Ex Parte: Tricha Ann McLendon ( 2011 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-11-00162-CR
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EX PARTE: TRICHA ANN MCLENDON
On Appeal from the 6th Judicial District Court
Red River County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-00974
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Moseley
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Carter
OPINION
Tricha Ann McLendon was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was
sentenced to two years’ confinement. McLendon, an indigent defendant, filed a motion for
reasonable bail pending appeal requesting to either ―be permitted to remain at large on the existing
bail‖ or ―be admitted to reasonable bail, in the amount of no more than $2,500, until conviction
becomes final.‖ The trial court set bond in the amount of $50,000.00 and ordered weekly drug
testing as a condition of bond. McLendon appeals, arguing that the amount of bond was
unreasonable and that the trial court had no authority to order weekly drug testing. McLendon
failed to preserve error by neglecting to notify the trial court of her objection to the bond condition,
and we find the amount of the bond reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. McLendon’s Complaint Relating to Bond Condition Was Not Preserved
McLendon challenges the condition of bail requiring her to undergo weekly drug testing.
Although McLendon had a right to appeal the order of the trial court that set the condition of drug
testing, she was not relieved of the requirement to preserve error by bringing her complaint about
the condition to the attention of the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Margoitta v. State, 994
S.W.2d 336, 338–39 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (citing Hill v. State, 902 S.W.2d 57, 60
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d)). Because McLendon failed to preserve this
point of error by raising it below, the point of error is overruled.
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II. Bond Amount Was Reasonable
Article 44.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled ―Bond pending appeal‖
authorized the trial court to admit McLendon to ―reasonable bail‖ and ―impose reasonable
conditions on bail,‖ pending finality of her conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
44.04(c) (West 2006). In reviewing bail, we are guided by Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, and we reverse a lower court’s determination only if we find an abuse of
discretion. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2005). That is, we will reverse the trial
court’s decision only if it was made without reference to any guiding principles or was, in other
words, arbitrary or unreasonable. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990). Even if we would have reached a different result, we will not intervene if the trial court’s
ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 391 (op. on reh’g).
Under Texas law, the amount of bail required in any case is within the discretion of the
court, judge, magistrate, or officer taking the bail, subject to the following rules:
1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that
the undertaking will be complied with.
2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an
instrument of oppression.
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was
committed are to be considered.
4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken
upon this point.
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5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the
community shall be considered.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15. In addition, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
directed courts to consider the work record, family and community ties, length of residency, prior
criminal record (if any), and any aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the
offense the accused is charged with committing. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
Generally, a writ applicant has the burden of proving the facts which would entitle the
applicant to relief. Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The same
holds true for an applicant in a bail reduction proceeding. See Ex parte Charlesworth, 600
S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Although a hearing on the motion for
reasonable bail was set, it was not held.1 We will examine the existing record as presented to us to
determine reasonableness of the amount of bail.
The nature of the offense and circumstances surrounding the crime are primary factors in
determining what constitutes reasonable bail. See Ex parte Davila, 623 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. ref’d). In considering the nature of the offense, it is also proper to consider the possible
punishment. Maldonado v. State, 999 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
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In a letter dated November 8, 2011, this Court recited it had ―been informed by telephone that a hearing on this motion
did not occur,‖ and asked the trial court to ―confirm in writing, within ten days of the date of this letter, that no hearing
was held on this motion on August 8th, and that no hearing on bail pending appeal was conducted.‖ The court failed
to respond to our request. In the absence of a response, and because the court’s docket sheet does not reflect the
occurrence of a hearing, we proceed as if none occurred.
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pet. ref’d). McLendon was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine in an amount less
than one gram and received the maximum two-year sentence for this state jail felony. The nature
of this crime suggests that the bond amount of $50,000.00 may be unreasonable.
A criminal defendant’s ability to make bond is ―merely one factor to be considered in
determining the appropriate amount of bond.‖ Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth, no pet.) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(4)). Here, while there
was no hearing on the motion for reasonable bail, the record establishes that McLendon was
indigent and was represented by appointed counsel during appeal. The only work history
provided was that she ―drive[s] a bulldozer for my ex-husband.‖ No mention of her wages was
made. Yet, ―[t]o show that he is unable to make bail, a defendant generally must show that his
funds and his family’s funds have been exhausted.‖ Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The record demonstrates that McLendon met her bail
pending trial, which was $3,000.00. Without a record establishing McLendon’s access to family
funds, a record which McLendon had the burden to secure, we find this factor neutral.
There is no mention in the record suggesting there was a victim in this drug possession
case, nullifying the requirement to provide for the victim’s future safety. Also, this was a
nonviolent crime, and no evidence related to the future safety of the community was presented.
However, at a previous revocation hearing, the trial court heard that McLendon ―has a pending
case in Titus County,‖ indicating a possible prior criminal history.
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This offense occurred in Red River County. The motion for reasonable bail states
―McLendon is a native of Red River County and has family ties to Red River County.‖ Although
she might be a native of the county, McLendon testified during the revocation hearing that she had
―not lived in Red River County in over five years.‖ The record also establishes that McLendon
tested positive for amphetamines during the pendency of this case. McLendon’s drug use,
combined with the fact that she was not a resident of Red River County, could have led the trial
court to determine that McLendon was a flight risk.
Based on this record, we cannot hold that the trial court acted without reference to any
guiding principles or was arbitrary or unreasonable in setting the bond amount. We overrule
McLendon’s point of error.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
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DISSENTING OPINION
The statute requires that four objective factors be considered in setting bail; all of them
indicate that this bail setting is unreasonable.
1. Reasonable assurance of compliance––McLendon apparently complied with a
pretrial bond set at $3,000.00 and appeared so that her case was processed. If we draw any
conclusion from this information, it would be that her history does not support a finding that such
a substantial bail was required to give reasonable assurance of her compliance.
2. Nature of the offense––This is the lowest level felony offense (state jail) and the
maximum punishment is two years’ incarceration. The conviction was for her personal
possession of less than one gram of a controlled substance.
3. Ability to make bond––She is indigent, which means she has little or no assets or
resources from which to provide funds for bail.
4. Future safety––This offense for possession of a drug was a nonviolent offense.
There is no evidence that she is a threat to the safety of the community.
Vague references to ―a pending case‖ does not establish a criminal history. Perhaps the
trial court had some information that is undisclosed that would suggest that such a substantial bond
was now required; if so, that could have been produced had a hearing been conducted. Based on
the record before us, a bail of $50,000.00 in this instance is unreasonable. In view of the
circumstances presented, a reasonable bail setting should not exceed $10,000.00.
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I respectfully dissent.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: December 5, 2011
Date Decided: December 6, 2011
Publish
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