Darrell Steven Greer v. State ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-13-00225-CR
________________________
DARRELL STEVEN GREER, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1296623; Honorable Michael Mitchell, Presiding
June 9, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Darrell Steven Greer, pleaded guilty in open court to an information
alleging he committed the class B misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated.1
Pursuant to a plea agreement he was sentenced to thirteen days confinement and fined
$650. In a single issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a), (b) (West Supp. 2013).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We use an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
Hudson v. State, 247 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.). In a
suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d
17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s ruling, State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999),
and “afford almost total deference to the trial judge’s determination of facts (if they are
supported by the record).” State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). Further, “[t]he winning side is afforded the ‘strongest legitimate view of the
evidence’ as well as all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it.” Id. at 571.
(quoting State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).
We review de novo the court’s application of the law of search and seizure to the
facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As no findings of fact
or conclusions of law were filed here, we will assume that the trial court made implicit
findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the
record. Id. at 855. If the trial court’s decision is correct on any theory of law applicable
to the case, we will affirm the decision. Id. at 855-56.
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DISCUSSION
The sole issue presented by Appellant at the suppression hearing was whether
Officer Dickinson had any reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate a traffic
stop.
A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than probable
cause if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific,
articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968);
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer
conducts a lawful temporary detention when he or she has reasonable suspicion to
believe that an individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that when combined with the
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a
particular person is, has been or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 492-93.
This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making
the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id. at 492.
Officer Dickinson testified at the hearing that, on September 3, 2012, at
approximately 3:30 a.m., he was dispatched to intercept a driver that was possibly
intoxicated. The dispatcher had received a 911 call from an identified driver who had
observed a Jeep Cherokee driving erratically. 2 The caller continued to observe the
Jeep and periodically updated the dispatcher as to the location of their respective
2
The dispatcher originally indicated the Jeep was white but, prior to any traffic stop, confirmed
the Jeep was, in fact, black.
3
vehicles. Officer Dickinson located the Jeep according to the caller’s vehicle
descriptions and periodic driving updates. As Officer Dickinson approached the Jeep,
the driver immediately slowed “dramatically,” i.e., from 55-65 mph to 30-40 mph, and
then veered from lane three to lane two without giving a turn signal prior to the lane
change. This activity was consistent with the description of the suspect’s behavior
provided earlier by the caller, i.e., dramatic speed variances. Prior to initiating a traffic
stop, Officer Dickinson testified the dispatcher confirmed the color of the Jeep was black
and gave him the first three digits of the Jeep’s license plate number. Based upon the
totality of these circumstances, Officer Dickinson testified he believed he had identified
the Jeep referred to by the 911 caller, and he observed a traffic violation. He then
initiated a traffic stop.
Based on Officer Dickinson’s testimony, the trial court determined he had
reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. We agree—not only did Officer
Dickinson have sufficient facts to form a reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving
erratically as reported by the 911 caller, but he also observed what he believed was a
traffic violation, i.e., changing lanes without giving the proper signal. See TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 545.104(a) (West 2011); Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 256-60 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). See also Favors v. State, No. 13-05-669-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS
9388, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (traffic stop legal where officer witnessed suspect change
lanes without signaling). Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in concluding
that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Appellant’s single issue is overruled.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
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