Stephen Anthoney Walker v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
STEPHEN ANTHONY WALKER, §
No. 08-13-00239-CR
Appellant, §
Appeal from the
v. §
213th Judicial District Court
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
of Tarrant County, Texas
Appellee. §
(TC# 1216371D)
§
OPINION
Stephen Anthony Walker appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. In three issues, Walker complains of the trial court’s rulings on his objections to remarks
made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Walker was indicted for assaulting his girlfriend’s son, Steven Bryce, with a knife
following a physical altercation with Bryce’s mother. At trial, Bryce testified that, when he called
911 to report Walker had choked his mother, Walker: (1) told him he was not going back to jail;
(2) smashed the phone against the wall; (3) slashed him across the neck with a knife; and (4) fled
the scene. Walker conceded he injured Bryce but disputed the notion he did so intentionally.
During opening arguments, defense counsel told the jurors the incident was an accident:
But it was at that time that Mr. Walker decided he wanted away from the
situation. And as he was trying to leave, Mr. Bryce was got -- tried to stop him
from leaving or was blocking his path and he accidentally cut him. Now, Mr.
Walker, he didn’t intend cut him. In fact, he was so devastated that the fact this
accident had happened, and he was so upset by this, he left and tried to commit
suicide in the woods.
To counter Walker’s theory and bolster its case, the State called the responding and investigating
officers as witnesses and introduced into evidence audio recordings of the 911 calls and
photographs of the injuries sustained by Bryce and his mother. Walker did not testify, nor did he
introduce any evidence.
The issues in this appeal arise from three exchanges that occurred during closing
arguments. The first arose when the parties were arguing the merits of the State’s case. In
contending the evidence proved Walker intended to cut Bryce, the prosecutor drew the jury’s
attention to the 911 calls, the photographs, and Walker’s suicide attempt. Counsel countered that
the evidence actually told a different story:
Look at the evidence. It’s visual evidence. Okay. And the problem here
is Steve Walker is, in fact, responsible for Steve Bryce’s injuries. In a civil court
there wouldn’t be any question. Okay. Because he was careless, because he
instigated the physical action that happened. Now, did he have any intent -- did he
have any intent to cause him injury? No. Did he have any knowledge that he was
causing him injury? No. Because when he realized it he panicked and flew into a
suicidal whatever you want to call it.
The -- you have gotten partial pictures in this case. The State -- the State
dwells on the fact that he, quote, ran away. He ran a couple hundred feet and
immobilized himself with a knife. His -- his shock and horror over it was enough
that he turned the knife on himself. Okay. [Emphasis added].
Apparently misconstruing the italicized language above as an accusation that the State had failed
to turn over all evidence in its possession, the prosecutor responded:
Really? Really? Let me tell you this. The State of Texas has an open file
policy. And the Defense has everything the State of Texas has. So if he wants to
tell you what you received is partial pictures, he could have introduced any other
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pictures he wanted to if they exist.
Counsel immediately objected on the basis that the prosecutor’s remark impermissible shifted the
burden of proof and commented on Walker’s failure to testify. The trial court overruled the
objection, and the prosecutor—continuing to labor under the misimpression that defense counsel’s
“partial pictures” comment was literal—told the jury that she had “no idea what he [was] talking
about” “[b]ecause he [had] a copy of every picture taken in this case.”
The second exchange transpired minutes later when the prosecutor was reminding the jury
that Walker, not Bryce, was on trial. The prosecutor’s comments regarding Walker’s state of
mind on the day in question, including that he may have been inebriated, led to this colloquy:
[PROSECUTOR]: Who was agitated? Who was angry? Who was drunk?
Stephen Walker.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object, outside the record.
[TRIAL COURT]: Sustained.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can we have the jury instructed to disregard?
[TRIAL COURT]: Disregard the last comment of the prosecutor about drunk.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move for mistrial.
[TRIAL COURT]: Denied.
[PROSECUTOR]: There was testimony from the officers that Stephen Walker
smelled of alcohol.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object. That’s outside the record. There was none.
