in Re Guillermo R. Pechero, M.D. and Ruben D. Pechero, M.D. ( 2012 )


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  •                                 NUMBER 13-12-00732-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    IN RE GUILLERMO R. PECHERO, M.D. AND
    RUBEN D. PECHERO, M.D.
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Vela
    Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam1
    Guillermo R. Pechero, M.D. and Ruben D. Pechero, M.D., filed a petition for writ
    of mandamus in the above cause on December 3, 2012, seeking relief from an order
    severing their counterclaims against the real party in interest, Agustin Garcia.                  The
    Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from
    Garcia.
    1
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in
    any other case,” but when “denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do
    so.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
    Generally, mandamus relief is appropriate only when (1) there has been a clear
    abuse of discretion by the trial court, and (2) there is no adequate remedy on appeal. In
    re Olshan Found. Repair, 
    328 S.W.3d 883
    , 887 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). The
    relator has the burden of establishing both prerequisites to mandamus relief, and this
    burden is a heavy one. In re CSX Corp., 
    124 S.W.3d 149
    , 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig.
    proceeding).
    A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
    unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to
    correctly analyze or apply the law. See In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 
    164 S.W.3d 379
    , 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). We assess the adequacy of an appellate
    remedy by “balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments.” In re
    Team Rocket, L.P., 
    256 S.W.3d 257
    , 262 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). In performing
    this balancing, we look at a number of factors, among them “whether mandamus will
    spare litigants and the public ‘the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual
    reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’“ 
    Id. (quoting In
    re Prudential Ins. Co. of
    Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
    Courts permit severance principally to avoid prejudice, do justice, and increase
    convenience. In re State, 
    355 S.W.3d 611
    , 613 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); F.F.P.
    Operating Partners v. Duenez, 
    237 S.W.3d 680
    , 693 (Tex. 2007). A claim may be
    severed if: (1) the controversy must involve multiple causes of action, (2) the severed
    claim would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the
    severed claim must not be so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the
    same facts and issues. In re 
    State, 355 S.W.3d at 614
    ; Guaranty Fed. Savs. Bank. v.
    2
    Horseshoe Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    , 658 (Tex. 1990); see also TEX. R. CIV. P.
    41. A trial court possesses broad discretion in deciding whether to sever causes of
    action. Black v. Smith, 
    956 S.W.2d 72
    , 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, orig.
    proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to order a severance “[w]hen all
    of the facts and circumstances of the case unquestionably require a separate trial to
    prevent manifest injustice, and there is no fact or circumstance supporting or tending to
    support a contrary conclusion, and the legal rights of the parties will not be prejudiced
    thereby, there is no room for the exercise of discretion.” Womack v. Berry, 
    156 Tex. 44
    ,
    
    291 S.W.2d 677
    , 683 (1956) (orig. proceeding).
    The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of
    mandamus and the response thereto under the applicable standard of review, is of the
    opinion that relators have not shown themselves entitled to the relief sought.
    Accordingly, the stay previously imposed by this Court is LIFTED. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective
    until the case is finally decided.”). The petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See
    
    id. R. 52.8(a).
    PER CURIAM
    Delivered and filed the 18th
    day of December, 2012.
    3