Ex Parte Eugene Lamar Jenkins ( 2013 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-13-00030-CR
    EX PARTE EUGENE LAMAR JENKINS
    From the 272nd District Court
    Brazos County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 12-01244-CRF-272
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Eugene Jenkins was indicted for the offense of capital murder, and he was held
    on a $500,000 bond. Jenkins filed a motion for bail reduction seeking to reduce his bail
    to personal recognizance bond. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and
    reduced the bail to $100,000. Jenkins appeals from the trial court’s order. We affirm.
    Jenkins argues in his sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to
    grant him a personal recognizance bond because the State was not ready for trial within
    ninety days from the commencement of his detention. A defendant who is detained in
    jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on personal bond
    or by reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of the
    criminal action for which he is being detained within 90 days from the commencement
    of his detention if he is accused of a felony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO ANN. art. 17.151 (West
    Supp. 2012).
    We review a trial court's decision to deny relief on a claim that the trial court
    violated article 17.151 for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte Craft, 
    301 S.W.3d 447
    , 448
    (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); Ex parte Karlson, 
    282 S.W.3d 118
    , 127-28 (Tex.App.-
    -Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we view the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the ruling. Ex parte 
    Craft, 301 S.W.3d at 449
    ; Ex parte
    
    Karlson, 282 S.W.3d at 127-28
    .
    When a defendant complains the State was not ready within the statutory time
    period, the State had the burden to make a prima facie showing that it was. Ex parte
    Brosky, 
    863 S.W.2d 775
    , 778 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, no pet.). Once the State makes
    its prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut it. 
    Id. In the
    absence
    of a sufficient rebuttal, the trial court has the discretion to find the State was timely
    ready for trial. 
    Id. The question
    of the State's "readiness" within the statutory limits
    refers to the preparedness of the prosecution for trial. Behrend v. State, 
    729 S.W.2d 717
    ,
    720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Ex parte 
    Brosky, 863 S.W.2d at 778
    . No bright line rule has
    emerged concerning just how much or what type of evidence the State must have
    available for trial in order to be prepared for trial. Behrend v. 
    State, 729 S.W.2d at 720
    .
    Jenkins argues that the State was not ready for trial because a key witness, co-
    defendant Clifton Montgomery, was not available. Jenkins contends that Montgomery
    was unavailable because there was no agreement for Montgomery to waive his right
    Ex parte Jenkins                                                                        Page 2
    against self-incrimination and testify against Jenkins. At the hearing, the attorney for
    the State informed the trial court:
    It is absolutely my belief that Clifton Montgomery is absolutely going to
    testify in this case …
    Clifton Montgomery has already confessed and Clifton Montgomery has
    already implicated [Jenkins].
    And if I need to, I will put Clifton Montgomery on the witness stand and I
    will offer Clifton Montgomery immunity to anything he testifies to in this
    court … So, one way or another, Clifton Montgomery is going to testify in
    this case, and he has already implicated [Jenkins].
    So long as the State was ready or prepared to go to trial and in good faith was
    ready to attempt with witnesses or evidence to persuade a jury of the offense within the
    time limitations, the readiness requirements of article 17.151 are satisfied. See Behrend v.
    
    State, 729 S.W.2d at 721
    . The State satisfied its burden to show that it was “ready” for
    trial, and Jenkins did not rebut this presumption. The trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Jenkins’s release on a personal recognizance bond. We overrule
    the sole issue on appeal.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    AL SCOGGINS
    Justice
    Ex parte Jenkins                                                                      Page 3
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed May 16, 2013
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Ex parte Jenkins                           Page 4