Edson Hedivaldo Olvera-Garza Sr. v. State ( 2012 )


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  •                                           In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    _________________
    NO. 09-11-00073-CR
    _________________
    EDSON HEDIVALDO OLVERA-GARZA SR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 435th District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 10-08-09235-CR
    ________________________________________________________________________
    ORDER
    The appellant, Edson Hedivaldo Olvera-Garza Sr., has challenged the trial court’s
    ruling denying his motion seeking to suppress the oral and written statements he gave to
    the police. One of Olvera’s issues argues that the trial court erred by failing to make
    written findings regarding its ruling on his motion to suppress.
    The Code of Criminal Procedure anticipates that a trial court will make written
    findings in response to a defendant’s motion challenging the voluntariness of a statement.
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 (West 2005). Upon finding that a
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    defendant’s statement was made voluntarily, “the court must enter an order stating its
    conclusion as to whether or not the statement was voluntarily made, along with the
    specific finding of facts upon which the conclusion was based, which order shall be filed
    among the papers of the cause.” Id.
    At the conclusion of the suppression hearing in Olvera’s case, the trial court stated
    the following findings and conclusions on the record:
    “the defendant was not in custody at the time that he gave his statement to
    the police[;]”
    “a person is brought into contact with the police, acting only upon a request
    or urging the police[;]”
    “there is no threat expressed or implied that a statement was gonna be
    taken forcibly[,] when the statement’s taken[,] that the statement is
    valid[;]”
    “the statement was voluntary when it was given based upon the evidence of
    Detective Haas and of the defendant[;]” [and]
    “[s]o the statement [is] gonna be allowed into evidence.”
    These findings address one of the arguments Olvera has made, that he was in
    custody before being provided with his Miranda1 warnings; however, the findings are not
    sufficient to allow an adequate review of each of the issues Olvera has raised in his
    appeal. See State v. Cullen, 
    195 S.W.3d 696
    , 698-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Hester v.
    State, 
    535 S.W.2d 354
    , 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The findings that should be made
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L.Ed.2d 694
     (1966).
    2
    explicit in written findings include those that relate to the factors discussed by the Court
    of Criminal Appeals in Dowthitt v. State, including:
    whether and when Olvera was physically deprived of his freedom of action
    in any significant way, and what objective circumstances the trial court
    considered in determining whether Olvera’s freedom of movement was
    restricted to the degree associated with an arrest;
    whether and when a law enforcement officer told Olvera he could leave, or
    told him that he could not leave;
    whether and when law enforcement officers created a situation that would
    have made a reasonable person believe his freedom of movement was
    significantly restricted, identifying the objective circumstances the trial
    court considered in making that determination; and
    the point at which the law enforcement officers developed probable cause
    for Olvera’s arrest, when that knowledge was communicated to Olvera or
    Olvera communicated evidence of probable cause to the officers, and
    whether Olvera was told he was free to leave after that point.
    
    931 S.W.2d 244
    , 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also State v. Ortiz, No. PD-1181-11,
    
    2012 WL 5348503
    , at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2012).
    The trial court’s findings are also insufficient to allow adequate review of Olvera’s
    claim that the officers deliberately delayed providing him with a Miranda warning. See
    Missouri v. Seibert, 
    542 U.S. 600
    , 608-12, 
    124 S.Ct. 2601
    , 
    159 L.Ed.2d 643
     (2004)
    (plurality opinion); Carter v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 31
    , 37-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The
    trial court’s written findings should make explicit its findings regarding:
    whether Detective Haas deliberately employed a “question first, warn later”
    approach, identifying the objective circumstances the trial court considered
    in making that determination;
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    whether Detective Echols deliberately employed a “question first, warn
    later” approach, identifying the objective circumstances the trial court
    considered in making that determination; and
    whether law enforcement officers employed any curative measures to
    protect Olvera’s Fifth Amendment rights before taking Olvera’s written
    statement, identifying the objective circumstances the trial court considered
    in making that determination.
    It is, therefore, ORDERED that the case is remanded to the trial court to allow the
    trial court to make the written findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to
    resolve Olvera’s appellate issues. In addition to the trial court’s findings on the issues that
    we have identified, the trial court may make such other findings as it finds are proper.
    We abate the appeal while the case is before the trial court. The trial court’s
    findings and conclusions must be reduced to writing and filed in a supplemental clerk’s
    record within thirty days. The appeal will be reinstated without further order of the Court
    when the supplemental clerk’s record is filed.
    The appellant may file a supplemental brief addressing the trial court’s findings.
    The appellant’s supplemental brief is due thirty days after the supplemental record is
    filed. If the appellant files a supplemental brief, the State may file a supplemental brief in
    response, due thirty days after the appellant files his supplemental brief.
    ORDER ENTERED December 13, 2012.
    PER CURIAM
    Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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