Martel D. Hicks v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00398-CR
MARTEL D. HICKS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1232353D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Martel D. Hicks appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his
deferred adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of
evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. In three issues, Hicks argues that the
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
trial court abused its discretion by finding that he had violated the terms of his
deferred adjudication community supervision. We will affirm.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2011, Hicks pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,
to the state jail felony of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a), (b)(1)(B) (West 2013). Following this plea, the trial
court placed him on two years’ deferred adjudication community supervision and
imposed a $200 fine. Later, Hicks’s community supervision was extended for
another year.
On June 27, 2014, the State filed its first amended petition to proceed to
adjudication, alleging three categories of violations: that Hicks (1) committed a
new offense against the laws of this State; (2) failed to participate in and
complete 120 hours of monthly community service at the rate of no less than ten
hours per month; and (3) failed to pay his court-ordered community supervision
fees more than twenty times.
At the hearing on the State’s petition, Hicks pleaded “[n]ot true” to each of
the State’s allegations. After hearing testimony, the trial court found the
allegations in all three paragraphs true and that Hicks had violated the terms and
conditions of his community supervision; revoked his deferred adjudication
community supervision; adjudicated him guilty of the offense of evading arrest or
detention with a vehicle; and sentenced him to two years’ confinement in state
jail. This appeal followed.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of the decision to adjudicate guilt is “in the same manner”
as review of the revocation of community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (West Supp. 2014). We review an order revoking
community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. State,
202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492,
493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and
conditions of community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cardona, 665
S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its
discretion in revoking the community supervision. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–
94.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged
violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a
revocation order. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1980).
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IV. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In part of Hicks’s second issue, he contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that he had violated the terms of his deferred adjudication
community supervision for failure to complete community service hours. We
disagree.
Hicks’s argument is predicated first on the notion that because his
community supervision had previously been extended at a time when it was
obvious he was not in compliance with his community service hours condition, he
“was denied due process of law . . . because his [community supervision] was
extended by the court [w]hile those alleged violations were known to the court.”
Hicks does not cite any authority for this proposition. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i)
(“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made,
with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); Tong v. State, 25
S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“In failing to provide any relevant
authority suggesting how the judge’s actions violated any of appellant’s
constitutional rights, we find the issue to be inadequately briefed.”).
Hicks’s argument is next predicated on the notion that because he was
jailed for a portion of his community supervision extension, he was unable to
complete his required community service. Again, Hicks fails to cite any authority
for this proposition. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Tong, 25 S.W.3d at 710.
But even assuming Hicks’s arguments on this issue are firm and
preserved, the record demonstrates that during the time after he received an
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extension of his community supervision and before he was jailed, he failed to
complete the required ten hours of community supervision per month. Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Hicks’s deferred adjudication
community supervision based on this violation.
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
we hold that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hicks
violated the condition of his community supervision that required him to complete
120 hours of community service at the rate of no fewer than ten hours per month.
See, e.g., Elizondo v. State, 966 S.W.2d 671, 672–73 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1998, no pet.) (holding that the finding that Elizondo had failed to comply with
term of probation requiring him to perform his community service hours was
sufficient to support revocation); Trevino v. State, No. 08–13–00234–CR, 2015
WL 181657, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 14, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (upholding revocation of community supervision because State
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had failed to complete
his court-ordered community service at the required rate). We overrule this part
of Hicks’s second issue.
Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the
alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to
support a revocation order, we need not address the remainder of Hicks’s issues.
See Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926.
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V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled the relevant portion of Hicks’s second issue, and not
addressing the remainder of his issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 30, 2015
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