[TRIAL COURT]: Sustained.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can we have the jury instructed to disregard?
[TRIAL COURT]: And the jury shall disregard that comment.
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move for mistrial.
[TRIAL COURT]: Denied.
The prosecutor moved on to summarize the events surrounding the incident.
The third exchange occurred when the prosecutor implored the jury to reject the theory that
Walker attempted suicide because he was upset. In asserting that Walker tried to kill himself
primarily to avoid jail, the prosecutor remarked that Walker did not regret his actions:
Remember the situation we talked about in voir dire, when you are mad and you
walk in the room and slam the door and a picture falls. You have broken the
picture. Well, you regret it after it happened. But it doesn’t make the fact that
you did the action any different. Maybe -- maybe he regretted what he did after it
happened. I submit to you he didn’t. All he cared about was himself.
Counsel immediately objected on the following grounds:
That’s a comment on the Defendant’s failure to testify. It’s a question that only
the Defendant can answer. It’s a comment on lack of remorse . . . .
The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to “disregard the argument
concerning the accused’s failure to testify” but denied the request for a mistrial.
The jury found Walker guilty of the charged offense and assessed punishment at 15 years’
confinement. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict.
COMMENT ON FAILURE TO TESTIFY
Walker’s first and third issues concern his constitutional right against compelled
self-incrimination. In his first issue, Walker asserts the trial court should have sustained his
objection to the prosecutor’s “pictures” remark because it was improper jury argument. In his
third issue, Walker claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when the
prosecutor remarked that he lacked remorse for his actions. According to Walker, “the improper
comments “were targeted to degrade . . . [his] . . . character . . . [and] made it much less likely for
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the jury to accept the Defense’s theory that this could have been an accident.” Although Walker
contends he was harmed by the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s remarks, his complaints are
legally distinct. Because of that distinction, we will analyze them separately.
1. “Pictures” Remark
In his first issue, Walker contends the prosecution’s remark that “he could have introduced
any other pictures he wanted to” amounted to an improper comment on his failure to testify. We
disagree.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on an objection based on an improper jury argument for an
abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 825 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010).
Applicable Law
Proper jury argument generally falls within one of four categories: (1) summation of the
evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3) responses to argument of opposing
counsel; and (4) pleas for law enforcement. Id. at 821. Argument that the defendant failed to
testify does not fall into any of these categories and violates a defendant’s constitutional and
statutory rights against compelled self-incrimination. Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891
n.8 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011)(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX.CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX.CODE
CRIM.PROC. art. 38.08).
To determine whether prosecutorial argument rises to that level, we view the argument
from the jury’s standpoint and in the context in which it was made, and we resolve any ambiguities
in its language in favor of it being a permissible argument. Randolph, 353 S.W.3d at 891. If the
language used by the prosecution was so clear and unequivocal that the jury could reach no
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conclusion other than the State intended to comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, the
argument is improper. Randolph, 353 S.W.3d at 891. But “[i]f the language might reasonably
be construed as merely an implied or indirect allusion, there is no violation.” Id. Nor is there
any violation “if the language can reasonably be construed to refer to appellant’s failure to produce
evidence other than his own testimony[.]” Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 491 (Tex.Crim.App.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1106, 116 S. Ct. 1323, 134 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1996). Indeed, “a party
may always comment on the fact that the opponent failed to call an available witness and then
argue ‘Don't you know, if Mr. X had anything favorable to say, my opponent would have called
him.’” Pope v. State, 207 S.W.3d 352, 365 & n.51 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).
Discussion
Viewed in context and from the jury’s perspective, the remark in issue was not a direct
comment on Walker’s failure to testify, nor did it otherwise draw the jury’s attention to the
absence of statements from him or refer to a particular aspect of the case that only his testimony
could refute. Nothing in the language used by the prosecutor suggests that Walker should have
testified or that the jury necessarily and naturally construed it as referring to his choice to remain
silent. Rather, the prosecutor’s remark can be reasonable construed as a comment on, or
summation of, the evidence presented at trial or as a comment on Walker’s failure to produce any
evidence at trial. To be considered improper, the remark would have to necessarily and naturally
steer the jury to conclude that the prosecutor was implying that the absence of controverting
evidence was due to Walker’s failure to testify. That is neither a clear nor a necessary implication
from the prosecutor’s remark.
