Daniel Singleton v. State ( 2012 )


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  •                                    IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-11-00303-CR
    DANIEL SINGLETON,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 220th District Court
    Hamilton County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CR-07617
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Oran Daniel Singleton was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in an
    amount of more than four grams but less than 200 grams. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
    CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (d) (West 2010). He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. We
    affirm.
    Singleton contends in one issue that the trial court erred when it refused to
    disclose the informant's identity in open court and hold an in-camera hearing to
    evaluate the informant's reliability. Singleton asserts that disclosure of the informant's
    identity is necessary because there was a reasonable probability that the confidential
    informant would be a material witness to his guilt or innocence.
    We review a trial court's denial of a motion to disclose a confidential informant
    under an abuse of discretion standard. See Taylor v. State, 
    604 S.W.2d 175
    , 179 (Tex.
    Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 
    98 S.W.3d 349
    , 355 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). Generally, the State has a privilege to refuse to disclose the
    identity of a confidential informant who has furnished information to a law
    enforcement officer conducting an investigation. See TEX. R. EVID. 508(a). There are
    three exceptions that may require the State to disclose the identity of the informant. See
    TEX. R. EVID. 508(c)(1)-(3). Singleton relies on the second exception, which provides in
    pertinent part:
    Testimony on Merits. If it appears from the evidence in the case or from
    other showing by a party that an informer may be able to give testimony
    necessary to a fair determination of … guilt or innocence in a criminal
    case, and the public entity invokes the privilege, the court shall give the
    public entity an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to
    determining whether the informant can, in fact, supply that testimony.
    TEX. R. EVID. 508(c)(2).
    The defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the confidential informant
    may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the defendant's guilt
    or innocence. 
    Id. This initial
    burden has been described as a "plausible showing." Bodin
    v. State, 
    807 S.W.2d 313
    , 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). "Evidence from any source, but not
    mere conjecture or speculation must be presented to make the required showing that
    Singleton v. State                                                                     Page 2
    the informant's identity must be disclosed." 
    Id. If the
    defendant meets the burden of
    making the preliminary showing, then the trial court is required to hold an in-camera
    hearing. See Bailey v. State, 
    804 S.W.2d 226
    , 230 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1991, no pet.).
    The in-camera hearing provides the State the opportunity to show facts that rebut the
    defendant's preliminary showing. 
    Id. Whenever an
    informant is an eyewitness to an alleged offense, then that
    informant can give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
    innocence. Anderson v. State, 
    817 S.W.2d 69
    , 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, when
    the informant's information is used only to establish probable cause and the informant
    was not a participant in the offense for which the defendant is charged, the identity of
    the informant need not be disclosed because his testimony is not essential to a fair
    determination of guilt. See Washington v. State, 
    902 S.W.2d 649
    , 656-57 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd).
    Singleton argues on appeal that only the informants could place the drugs, the
    buy money, and Singleton at the scene. Further, because one of the informants may
    have been female, he argues that a single deputy acting alone could not properly search
    two persons of differing gender.          He also argues that he could have attacked the
    credibility of the female informant which would have cast doubt on Singleton’s guilt.
    These informants, however, could offer no testimony about the actual offense.
    There is no evidence that the confidential informants participated in the offense for
    Singleton v. State                                                                 Page 3
    which Singleton was charged, that is, possession of methamphetamine, nor is there
    evidence the informants were eyewitnesses to the search. The informants’ testimony
    would only be relevant to the issue of probable cause, thus making it unnecessary for
    the identity of the informants to be disclosed.           
    Washington, 902 S.W.2d at 657
    .
    Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an in-
    camera hearing or to disclose the identity of the informants. Ford v. State, 
    179 S.W.3d 203
    , 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd). Singleton’s sole issue is
    overruled.
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed June 20, 2012
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Singleton v. State                                                                 Page 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-11-00303-CR

Filed Date: 6/20/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015