Conley Wendt v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                                         NO. 12-13-00073-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    CONLEY WENDT,                                           §       APPEAL FROM THE 349TH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                                      §       JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE                                                §       HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Conley Wendt appeals the revocation of his deferred adjudication community supervision.
    In two issues, Appellant argues the revocation constitutes an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance, cocaine. The
    trial court accepted Appellant’s plea, found the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of
    Appellant’s guilt, deferred further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and
    ordered that Appellant be placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years. 1
    The trial court also ordered that Appellant pay court costs and restitution.
    Later, the State filed a first amended motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt,
    alleging in three paragraphs that Appellant had violated the terms of his community supervision.
    At the hearing on the application, Appellant pleaded “true” to all the allegations contained in the
    State’s motion. After a hearing, the trial court found the allegations to be “true,” adjudged
    Appellant guilty of the underlying third degree felony offense, and assessed his punishment at
    seven years of imprisonment and court costs. This appeal followed.
    1
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5(a) (West Supp. 2013).
    EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY
    In his first and second issues, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by
    revoking his community supervision because the evidence is insufficient to show that he violated a
    condition of his community supervision. In his first issue, he contends the condition alleged to
    have been violated, i.e., that he not commit an offense against the laws of this State or any other
    State of the United States or of any governmental entity, does not appear to have been imposed in
    the order of community supervision. In his second issue, he argues that he was entitled to the
    affirmative defense of necessity.
    Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    In community supervision revocation cases, the state has the burden to establish by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the terms and conditions of community supervision have been
    violated. See Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The preponderance
    of the evidence standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence before the trial
    court supports a reasonable belief that a condition of community supervision has been violated.
    Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    When the state has met its burden of proof and no procedural obstacle is raised, the
    decision whether to revoke community supervision is within the discretion of the trial court.
    Flournoy v. State, 
    589 S.W.2d 705
    , 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Thus, our review of the trial
    court’s order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court
    abused its discretion. Caddell v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 275
    , 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). When a
    trial court finds several violations of community supervision conditions, we affirm the revocation
    order if the proof of any single allegation is sufficient. See Hart v. State, 
    264 S.W.3d 364
    , 367
    (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d); Cochran v. State, 
    78 S.W.3d 20
    , 28 (Tex. App.—Tyler
    2002, no pet.). In other words, if there is some evidence to support the finding of even a single
    violation, the revocation order must be upheld. 
    Cochran, 78 S.W.3d at 28
    (citing Moore v. State,
    
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). A plea of “true,” standing alone, is sufficient to
    support a revocation of community supervision. Moses v. State, 
    590 S.W.2d 469
    , 470 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1979); Cole v. State, 
    578 S.W.2d 127
    , 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Indeed, an
    appellant cannot question the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the decision once he has
    pleaded “true.” See 
    Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128
    ; Moore v. State, 
    11 S.W.3d 495
    , 498 n. 1 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
    2
    Analysis
    Here, Appellant pleaded “true” to all of the allegations in the State’s motion that he
    violated the terms of his community supervision by possessing a controlled substance. Appellant’s
    plea of “true” to any of these violations is sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation order.
    See 
    Moses, 590 S.W.2d at 470
    ; 
    Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128
    . But even if this were not the law, the
    result would not change.
    Regarding the conditions of Appellant’s community supervision (his first issue), a
    supplement to the clerk’s record filed in this case includes an order imposing conditions of
    community supervision signed by Appellant on the day he pleaded guilty to the underlying
    offense. This order reveals that the first condition is an order for Appellant to commit no offense
    against the laws of this State or any other State of the United States or of any governmental entity.
    Moreover, regarding his entitlement to the affirmative defense of necessity (his second issue),
    Appellant did not raise necessity during his revocation hearing. Nor did he request that the trial
    court consider necessity as an affirmative defense to the allegations in the State’s motion.
    Therefore, even if he had not pleaded “true” to the State’s allegations, he would be unable to make
    this complaint on appeal. See Suell v. State, No. 12-07-00193-CR, 
    2008 WL 836557
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Tyler Mar. 31, 2008, no pet.) (appellant not allowed to raise affirmative defense of
    entrapment for first time on appeal).
    Because Appellant’s plea of “true” to any of the State’s allegations supported the
    revocation order, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s community
    supervision. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first and second issues.
    DISPOSITION
    Having overruled Appellant’s first and second issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered December 20, 2013.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
    (DO NOT          PUBLISH)
    3
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    DECEMBER 20, 2013
    NO. 12-13-00073-CR
    CONLEY WENDT,
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 349th District Court
    of Houston County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 08CR-153)
    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
    herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
    judgment.
    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
    of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
    below for observance.
    Brian Hoyle, Justice.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.