Walker asserts the remark was improper for two reasons, but his reasoning is not
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persuasive. First, he claims the remark constituted a direct comment on his failure to present an
overall case and, thus, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. But jury argument
pointing out that the defendant has failed to present evidence in his favor does not shift the burden
of proof but instead summarizes the state of the evidence and is a reasonable deduction from the
evidence. See Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 491; Caron v. State, 162 S.W.3d 614, 618
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)(holding that prosecutor’s statement that “[i]f there
is something out there that is going to exonerate you, you want to make it known” was permissible
jury argument); Baines v. State, 401 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no
pet.)(holding that prosecutor’s statement that defendant “has the same subpoena power” and could
have called witnesses to testify in his defense was “a permissible remark about appellant’s failure
to produce evidence in his favor on his defense and did not shift the burden of proof to appellant”).
Walker contends the remark shifted the burden of proof to him in this case because “[t]he State
was not defending a particular piece of evidence or testimony, but the entirety of its case.” In
support of the proposition that a prosecutor cannot comment on a defendant’s failure to present
evidence unless rebutting the defense’s challenge to “a particular piece of the State’s case or a
certain witness or a certain item of evidence[,”] Walker cites Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664
(Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Walker’s reliance on Jackson is misplaced.
In Jackson, the appellant argued the prosecution had impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof to him when telling the jury during closing argument that the defense “would have called its
expert to the stand if it had seriously disputed the State’s evidence.” 17 S.W.3d at 674. The
court disagreed, holding that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s failure to produce expert
testimony in support of his assertions that the State’s DNA evidence was lacking was proper jury
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argument because it was merely a response to the defense’s assertion. Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 674.
In so holding, the court recognized that it is permissible argument for the prosecutor to answer the
arguments of opposing counsel. Id. The court also held the prosecutor’s argument did not
amount to a prohibited reference to the appellant’s failure to testify. Id. Contrary to Walker’s
assertion, the court did not hold that the prosecution is forbidden to comment on a defendant’s
failure to produce evidence in any circumstance other than in response to the defense’s argument
attacking a specific piece of the State’s evidence. Indeed, the court has observed that it is
permissible for the prosecution to comment on the defendant’s failure to testify if the comment is a
“fair response” to the defendant’s claim that he is not responsible because the result was an
accident. See Randolph, 353 S.W.3d at 892-93.
Second, Walker alleges the prosecutor’s remark exacerbated the harm he suffered because
it “incorrectly imparted to the jury that [he] had an unfettered right to introduce whatever he
wanted regardless of the rules of evidence.” But Walker cites no authority for his assertion, nor
does he pause to explain how that inference unfairly shifted the burden of proof to him or
constituted a direct comment on his failure to testify.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Walker’s objection to
the prosecutor’s remark that “he could have introduced any other pictures he wanted to if they
exist.”
Walker’s first issue is overruled.
2. “Remorse” Remark
In his third issue, Walker argues the prosecution’s argument that he lacked remorse for his
actions constituted an improper commented on his failure to testify because only his testimony
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could refute that notion. We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.
Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 292 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. –––, 131 S. Ct.
3030, 180 L. Ed. 2d 846 (2011). If the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement, it must be upheld. Id.
Applicable Law
A mistrial is required only in extreme circumstances where the prejudice is incurable.
Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Prejudice is incurable when the
objectionable material is clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or was of such a
damaging character as to suggest it would be impossible to remove the harmful impression from
the jurors’ minds. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Rojas v. State,
986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).
To determine whether prejudice is incurable, we apply a three-factor balancing test.
Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119
S. Ct. 1466, 143 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1999). We look at: (1) the severity of the misconduct (the
magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the remark); (2) the curative measures taken (the efficacy of
any cautionary instruction by the trial judge); and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the
misconduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction). Id. In evaluating the
severity of the misconduct, we assess “whether [the] jury argument is extreme or manifestly
improper [by] look[ing] at the entire record of final arguments to determine if there was a willful
and calculated effort on the part of the State to deprive appellant of a fair and impartial trial.”
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Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 573 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). [Internal quotation omitted].
Discussion
Assuming the prosecutor’s “remorse” remark was improper, 1 Walker has failed to
establish it warranted a mistrial. The remark, when analyzed under the three-factor test
articulated in Mosley, is not so prejudicial as to be incurable.
The magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the remark was minimal. The prosecutor was
not inviting the jury to observe Walker’s lack of remorse in the courtroom. Rather, she was
arguing to them that the evidence indicated Walker lacked remorse following the incident, which
she could fairly do in rebutting Walker’s claim that Bryce’s injuries were the result of an accident.
The evidence adduced at trial supported the prosecutor’s argument. No witness testified that
Walker inquired about Bryce’s welfare, and Walker does not argue to the contrary. Viewed in its
proper context, the prosecutor’s remark was limited to Walker’s behavior following the incident,
and the concept of remorse was not mentioned again. There is simply no connection between
Walker’s behavior at the time of the incident and his failure to testify at trial more than two years
later.
There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court’s instructions to disregard did not
cure the prosecutor’s remark. Following the prosecutor’s remark, the trial court immediately
applied the curative measure requested by Walker—an instruction to disregard. A prompt
instruction to disregard ordinarily cures any harm from improper argument. Wesbrook v. State,
1
The State contends the trial court erred in sustaining Walker’s objection to the prosecutor’s remark because it “was a
proper response to the argument of defense counsel, and referred to the facts of the offense itself, not to [Walker]’s
present-sense lack of remorse at the time of trial.” As the State correctly points out, a prosecutor may comment about
an appellant’s lack of remorse at the time of the offense, if the comment is supported by the evidence, but may not
comment about an appellant’s lack of present-sense remorse. See Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 823-25
(Tex.Crim.App. 2011). But the prosecution never asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling on this, or any other,
basis. Because the State did not raise its complaint at trial, we will not address it on appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P. 33.1.
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29 S.W.3d 103, 115-16 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Moreover, we generally presume the jury will
obey a trial court’s instruction to disregard. Id. at 116. Walker asserts we cannot rely on this
presumption because the prosecutor’s “[r]epeated comments on [his] failure to testify and
improper comments of evidence outside of the record … shows that the attempts of the trial court
to cure the prejudice were in vain.” But beyond making this assertion, Walker does not explain
how the instruction was ineffective. Nor does he direct our attention to any other portion of the
record suggesting it was impossible to remove the harmful impression from the jurors’ minds.
Contrary to Walker’s assertion, the remarks here were not so blatant as to render the presumption
inapplicable. Therefore, we must presume the trial court’s admonishments were effective. See
Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 292; see also Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)(grant
of mistrial motion should be reserved for those cases in which an objection could not have
prevented, and an instruction to disregard could not have cured, the prejudice stemming from an
event at trial); Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 799-800 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), overruled on
other grounds by Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, 532-35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995)(any improper
jury argument by State alluding to defendant’s lack of remorse was cured by trial court’s
instruction to disregard).
The certainty of Walker’s conviction is high absent the misconduct. As mentioned above,
Walker never disputed he cut Bryce’s throat. Instead, he claimed to have injured Bryce
accidently while fleeing. But, as the trier of fact, the jury was free to reject Walker’s theory, and
a rational jury could have found that Walker intended to cut Bryce based on how Walker used the
knife, which was similar to a box cutter in that it had a blunt edge and a sharp edge, and how he
behaved after cutting Bryce. Bryce testified that, before Walker attacked him, Walker mimicked
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slicing his own throat with the knife’s dull edge. When asked to relate what occurred
immediately thereafter, Bryce provided the following harrowing account:
[BRYCE]: All I remember is him pulling his arm back and slicing my throat from
back and forth. And then –
[PROSECUTOR]: Where were you standing in relation to him?
