John Matte v. State ( 2012 )


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  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 20, 2012.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-12-00067-CR
    JOHN MATTE, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 09-07779
    MEMORANDUM                    OPINION
    Appellant, John Matte, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking his
    deferred adjudication community supervision and finding him guilty of the offense
    of assault on a family member. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2) (West
    2011).    He contends that the trial court failed to consider the full range of
    punishment in sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment.       We disagree and
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant was indicted for the offense of assault on a family member, a third
    degree felony, in November 2009. Appellant waived a jury trial and entered a plea
    of guilty. In August 2010, the trial court placed appellant on three years’ deferred
    adjudication with community supervision and assessed a $750.00 fine.
    In November 2011, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated
    Probation. At the hearing on the motion, appellant entered a plea of true to an
    allegation that he failed to pay court-assessed fees in violation of the conditions of
    his community supervision. Appellant entered a plea of untrue to an allegation that
    he committed the offense of terroristic threat on October 30, 2011. See Tex. Penal
    Code Ann. §22.07(a)(2) (West 2011). During the ensuing evidentiary hearing,
    several witnesses, including appellant, testified regarding the terroristic threat
    allegation. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found both allegations
    true, revoked appellant’s probation, and gave him the maximum sentence of ten
    years’ imprisonment for the assault. The court explained its decision as follows:
    THE COURT:          The problem here, Mr. Matte, is you’re on
    probation, my probation, for assault on a family
    member and I’ve reviewed the presentence report
    underlying your case and in that case you tried to
    play that down as being no big deal. And I’m
    looking through your history here in the
    presentence report, and all I see is you being a
    bully and a thug. Maybe Ms. Matte is not a perfect
    lady, but I believe this evidence shows that you did
    what you have done in the past. You’ve got a hot
    temper. You had a short fuse and for whatever
    reason, you decided that it was enough that
    happened to go firing away and you threatened her
    while you’re on probation and that was a big
    mistake.
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    In fact, I’m looking at this criminal history when
    we put you on probation and you knew it was
    going to be a reach because you’ve got in ’97, two
    family assaults and it was revoked in ’99; a family
    assault in ’99, 75 days in jail and you have—the
    presentence report is always very thorough and has
    a lot about someone in their history but, I mean,
    it’s loaded with you being a bully. I thought that
    sending you to SAFPF, it was a substance abuse
    issue, that you would be all better and you would
    learn your lesson and would be calm and deal with
    your problems in more of a gentlemanly, adult
    way. And apparently, this love spat, you can’t deal
    with your issues any better than you did before we
    sent you to SAFPF. I’m very disappointed
    because I kind of stuck my neck out on that one
    and I thought you would be better and deal with
    your problems in a better way than you have, but
    you have proven to be dangerous and a threat to
    others in the free world.
    Your probation is revoked. Earlier you pleaded
    guilty to assault on a family member, a third
    degree felony, voluntarily. You were mentally
    competent to do so.          You understood the
    consequences of pleading guilty. There was
    sufficient evidence supporting your guilty plea to
    find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I now
    find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of this
    underlying offense. It is a third degree felony.
    You are hereby sentenced to confinement in the
    Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
    Criminal Justice to serve a term of 10 years. Let
    me just ask you: You have a tattoo on your lower
    lip, don’t you?
    [APPELLANT]:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:     What does it say?
    [APPELLANT]:   It’s derogatory.
    THE COURT:     What does it say?
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    [APPELLANT]:       “F[***] you.”
    THE COURT:         Do you think someone who would tattoo
    something on their lips, it would be—you would
    be a verse [sic] to saying the kind of vulgarity we
    have here on those tapes and those threats? Every
    word you say goes past those words that you have
    stapled onto your body. There is not even a self
    respect issue. I mean, you take pride in being
    defiant and vulgar; and we heard it in these tapes.
    I hope that you can do something about getting a
    grip on yourself and your dealings with others but
    you’re supposed to be living in this world with 7
    billion other people in a form of peace. And if you
    treat people you say you love this way like I heard,
    what about all those people you don’t like? I’ll bet
    you they are in harm’s way. You’ve got a long life
    ahead of you but you need to change the direction
    that your mindset is and your aggressive nature in
    dealing with your personal relationships that not
    only hurt others but commit crimes and you
    committed a crime while on probation, the same
    kind of crime while on probation and this Court is
    not going to be tolerant of violence and that’s what
    that is, a threat of violence to burn a lady and her
    children in their home. It’s illegal. It’s not
    appropriate and this Court is going to administer
    justice under these circumstances and this Court
    under the circumstances and the evidence in this
    case, finds this decision to be proper and just.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, appellant contends in his first issue that the trial court violated
    his right to due process when it allegedly failed to consider the entire range of
    punishment. In response, the State asserts appellant waived any complaint he may
    have regarding the sentence imposed by the trial court because he failed to object
    at the time the sentence was imposed. Anticipating the State’s waiver argument,
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    appellant, citing the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Ex parte Brown, 
    158 S.W.3d 449
    , 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), argues no contemporaneous objection
    was necessary because the evidence that the trial court refused to consider the full
    range of punishment was ambiguous. Assuming appellant’s contention is correct
    that he was excused from the long-standing rule that errors in sentencing can be
    waived by failure to object, we conclude the record does not support appellant’s
    argument that the trial court did not consider the entire range of punishment.
    Instead, the record evidence, quoted in part above, supports the opposite
    conclusion.
    Due process requires a neutral and detached judicial officer who will
    consider the full range of punishment and mitigating evidence. Buerger v. State,
    
    60 S.W.3d 358
    , 363–64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (citing
    Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 786–87 (1973)); Phillips v. State, 
    887 S.W.2d 267
    , 270 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, pet. ref’d). A trial court denies due process
    when it arbitrarily refuses to consider the entire range of punishment for an offense
    or refuses to consider mitigating evidence and imposes a predetermined
    punishment. 
    Buerger, 60 S.W.3d at 364
    (citing McClenan v. State, 
    661 S.W.2d 108
    , 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by De Leon v.
    Aguilar, 
    127 S.W.3d 1
    , 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). For example, a trial court
    denies due process when it actually assesses punishment at revocation consistent
    with the punishment it has previously announced it would assess upon revocation.
    
    Id. In the
    absence of a clear showing to the contrary, we presume that the trial
    court was neutral and detached. 
    Id. Here, the
    record establishes that the trial court conducted an evidentiary
    hearing in which appellant had an opportunity to present mitigating evidence.
    Indeed, the trial court even inquired if appellant intended to retake the witness
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    stand following testimony from his probation officer, which directly contradicted
    appellant’s previous sworn testimony denying ownership of the cellular telephone
    used to convey the terroristic threats at issue. In addition, an examination of the
    revocation hearing record demonstrates that the trial court sentenced appellant
    based on (1) the trial court’s assessment of the evidence introduced during the
    hearing, (2) a review of appellant’s presentence investigation report prepared
    during the underlying assault case, and (3) the failure of other efforts to change
    appellant’s behavior. Also, there is no evidence that the trial court had previously
    promised to assess appellant’s punishment at the maximum term of confinement in
    the event he violated the terms of his community supervision.
    Because appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court arbitrarily
    failed to consider the entire range of punishment before sentencing him to ten
    years’ imprisonment, we overrule his first issue on appeal. Appellant also lists a
    second issue in his brief: “the trial court erred in giving [him] the maximum
    sentence.”   Appellant does not separately brief this issue, and therefore we
    conclude he has waived it. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    /s/       J. Brett Busby
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Brown and Busby.
    Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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