Joy Kirven v. State ( 2013 )


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  • Affirmed as Modified; Opinion Filed November 14, 2013.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-00006-CR
    No. 05-13-00007-CR
    No. 05-13-00009-CR
    JOY JANE KIRVEN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. F12-56533-H, F12-56534-H, F12-50611-H
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices O’Neill, Lang-Miers, and Evans
    Opinion by Justice Evans
    Joy Jane Kirven was convicted of felony prostitution, escape from custody, and
    unauthorized absence from a community corrections facility.          In each case, the trial court
    sentenced appellant to seven years’ imprisonment.       In four points of error, appellant contends
    the judgments in cause nos. 05-13-00006-CR and 05-13-00007-CR should be modified to correct
    inaccuracies and there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that appellant pay
    court costs in cause no. 05-13-00009-CR. We modify the trial court’s judgments in cause nos.
    05-13-00006-CR and 05-13-00007-CR and affirm as modified. We affirm the trial court’s
    judgment in cause no. 05-13-00009-CR.
    BACKGROUND
    In cause nos. 05-13-00006-CR and 05-13-00007-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded
    guilty to the charged offenses of felony prostitution and escape from custody, and pleaded true to
    one enhancement paragraph alleged in each case. The trial court sentenced appellant to ten
    years’ imprisonment, probated for five years in each case. The trial court assessed a $2,000 fine
    in the prostitution case and a $1,500 fine in the escape case. The State later moved to revoke
    appellant’s community supervision, alleging appellant violated condition (a) by committing the
    offense of unauthorized absence from community correction facility, and condition (p) by failing
    to participate in treatment. Appellant pleaded true to violating condition (a) and not true to
    violating condition (p).      The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant’s
    community supervision, and sentenced appellant to seven years’ imprisonment in each case.
    In cause no. 05-13-00009-CR, appellant waived a jury, pleaded guilty to the offense of
    unauthorized absence from a community corrections facility, and pleaded true to one
    enhancement paragraph. After finding appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraph true, the
    trial court sentenced appellant to seven years’ imprisonment. The judgment also orders appellant
    to pay $244 in court costs.
    COURT COSTS
    In her fourth point of error, appellant contends the evidence in cause no. 05-13-00009-CR
    is insufficient to support the trial court’s orders that she pay $244 in court costs because the
    clerk’s record does not contain a bill of costs. The State responds that the record contains
    sufficient evidence to support the assessment of court costs.
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    If a criminal action is appealed, “an officer of the court shall certify and sign a bill of
    costs stating the costs that have been accrued and send the bill of costs to the court to which the
    action or proceeding is . . . appealed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.006 (West 2006).
    Costs may not be collected from the person charged with the costs until a written bill, containing
    the items of cost, is produced and signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer
    entitled to receive payment for the cost. 
    Id. art. 103.001.
    The clerk’s record in this case initially did not contain a copy of the bill of costs. We,
    however, ordered the Dallas County District Clerk to file a supplemental record containing the
    certified bill of costs associated with this case, and the clerk did so. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    34.5(c)(1) (rules of appellate procedure allow supplementation of clerk’s record if relevant items
    has been omitted).      Appellant’s complaint that the evidence is insufficient to support the
    imposition of costs because the clerk’s record did not contain a bill of costs is now moot. See
    Coronel v. State, No. 05-12-00493-CR, 
    2013 WL 3874446
    , at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas July 29,
    2013, no pet. h.); Franklin v. State, 
    402 S.W.3d 894
    , 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). We
    overrule her fourth point of error.
    In response to the Court’s order requiring supplementation of the records, appellant filed
    an objection that the bill of costs in the supplemental record is not “proper bill[s] of costs” and
    the bill of costs was not filed in the trial court or brought to the trial court’s attention before costs
    were entered into the judgment. We reject both arguments.
    Appellant first contends the bill of costs in the record is not “proper bill[s] of costs”
    because they are “unsigned, unsworn computer printout[s].” Appellant acknowledges the district
    clerk has certified that the documents constitute costs that have accrued to date,” but says this
    does not “set out the costs as required by statute.” While the code of criminal procedure requires
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    a record to be kept, the code is silent on the form of such a record except to the extent it must be
    certified and signed “by the officer who charged the costs or the officer who is entitled to receive
    payment for the cost.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.001, .006; Coronel, 
    2013 WL 3874446
    , at *4.
    Here, the district clerk provided a “Bill of Costs Certification” containing the costs that
    have accrued to date in the respective case, and the documents are certified and signed by the
    district clerk. Because the documents meet the mandate of the code of criminal procedure, we
    conclude appellant’s objection that the bills of costs are not “proper” lacks merit. See Coronel,
    