[BRYCE]: I was still standing straight in front of him.
[PROSECUTOR]: Could he see you?
[BRYCE]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: Were you trying -- was he trying to leave or anything like that?
[BRYCE]: No. Because I was -- he had open stairwell behind him. He had
access to leave and I wouldn’t have.
. . .
[PROSECUTOR]: What kind of motion did he do when he struck you with the
knife?
[BRYCE]: Like a swing motion backwards to forwards.
[PROSECUTOR]: So it started in the back?
[BRYCE]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: Were you standing directly in front of him?
[BRYCE]: Yes. I was standing directly in front of him.
[PROSECUTOR]: As soon as he cut you what did you do?
[BRYCE]: He vanished. He disappeared.
[PROSECUTOR]: Did he offer you any assistance?
[BRYCE]: No.
[PROSECUTOR]: Is there any way he would not have known that he had cut
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you?
[BRYCE]: No, ma’am.
[PROSECUTOR]: Why not?
[BRYCE]: Because you knew -- how he disappeared and how he vanished, you
knew he knew what he did.
The State adduced additional evidence undermining Walker’s theory. One of the responding
officers testified that, that based on his investigation, he did not think the incident was an accident.
The evidence was more than sufficient to sustain Walker’s conviction.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s motion for
mistrial.
Walker’s third issue is overruled.
JURY ARGUMENT NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
In his second issue, Walker argues the prosecutor’s remarks about his alleged inebriation
on the day of the incident were calculated to inflame the jury by “paint[ing] a picture of a ‘typical’
abusive boyfriend . . . who would hurt anyone that stood in his way.” Because there was no
evidence Walker was inebriated on the day he attacked Bryce, we agree the prosecutor’s remarks
were manifestly improper.2 See Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990)(“[A]
prosecutor may not use closing argument to get evidence before the jury which is outside the
record and prejudicial to the accused.”). But we disagree with Walker’s assertion that the trial
court erred by denying his motion for mistrial.
Discussion
The prosecutor’s remarks, when analyzed under the three-factor test articulated in Mosley,
2
On appeal, the State agrees the prosecutor’s remarks were improper because they were not supported by the
evidence.
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are not so prejudicial as to be incurable.
The magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the remarks was minimal. Although there was
no evidence Walker was inebriated on the day he attacked Bryce, there was evidence Walker drank
alcohol and became aggressive when drinking. Bryce testified that Walker’s aggressive behavior
while drinking was the source of past conflicts between them. Bryce also testified that he
believed his mother was not safe in Walker’s presence. In addition, there was evidence of
Walker’s past aggressive behavior. One of the responding officers testified that, when he spoke
to Walker on the phone, Walker disclosed a previous assault conviction. Moreover, the trial court
immediately instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remarks, and the prosecutor did not
mention Walker’s alleged inebriation during the remainder of her argument. When viewed in the
entirety of the prosecution’s closing argument, we cannot conclude that there was a willful and
calculated effort to deprive Walker of a fair and impartial trial.
There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court’s instructions to disregard did not
cure the prosecutor’s prejudicial remarks. Following the prosecutor’s remarks, the trial court
immediately applied the curative measures requested by Walker—instructions to disregard. As
noted above, a prompt instruction to disregard ordinarily cures any harm from improper argument.
Walker counters that the trial courts’ repeated instructions to disregard prove its attempts to cure
were disregarded. But beyond making this assertion, Walker does not explain how the
instructions were ineffective. Nor does he direct our attention to any other portion of the record
suggesting it was impossible to remove the harmful impression from the jurors’ minds. Absent
evidence to the contrary, we must presume the trial court’s admonishments were effective.
The certainty of Walker’s conviction is high absent the prosecutor’s remarks. For the
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reasons articulated above in our discussion of the prosecutor’s “remorse” remark, we are confident
a reasonable jury hearing the evidence in this case would have found Walker guilty irrespective of
the prosecutor’s remarks.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s motion for
mistrial.
Walker’s second issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
March 25, 2015
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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