Aaron Zane Somers v. State ( 2013 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00387-CR
    AARON ZANE SOMERS,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 272nd District Court
    Brazos County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 08-00910-CRF-272
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
    Aaron Somers appealed from his conviction for intoxication manslaughter, for
    which he was sentenced to twelve years in prison. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 49.08 (West
    2011). On original submission, this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
    Somers v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 747
    (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. granted) ("Somers I"). The
    Court of Criminal Appeals reversed our decision in part on the only ground before it
    and determined that an enzyme-multiplied immunoassay technique, or EMIT test, is
    scientifically reliable. Somers v. State, 
    368 S.W.3d 528
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ("Somers
    II"). That Court remanded this proceeding to this Court to determine whether the trial
    court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony regarding the results of
    the EMIT test of the victim's blood. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The scope of this opinion is limited
    to the issue remanded from the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Somers 
    II, 368 S.W.3d at 545
    . Because we resolved Somers's other issues in our prior opinion, we will not
    address them here. See, generally, Somers 
    I, 333 S.W.3d at 747
    .
    Admission of Evidence
    Somers complains that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit
    expert testimony regarding the results of the EMIT test conducted on the victim's blood
    because the results of the EMIT test would have aided his defense, which was that the
    victim was already deceased at the time of the collision due to a heart attack from
    cocaine use. The State contends that the testimony setting forth and explaining the
    results are not relevant or that even if it was relevant, the potential for undue prejudice
    is substantially greater than the probative value. Because the facts were set forth at
    length in prior opinions, we will not restate them here except as necessary to our
    disposition.
    Standard of Review
    An appellate court may not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings absent an
    abuse of discretion. Winegarner v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 787
    , 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As
    Somers v. State                                                                      Page 2
    long as the trial court's decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and
    was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, it must be upheld. 
    Id. (citing Montgomery
    v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (op. on
    reh'g)). The exclusion or admission of evidence does not result in reversible error
    unless it affects a substantial right of the accused. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a), (b).
    Relevance
    Before admitting expert testimony, the Texas Rules of Evidence require a trial
    judge to make three separate inquiries: qualification, reliability, and relevance. See Vela
    v. State, 
    209 S.W.3d 128
    , 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also TEX. RS. EVID. 104(a), 401,
    402, & 702.       Pursuant to relevance, the inquiry is whether admitting the expert
    testimony will actually assist the fact finder in deciding the case. See 
    Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131
    . Rules 401 and 402 render testimony admissible only if it "tend[s] to make the
    existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
    probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." TEX. R. EVID. 401; see
    
    Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131
    .
    Analysis
    In her dissent to the majority's opinion in Somers, Judge Johnson of the Court of
    Criminal Appeals stated:
    Both [experts] testified that EMIT testing could not reveal when
    cocaine was ingested, how it was ingested, how much was ingested, how
    many times the user had used cocaine, whether the user was a frequent
    user, or whether the user had overdosed. Even considering the
    Somers v. State                                                                           Page 3
    unconfirmed results of the EMIT test, the complainant could have
    ingested cocaine 10 minutes or four days before the collision.
    The cause of death, blunt force trauma, does not correlate to use of
    cocaine, but it does correlate to a violent collision between two
    automobiles. The state's collision reconstruction witness testified that the
    complainant's car was struck from the rear while it was in gear and
    stopped on the shoulder of the road with the left tires on or close to the
    white fog line. With its tires pointing straight ahead and traveling at
    about 60 miles per hour, the right front of appellant's truck struck the left
    rear of the complainant's car with no indication of any avoidance
    maneuvering or hard braking before the point of impact. About half the
    width of each vehicle was within the zone of impact. Even if the
    complainant had ingested cocaine just before impact, it could have no
    relevance in a crash in which appellant literally ran up the complainant's
    tailpipe, causing her car to violently rotate 180° and his car to use her left
    rear quarter panel as a spring board with enough force to launch his 5000-
    pound truck into a double layout somersault with a full twist. In the face
    of such evidence, cocaine use at some indeterminate time in some
    indeterminate amount had no relevance or probative value. The trial
    judge correctly ruled that the unconfirmed EMIT test would not be
    admitted, and that ruling should be affirmed.
    Somers II, 
    368 S.W.3d 528
    , 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Johnson, J. dissenting).
    We agree with Judge Johnson's dissent that the evidence was not relevant. The
    record contains no evidence that Briggs was dead from a cocaine-induced heart attack
    prior to the collision caused by Somers. Briggs sustained severe spinal cord injuries in
    the accident and blunt force trauma was ruled to be the cause of death. There was no
    damage to Briggs's heart or other sign of a cocaine-induced heart attack found in the
    autopsy. We find that the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony and the results
    of the EMIT test were within the zone of reasonable disagreement and therefore the trial
    Somers v. State                                                                          Page 4
    court did not abuse its discretion.            We overrule issue two from Somers's original
    submission.1
    Conclusion
    Having found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the exclusion of
    the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed August 1, 2013
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    1 Based on arguments made at the oral argument in this cause post-remand, in our review of Somers's
    argument that the victim was already dead as the result of a cocaine-induced heart attack at the time of
    the collision, we asked the parties to brief the issue of concurrent causation and the resuscitation of the
    victim. Given our disposition of the issue we now find it unnecessary to address that argument.
    Somers v. State                                                                                     Page 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-09-00387-CR

Filed Date: 8/1/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015