Gilbert Grimaldo v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00638-CR
GILBERT GRIMALDO APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1243882D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Gilbert Grimaldo appeals his conviction and sixty-year sentence
for aggravated assault. 2 We affirm.
Appellant’s indictment alleged that he had injured a woman by hitting,
grabbing, and dragging her; that he had also threatened imminent bodily injury to
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011).
her; and that he had used or exhibited a deadly weapon (a knife) during the
assault. The indictment contained a repeat offender notice, alleging that
appellant had been previously convicted of murder.
Appellant filed various pretrial documents and pled not guilty. A jury
convicted him, and after he pled true to the indictment’s repeat offender notice,
the trial court found the notice to be true and sentenced him to sixty years’
confinement. He brought this appeal.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief and motion, counsel
avers that he has diligently reviewed the record and opines that this appeal is
frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v.
California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–
45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (analyzing the effect of Anders).
Appellant filed a pro se response to his counsel’s brief, contending that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The State filed a brief, arguing
that the evidence is “amply sufficient.”
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
must independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,
511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Roots v. State, 419 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—
2
Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988);
Roots, 419 S.W.3d at 723. We have carefully reviewed the record, appellant’s
counsel’s brief, appellant’s pro se response, and the State’s brief. We agree with
appellant’s counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find
nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State,
206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court's judgment. See Roots,
419 S.W.3d at 723.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 18, 2014
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