in Re: Stephen Clay Johnston ( 2011 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-11-00161-CR
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IN RE: STEPHEN CLAY JOHNSTON
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Stephen Clay Johnston has filed a petition for writ of mandamus in which he asks this
Court to order the 6th Judicial District Court of Lamar County, Texas, to rule on several motions1
he filed with the District Clerk of Lamar County. The motions were filed on the eleventh or
fifteenth of August, 2011. Johnston argues that the trial court has failed or refused to fulfill its
ministerial duty to consider and rule on his motions.
We deny the petition for writ of mandamus because the trial court has not had a reasonable
amount of time in which to rule on Johnston’s motions.
We may grant a petition for writ of mandamus when the relator shows there is no adequate
remedy at law to redress the alleged harm and that the act to be compelled is purely ministerial.
Aranda v. Dist. Clerk, 207 S.W.3d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding). When a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, considering and
ruling on that motion is a ministerial act and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act.
In re Kleven, 100 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, orig. proceeding); see also
Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig.
proceeding).
A trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule on a motion brought to the court’s
attention within a reasonable amount of time. In re Bonds, 57 S.W.3d 456, 457 (Tex.
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Attached to Johnston’s petition are file-stamped copies of a request for appeal bond, request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, motion for production of documents, request for appointment of counsel, motion for evidentiary
hearing, supplemental motion for production of documents, and a motion for bench warrant.
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App.—San Antonio 2001, orig. proceeding). A trial court’s refusal to rule on a pending motion
within a reasonable amount of time constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. See In re Shredder
Co., 225 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Greenwell,
160 S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding)). Whether a reasonable
time has lapsed depends on the circumstances of each case. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding). “Determining what time period is reasonable is
not subject to exact formulation. . . . Moreover, no bright line separates a reasonable time period
from an unreasonable one.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Keeter, 134 S.W.3d at 253). Periods of
eighteen months and thirteen months have been held to be too long for a trial court not to rule.
In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding); Kissam v.
Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1976, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
In this case, barely one month has elapsed since the filing of the motions in question. We
find that Johnston has made no showing that the trial court has had a reasonable amount of time in
which to rule on his motions. See Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662.
Accordingly, we deny his petition for writ of mandamus.
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Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: September 15, 2011
Date Decided: September 16, 2011
Do Not Publish
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