Sam Sendejo v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                              NUMBER 13-13-00687-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    SAM SENDEJO,                                                                 Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.
    On appeal from the 105th District Court
    of Kleberg County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    Appellant, Sam Sendejo, was indicted for possession of cocaine, less than four
    grams, a third-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (West,
    Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). On January 12, 2005, appellant pleaded guilty to the
    offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to three years’ confinement, probated for
    three years, and assessed a $2,500 fine. Following a motion to revoke filed by the State
    on August 5, 2007, the trial court extended the term of appellant’s probation until January
    11, 2015. On May 16, 2013, the State filed its third motion to revoke alleging that
    appellant had committed six violations of his community supervision. The trial court
    conducted a hearing on the motion on June 3, 2013, at which appellant pleaded true to
    the allegations of consumption of alcohol, failure to pay supervision fees, and failure to
    pay attorneys’ fees. Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations of criminal mischief,
    theft, and criminal trespass.     After considering evidence, the trial court found the
    allegations of criminal mischief and theft true.       The trial court revoked appellant’s
    community supervision and assessed his punishment at the original sentence of three
    years’ confinement.
    Concluding that there are no errors that would result in the reversal of the judgment
    of the trial court, appellant’s counsel filed an Anders brief in which he reviewed the merits,
    or lack thereof, of the appeal. We affirm.
    I.      ANDERS BRIEF
    Pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967), appellant’s appellate
    counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief with this Court stating that he has found
    no reversible error committed by the trial court and no arguable ground of error upon
    which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders
    as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds
    to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error
    if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural
    history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 340
    ,
    343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    ,
    510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    2
    In compliance with High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
    Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has explained why, under controlling authority, there are
    no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. In his Anders brief, counsel noted that
    he specifically considered “whether Sendejo’s plea of true and the evidence presented
    were sufficient to support the revocation of his probation and reasonable sentence.”
    Counsel has informed this Court that he has complied with the requirements of Anders
    by (1) examining the record and applicable law and finding no arguable grounds to
    advance on appeal, (2) serving a copy of the brief and motion to withdraw as counsel on
    appellant, and (3) informing appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se
    response raising any ground of error or complaint which he may desire.1 See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510
    n.3; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23.     More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has not
    filed a pro se response with this Court. See In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n. 23.
    II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW
    Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
    proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s Anders brief, and we
    have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by
    indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the
    record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of
    1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with
    the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the
    court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the
    case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
    (quoting Wilson v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 693
    , 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
    3
    Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509
    . There is no
    reversible error in the record. Accordingly, we affirm.
    III.     MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for
    permission to withdraw as counsel.                See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; see also In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408
    n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 776
    , 779–80 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must
    withdraw from representing the appellant.                   To withdraw from representation, the
    appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
    appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered
    to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and advise him of his right to file
    a petition for discretionary review.2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412
    n.35; Ex parte Owens, 
    206 S.W.3d 670
    , 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    /s/ Rogelio Valdez
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    26th day of June, 2014.
    2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
    by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
    review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
    within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
    for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
    discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See 
    id. R. 68.3.
    Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules
    of Appellate Procedure. See 
    id. R. 68.4.
    4