in Re Karen G. Baunchand ( 2015 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00376-CV
IN RE KAREN G. BAUNCHAND
Original Proceeding
ORDER
On May 6, 2015, relator filed “Relator’s Emergency Motion to Quash Hearing
Setting and Proposed Order.” Later on the same day, one of the real-parties-in interest
filed a document entitled “Advisory to the Court” on the same issue as the relator’s
Emergency Motion. The “Advisory” is seeking “guidance” from the Court. Both the
Emergency Motion and the Advisory demonstrate unreasonable interpretations of prior
orders and notices of this Court.
This Court is not in a position to, and will not, micromanage the underlying
proceedings. There are already two trial courts and a regional presiding judge and this
appellate Court involved in what does not appear to be a particularly complicated
domestic relations case. It is only the actions of the respondent trial judge, Bob Carroll,
that are at issue in this mandamus proceeding. Respondent was appointed by the
Regional Presiding Judge, Mary Murphy, to decide certain motions in the underlying
domestic relations proceeding because the relator had asserted that the trial court judge
hearing the case, Joe Grubbs, was unable to continue to decide matters to resolve that
proceeding.
The above referenced Advisory asserts that “This Court [the Tenth Court of
Appeals] has directed Judge Bob Carroll to resolve motions relevant to the Petition for
Mandamus.” This is an errant and unreasonable reading of our prior order.
Initially, this Court issued a stay of all proceedings in the pending domestic
relations matter and ordered that all matters, including the domestic relations
proceeding, be mediated. Mediation was unsuccessful. Thereafter, we lifted the stay
except as to treating the sanctions ordered against relator, who is counsel for one of the
parties in the underlying domestic relations proceeding, as having been violated.
Recognizing that the scope of the respondent’s jurisdiction was possibly limited
by the regional presiding judge’s order of appointment, statutes, and local rules
regarding the exchange of benches among the district courts in Ellis County, this Court,
by its order partially lifting the stay, sought to clarify that the respondent trial court was
expressly authorized to proceed to decide anything within its jurisdiction, expressly
including motions filed before, during, or after the stay was entered or lifted. Further,
in an effort to avoid any confusion, this Court also expressly authorized respondent to
reconsider the events, motions, and all resulting orders that were the basis for relator’s
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
The Advisory is simply wrong in its assertion that this Court “directed” the
respondent court to do anything. Recognizing, however, that the trial court could have
modified its prior orders, and thus the extent of or need for mandamus relief could be
impacted, this Court requested a status report. See In re Duncan, 62 S.W.3d 333, 334
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (action by trial court after
mandamus filed resulted in dismissing mandamus as moot); see also In re Luna, 317
S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, orig. proceeding) (same); In re Gabriel, No. 10-
10-00290-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8483 (Tex. App—Waco, Oct. 20, 2010, orig.
proceeding) (not designated for publication) (same).
The relator’s Emergency Motion asserts that the trial court has scheduled a
hearing to consider certain matters or hold a status hearing on May, 8, 2015. Further,
relator asserts that this Court has not authorized the respondent to hold “hearings” on
any matter. This too, is an unreasonable interpretation of this Court’s order.
This Court would not authorize a trial court to consider, reconsider, or make
rulings without a hearing. The very act of considering the issues and making a decision
is a hearing. Furthermore, the Court would not limit the type or nature of the hearing
the respondent thought was necessary to one form, such as a chambers hearing, to the
exclusion of another type hearing, such as a live hearing with argument or an
evidentiary hearing, etc. To place such a restriction on a trial court would be to hand-
cuff the trial court’s decision making authority and would be ill advised even if it was
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within our power to do so.
Accordingly, it is:
ORDERED that “Relator’s Emergency Motion to Quash Hearing Setting and
Proposed Order” filed on May 6, 2015 is DENIED;
ORDERED that “Relator’s Motion to Quash Honorable Joe Grubb’s Motion to
Defer Sanctions” filed on March 18, 2015 is DENIED;
ORDERED that “Motion for Leave to Set Attached Motion to Defer Sanctions
Portion of Order for Hearing in the District Court” filed on March 17, 2015 is dismissed
as moot; and
ORDERED that a response to relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus is
requested. Any party that desires to do so must file a response by May 28, 2015.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Motions denied
Motion dismissed as moot
Response requested
Order issued and filed May 7, 2015
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