    2013 WL 3874446
    , at *4.
    Appellant further argues there is no indication the bill of costs was filed in the trial court
    or brought to the trial court’s attention before costs were entered in the judgments. Nothing in
    the code of criminal procedure or the statutes addressing the assessment of costs against
    defendants requires that a bill of costs be presented to the trial court at any time before judgment.
    See 
    id. at *5.
    Article 42.16 provides that the judgment shall “adjudge the costs against the defendant,
    and order the collection thereof as in other cases.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.16
    (West 2006). Court costs, as reflected in a certified bill of costs, are not part of the sentence, do
    not alter the range of punishment, and need not be orally pronounced or incorporated by
    reference in the judgment to be effective. Armstrong v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 759
    , 766 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2011); Coronel, 
    2013 WL 3874446
    , at *5. The code of criminal procedure does not require
    the bill of costs be filed at the time the trial court signs the judgment of conviction; it only
    requires a bill of costs be produced if a criminal case is appealed or costs are collected. See
    Coronel, 
    2003 WL 3874446
    , at *5. Because there is no requirement that the costs be presented
    -4-
    to the trial court, we conclude appellant’s second objection to the supplemented record lacks
    merit. See 
    id. We overrule
    appellant’s objection to the supplemented record.
    MODIFY JUDGMENTS
    In her first and second points of error, appellant contends the judgments in the cause nos.
    05-13-00006-CR and 05-13-00007-CR should be modified to show she pleaded true to the first
    allegation in the State’s motions to revoke, and pleaded not true to the second allegation. In her
    third point of error, appellant asserts the judgment in cause no. 05-13-00007-CR should be
    further modified to correctly identify the statute of the offense. The State agrees the judgments
    should be modified.
    In both cause nos. 05-13-0006-CR and 05-13-00007-CR, the record shows appellant
    pleaded true to violating condition (a) of her community supervision and pleaded not true to
    violating condition (p). The judgments incorrectly recite appellant’s plea to the motions to
    revoke as true. In cause no. 05-13-00007-CR, the judgment also incorrectly identifies the statute
    of the offense as 43.02 penal code. Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s first three issues.
    We modify the section of the trial court’s judgments entitled “plea to motion to revoke”
    to show appellant pleaded true to violating condition (a) and not true to violating condition (p).
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 
    865 S.W.2d 26
    , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993);
    Asberry v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 526
    , 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref d). In cause no. 05-
    13-00007-CR, we also modify the judgment to show the statute of the offense is “38.06 Penal
    Code.” 
    Id. -5- CONCLUSION
    In cause no. 05-13-00006-CR, we modify the judgment revoking community supervision
    to show the plea to the motion to revoke is true to condition (a) and not true to condition (p). As
    modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    In cause no. 05-13-00007-CR, we modify the judgment revoking community supervision
    to show the statute of the offense is “38.06 Penal Code,” and the plea to the motion to revoke is
    true to condition (a) and not true to condition (p). As modified, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    In cause no. 05-13-00009-CR, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /David Evans/
    DAVID EVANS
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47
    130006F.U05
    -6-
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    JOY JANE KIRVEN, Appellant                          Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No.
    No. 05-13-00006-CR        V.                        F12-56533-H).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Evans,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                        Justices O’Neill and Lang-Miers
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment revoking community
    supervision is MODIFIED as follows:
    The section entitled “Plea to Motion to Revoke” is modified to show “True to
    Condition(a) and Not True to Condition (p).”
    As modified, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment revoking community supervision.
    Judgment entered November 14, 2013.
    /David Evans/
    DAVID EVANS
    JUSTICE
    -7-
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    JOY JANE KIRVEN, Appellant                          Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No.
    No. 05-13-00007-CR        V.                        F12-56534-H).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Evans,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                        Justices O’Neill and Lang-Miers
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment revoking community
    supervision is MODIFIED as follows:
    The section entitled “Statute for Offense” is modified to show “38.06 Penal Code.”
    The section entitled “Plea to Motion to Revoke” is modified to show “True to
    Condition(a) and Not True to Condition (p).”
    As modified, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment revoking community supervision.
    Judgment entered November 14, 2013.
    /David Evans/
    DAVID EVANS
    JUSTICE
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    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    JOY JANE KIRVEN, Appellant                        Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No.
    No. 05-13-00009-CR       V.                       F12-50611-H).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Evans,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                      Justices O’Neill and Lang-Miers
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered November 14, 2013.
    /David Evans/
    DAVID EVANS
    JUSTICE
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Document Info

Docket Number: 05-13-00006-CR

Filed Date: 11/14/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015