Luis Angel Galvan v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00373-CR
NO. 09-13-00374-CR
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LUIS ANGEL GALVAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 11-12721, 13-15755
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Luis Angel Galvan appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
deferred adjudication community supervision and imposition of sentence. In cause
number 11-12721, Galvan pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation, a second
degree felony. The trial court found the evidence sufficient to find Galvan guilty,
deferred further proceedings, placed Galvan on community supervision for three
years, and assessed a fine of $750. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke
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Galvan’s unadjudicated community supervision. At the hearing on the motion to
revoke, Galvan pleaded “true” to four violations of the conditions of his
community supervision. The trial court found that Galvan violated the terms of his
community supervision order, found him guilty of burglary of a habitation, and
assessed punishment at twenty years’ confinement.
In cause number 13-15755, Galvan pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated
assault, a third degree felony. The trial court found the evidence sufficient to find
Galvan guilty, deferred further proceedings, placed Galvan on community
supervision for five years, and assessed a fine of $500. The State subsequently
filed a motion to revoke Galvan’s unadjudicated community supervision. At the
hearing on the motion to revoke, Galvan pleaded “true” to four violations of the
conditions of his community supervision. The trial court found that Galvan
violated the terms of his community supervision order, found him guilty of
attempted aggravated assault, and assessed punishment at five years’ confinement
to run consecutively to cause number 11-12721.
On appeal, Galvan contends the trial court erred by assessing a fine in its
written judgment when the court did not orally pronounce a judgment at the time
of sentencing. He also argues the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the fine
against him.
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The trial court must orally pronounce a defendant’s sentence in the
defendant’s presence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (West Supp.
2013); Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). When there
is a conflict between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written
memorialization of that sentence—the written judgment—the oral pronouncement
controls. Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500. Here, however, there is no conflict. Galvan
complains of language contained on page two of the court’s judgments.
Specifically, he takes issue with the language in the judgments describing the
court’s prior deferred adjudication order, which includes the imposition of a fine.
Galvan contends that repeating this information in the judgments necessarily
imposes a fine against Galvan as the judgments order defendant to pay all unpaid
fines upon release from confinement. We disagree with Galvan’s interpretation of
the judgments. The judgments order “Defendant punished as indicated on page
[one]” and order “Defendant to pay all fines, court costs, and restitution as
indicated on page [one].” Page one of the judgments do not assess a fine. We have
reviewed both the written judgments and the oral pronouncements of punishment
in the appellate records. Because neither the written judgments nor the oral
pronouncements impose a fine, we find no conflict between the oral
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pronouncements and the written judgments. We, therefore, overrule Galvan’s
issues and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
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CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on December 3, 2013
Opinion Delivered December 11, 2013
Do not publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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