Ronald Wayne Jackson, Jr. v. State ( 2013 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12-00285-CR
RONALD WAYNE JACKSON, JR.,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2011-1626-C2
DISSENTING OPINION
If a parent punishes a child so severely that flesh is removed from the child’s
buttocks, causing open oozing wounds, and also in the course of punishing the child
strikes the child with enough force to break bones in the child’s hands and then keeps
the child at home for the next four days, the first and last of which are school days,
withholding medical treatment while the child is obviously in pain and the use of his
hand is substantially impaired, has the parent committed one crime of injury to a child,
or two? The appellant, the State, and the Court find only one. I believe there are two.
I am not unmindful of the case the appellant, the State, and the Court reply upon.
See Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Nor am I unmindful of the
more recent case of Villanueva, or a long line of cases that have held that injury to a child
is a result oriented crime. See Villanueva v. State, 227 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
But what strikes me in this case, as hard as Jackson struck his son, is that at least
as charged and tried in this case, there were two results sufficiently distinct to charge
and prosecute as separate violations of the same penal code provision – the violation of
the same statute but not with the same result; therefore, two separate crimes. This case
presents the narrow hypothetical as recognized and discussed in Villanueva. Id. at 748-
749. At the very least, the evidence of the impaired use of his hand and the untreated
pain over the four day time period before school personnel intervened on the fifth day
negates the conclusion that the double jeopardy violation was apparent on the face of
the record and, thus, did not require preservation. See Ramirez v. State, 36 S.W.3d 660
(Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref’d). Had there been an objection and it was decided at
the trial level that there would be a double jeopardy violation, a distinct possibility
since the State now attempts to concede error, there would have been a single count
presented to the jury with alternative manner and means upon which unanimity would
not have been required. Thus, if this is a double jeopardy violation, I do not believe it is
immune to the preservation requirement. See id.
Jackson v. State Page 2
And if I am wrong on the double jeopardy question, I note that all that is
necessary for the disposition of this proceeding is section III of the Court’s opinion and
there is no need to discuss anything with regard to Count I. Thus, the entire discussion
and analysis in section II of the opinion is unnecessary dicta. Indeed, even the factual
background is largely irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
In summary, I understand that Count II was not argued as distinctly as it might
have been, but, nevertheless, I believe the injuries inflicted by omission by failing to
seek medical attention are sufficiently distinct so as to make Jackson’s conduct after
initially inflicting the injuries a separate and distinct violation of the same provision of
the penal code – injury to a child. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the Court’s
judgment acquitting Jackson of Count I – injury to a child.1
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Dissenting opinion delivered and filed on February 14, 2013
1
I also note the judgment erroneously recites that the defendant pled guilty and would reform it to recite
that Jackson pled NOT guilty.
Jackson v. State Page 3