Ex Parte Kendi Allen Page ( 2012 )


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  •                                      IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-12-00117-CR
    EX PARTE KENDI ALLEN PAGE,
    Appellant
    From the 54th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2012-0192-C2
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Kendi Allen Page, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial court’s
    denial of his application for the writ of habeas corpus. In his application, Page claimed
    that he was being illegally restrained on two charges of aggravated assault. See Dahesh
    v. State, 
    51 S.W.3d 300
    , 302 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (noting
    that a habeas-corpus proceeding is to secure discharge of one restrained of his liberty).
    Specifically, Page asserted that the State did not indict him within ninety days of his
    arrest; he is indigent; and he is entitled to a personal-recognizance bond. We dismiss
    Page’s complaints as moot.1
    1  On May 30, 2012, the State filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. In light of our opinion, we
    dismiss the State’s motion as moot.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    Page alleges that he was arrested on the aggravated assault counts on November
    2, 2011. According to Page, his bail in each case was initially set at $50,000. And
    because he was determined to be indigent, Page was appointed counsel.
    Thereafter, in April 2012, Page filed a pro se application for writ of habeas
    corpus, asserting that he was not indicted within ninety days of his arrest and
    requesting a personal-recognizance bond on the basis that he is indigent.2 See TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151, § 1(1) (West Supp. 2011) (providing that a defendant
    may be entitled to either a personal-recognizance bond or a bail reduction if the State is
    not ready for trial within ninety days of his arrest). The trial court denied Page’s pro se
    habeas corpus application on April 3, 2012. It is from this ruling that Page now appeals.
    Nevertheless, on April 25, 2012, Page’s trial counsel filed an application for writ
    of habeas corpus. The trial court conducted a hearing on this habeas corpus application
    on April 27, 2012, and subsequently granted the writ and reduced Page’s bail to $10,000.
    We have received notice that Page is no longer in custody.
    2
    We note that Page is still represented by counsel, and the record does not demonstrate that
    Page’s trial counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in the trial court or that he has been removed as
    Page’s attorney in some other fashion. Moreover, none of Page’s pro se filings appear to be served on his
    trial counsel. The court of criminal appeals has held that a party represented by counsel is not entitled to
    hybrid representation. See Ex parte Bohannon, 
    350 S.W.3d 116
    , 116 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that
    the court disregarded and took no action on a habeas corpus applicant’s pro se submissions because he
    was represented by counsel); see also Ex parte Taylor, 
    36 S.W.3d 883
    , 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Page has
    not adequately explained that he is entitled to advance pro se in this matter, considering he is currently
    represented by counsel.
    Ex parte Page                                                                                        Page 2
    II.   ANALYSIS
    Because Page is no longer incarcerated, we conclude that Page’s contentions
    pertaining to pre-trial confinement are moot. See Martinez v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 620
    , 620
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (holding that if a habeas-corpus applicant is no longer
    subject to pre-trial confinement, then the applicant’s petition is moot and the reviewing
    court will not address the merits of his petition); Danziger v. State, 
    786 S.W.2d 723
    , 724
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam); see also Bennet v. State, 
    818 S.W.2d 199
    , 200 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.) (“‘[W]here the premise of a habeas corpus
    application is destroyed by subsequent developments, the legal issues raised
    thereunder are rendered moot.’” (quoting Saucedo v. State, 
    795 S.W.2d 8
    , 9 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.))). Accordingly, we dismiss Page’s appeal of the trial
    court’s denial of his pro se habeas corpus application as moot.
    AL SCOGGINS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Dismissed
    Opinion delivered and filed June 13, 2012
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Ex parte Page                                                                       Page 3