in the Interest of R.J.S., a Child ( 2014 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    No. 07-14-00146-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.S., A CHILD
    On Appeal from the 170th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2010-3968-4, Honorable Jim Meyer, Presiding
    June 12, 2014
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
    Appellant filed his pro se notice of appeal in the Waco Court of Appeals on April
    3, 2014, in an attempt to perfect what he has identified as a restricted appeal of a
    judgment or order signed on February 13, 2014.1                 Appellant has not identified the
    nature of that judgment or order, and our Clerk’s Office’s attempts to procure a certified
    copy of that judgment or order from the district clerk have revealed that there seems to
    have been no judgment or order signed on February 13, 2014. From the Court’s review
    of the notice of appeal and the available documents in connection with the underlying
    1
    Subsequently, this case was transferred to this Court from the Waco Court of Appeals pursuant
    to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West
    2013).
    trial court cause number 2010-3968-4, it does not appear that there has been a final,
    appealable order from which appellant may appeal to this Court.
    Applicable Law
    Generally, unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal,
    appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only. See Lehmann v. Har-Con
    Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it
    disposes of all pending parties and claims. Id.; see N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge,
    
    400 S.W.2d 893
    , 895 (Tex. 1966).        Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider
    immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate
    jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 
    967 S.W.2d 352
    , 352–53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). The
    absence of an appealable order deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider
    the appeal. See Qwest Commc’ns. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
    24 S.W.3d 334
    , 336 (Tex.
    2000) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v. Shouse, 
    877 S.W.2d 8
    , 10 (Tex. App.—El Paso
    1994, no writ).
    Analysis
    In the absence of any information regarding the nature or even existence of the
    order from which appellant attempts to appeal and in furtherance of our investigation
    into our own jurisdiction over this cause, we reviewed the extensive and detailed docket
    sheet provided by the district clerk to determine what order, if any, may have been
    entered on the date appellant has identified. The docket sheet indicates only that there
    was an email dated February 13, 2014, but its author, recipients, subject, and contents
    are not available from the notation on the docket sheet.
    2
    Even we were to assume that the trial court sent this email to indicate its rulings
    on a matter pending before it in this underlying cause, it is unlikely that this email would
    serve as a final, appealable judgment; generally, a trial court’s “[l]etters to counsel are
    not the kind of documents that constitute a judgment, decision[,] or order from which an
    appeal may be taken.” See Goff v. Tuchscherer, 
    627 S.W.2d 397
    , 398–99 (Tex. 1982)
    (per curiam).
    However, in the event that the email could be interpreted as a final, appealable
    order or that there existed another order that was not apparent from the docket sheet or
    other documents studied in our inquiry, we alerted the parties to this apparent
    jurisdictional defect by letter dated May 21, 2014 and provided an opportunity for
    appellant to show grounds no later than May 30, 2014, for continuing this appeal. See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. As of the date of this opinion, we have received no response from
    any party to this appeal to explain or remedy the jurisdictional defect apparent from the
    documents before us at this point. So, we again observe that there appears to be no
    judgment or order from which an appeal may be taken.
    Conclusion
    In the absence of an appealable order, we are without jurisdiction to entertain this
    appeal. See Qwest Commc’ns. 
    Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 336
    . We, therefore, dismiss this
    appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f).
    Mackey K. Hancock
    Justice
    3