Ronald Gene Setler Jr. v. State ( 2012 )


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  •                                  NUMBER 13-12-00279-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    RONALD GENE SETLER JR.,                                                                  Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                        Appellee.
    On appeal from the 75th District Court
    of Liberty County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Vela
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    Appellant, Ronald Gene Setler Jr., appeals from his conviction for the state jail
    felony of theft of material—fifty percent copper under $20,000.2 See TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(F) (West Supp. 2011).                The trial court sentenced Settler to
    1
    This case is before the Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant
    to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2005).
    2
    The jury found Settler “not guilty” of the offense of criminal mischief of the value of $1500 or
    more but less than $20,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03 (West 2011).
    eighteen months’ confinement. By two issues, Settler contends that the State failed to
    produce any evidence that Mark Stoesser, the alleged victim in the indictment, owned
    the stolen copper wire and of the market value of the copper wire. We affirm.3
    I.      STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
    In a sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the verdict to determine whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    ,
    319 (1979); see Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The
    fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and of the
    weight to be given testimony.          
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899
    . We must resolve any
    evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment. 
    Id. We measure
    the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense
    as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Coleman v. State, 
    131 S.W.3d 303
    ,
    314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    ,
    240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A person commits the offense of theft of copper under
    $20,000 if that person unlawfully appropriates the property consisting of at least fifty
    percent copper with the intent to deprive the owner of that property. See TEX. PENAL
    CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(F). “Appropriation of property is unlawful if . . . it is without
    the owner’s effective consent.” See 
    id. 31.03(b). Theft
    of a material is a state jail felony
    if the value is less than $20,000 and it is insulated or noninsulated tubing, rods, water
    3
    Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
    recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons
    for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    2
    gate, stems, wire, or cable that consists of at least fifty percent copper. 4 See 
    id. § 31.03(e)(4)(F).
    II.      DISCUSSION
    By his first issue, Settler contends that there is no evidence that Stoesser owned
    the stolen copper wire. We disagree. Stoesser testified that he owned a ranch where
    he planted various crops for a living. Stoesser stated that on his property there is a
    water pump. Stoesser referred to the water pump as “our” water pump and explained
    that he had utilized the water pump for irrigation of his crops.
    On March 1, 2011, Stoesser discovered that the motor on the water pump had
    been “cut up” and that “the whole system had been ripped off and the wires had been
    stolen.” Stoesser went to the scrap yard after discovering that the copper wire was
    missing. Stoesser stated, “I went to the scrap yard in Hoffman where my wire was
    found.” (Emphasis added.) After finding the copper wire at the scrap yard, Stoesser
    gave an employee of the scrap yard $100 to retrieve the wire.
    Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
    conclude that a rational fact-finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Stoesser was the owner of the copper wire that was stolen.5 See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; see also 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898
    –99. We overrule Settler’s first issue.
    By his second issue, Settler contends that the State failed to produce evidence of
    the copper wire’s market value. Stoesser testified that he paid $100 for the return of the
    4
    The statute does not require a minimum value of the stolen copper. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 31.03(e)(4)(F) (West Supp. 2011).
    5
    For purposes of theft, the “owner” is a person who has the title to the property, possession of
    the property, whether lawful or not, or has “a greater right to possession [of the stolen property] than the
    [defendant].” See 
    id. § 1.07(a)(35)(A)
    (West Supp. 2011).
    3
    copper wire. In addition, the trial court admitted State’s exhibit 39, which is a receipt
    showing that Settler received $457.40 for the copper wire.         Therefore, the State
    produced evidence that the value of the copper wire was less than $20,000. Viewing
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational fact-
    finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the market value of the copper
    was less than $20,000. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; see also 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898
    –99. We overrule Settler’s second issue.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    ___________________
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Do not Publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered and filed the
    20th day of December, 2012.
    4