘s conspiracy
    allegations, these remaining elements are that Reynolds, COS 1, and COS 2 had a
    meeting of the minds on the object of fraudulently transferring the assets from
    COS 1 to COS 2 and that Reynolds engaged in one or more overt acts to this end.7
    See PAS, Inc. v. Engel, 
    350 S.W.3d 602
    , 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2011, no pet.).8
    6
    In a portion of the ―Summary of the Argument‖ section of their brief regarding SEM‘s
    fraudulent-transfer claim, appellants state, ―No funds were advanced to [Reynolds] by anyone.‖
    Presumably, appellants are arguing Reynolds could not have been trying to evade a creditor
    because no one advanced funds to Reynolds in his individual capacity. However, we need not
    address this issue because, as determined in the following section, appellants have not
    established that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court‘s conspiracy finding
    involving COS 1, COS 2, and Reynolds in his individual capacity.
    7
    Because the judgment against COS 1 may be affirmed based upon claims previously
    addressed in this opinion, we address the evidence of conspiracy only as to Reynolds.
    8
    Appellants contend there is no evidence Reynolds, individually, removed funds from
    COS 1. However, such evidence is not necessary for there to be legally and factually sufficient
    evidence of the foregoing elements. To support the conspiracy findings against Reynolds, there
    need not be evidence that Reynolds personally absconded with COS 1‘s assets or the advanced
    funds. Reynolds can be held liable for fraudulent transfer as a conspirator as long as there is
    evidence showing he participated in a conspiracy to fraudulently transfer COS 1‘s assets to COS
    14
    Reynolds forwarded to Karimli his February 17, 2007 email in which he
    suggested to SEM four resolutions of the repayment issue. Karimli later became
    one of the owners of COS 2, to which COS 1‘s assets were transferred. COS 2
    benefited by receiving COS 1‘s assets without having to pay consideration.
    Moreover, Reynolds attempted to benefit individually from the transfer by gaining
    an ownership interest in COS 2. Reynolds testified that, during the negotiations
    with IOT for the purchase of COS 2, he wanted to receive an ownership interest in
    COS 2 ―[b]ecause it was [his] company.‖ In fact, Karimli and Agayev offered
    Reynolds 5% of COS 2‘s shares, but Reynolds ultimately declined because IOT
    did not want outside investors.
    We hold the foregoing evidence and inferences arising therefrom are legally
    and factually sufficient to support the challenged elements of SEM‘s conspiracy
    claim. First, at least two persons were involved—Reynolds and COS 2 through
    Karimli‘s acts. Second, Reynolds and COS 2 had a meeting of the minds to
    accomplish the transfer of COS 1‘s assets to defraud SEM because Reynolds
    relayed to Karimli information regarding SEM‘s valid request for repayment but
    Reynolds and Karimli nevertheless ignored the request and worked together to
    transfer COS 1‘s assets to COS 2. Finally, Reynolds committed an unlawful, overt
    act in furtherance of the conspiracy by transferring COS 1‘s assets to COS 2. See
    Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 
    371 S.W.3d 366
    , 378 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (holding there was fact issue on whether defendants
    conspired to commit fraudulent transfer). We overrule appellants‘ fifth issue.9
    2. See Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 
    371 S.W.3d 366
    , 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
    9
    In their third issue, appellant assert the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
    support the trial court‘s finding that they were liable for ―breach of constructive trust.‖ Because
    the trial court‘s judgment may be affirmed based upon the UFTA claim and conspiracy, we need
    not and do not address issue three.
    15
    IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES
    Finally, in their sixth issue, appellants contend SEM may not recover
    attorney‘s fees from COS 1 pursuant to section 38.001(8) of the Civil Practice and
    Remedies Code because SEM did not suffer any damages. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
    Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) (West 2008) (providing party may recover attorney‘s
    fees, in addition to amount of valid claim, if claim is based on contract); Ashford
    Partners, Ltd. v. ECO Res., Inc., 
    401 S.W.3d 35
    , 40–41 (Tex. 2012) ([T]o qualify
    for fees under [section 38.001(8)], a litigant must prevail on a breach of contract
    claim and recover damages.‖).        However, we have affirmed the trial court‘s
    breach-of-contract damages awarded against COS 1. Accordingly, we overrule
    appellants‘ sixth issue.
    We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
    /s/            John Donovan
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Donovan.
    16