Chance Wade Rosser v. State ( 2011 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00328-CR
    CHANCE WADE ROSSER,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the County Court at Law No. 1
    Johnson County, Texas
    Trial Court No. M200801420
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Chance Wade Rosser appeals his conviction for the Class B misdemeanor offense
    of driving while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West 2011). In his sole
    issue, Rosser contends that “the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to
    suppress because the search warrant for Defendant’s blood was not issued by a neutral
    and detached magistrate.” We will affirm.
    To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial
    court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the
    desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or
    motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the
    request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party
    must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).
    To preserve a complaint about the illegal seizure of evidence, a defendant must
    either file a motion to suppress and obtain a ruling on the motion or timely object when
    the State offers the evidence at trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1);
    Roberts v. State, 
    545 S.W.2d 157
    , 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ratliff v. State, 
    320 S.W.3d 857
    , 860-61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d); Thomas v. State, 
    884 S.W.2d 215
    ,
    216-17 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, pet. ref’d). If the defendant waits until the State offers
    the evidence at trial, the objection to the evidence must be made before a witness gives
    substantial testimony about it. See Marini v. State, 
    593 S.W.2d 709
    , 714 (Tex. Crim. App.
    [Panel Op.] 1980) (explaining that an objection to evidence “must be urged at the
    earliest opportunity”); 
    Ratliff, 320 S.W.3d at 261
    ; Angelo v. State, 
    977 S.W.2d 169
    , 177
    (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (op. on reh’g).
    In this case, Rosser filed a Motion to Suppress, a Motion to Suppress Evidence
    Seized by Search Warrant, and a First Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized by
    Search Warrant. But Rosser’s contention on appeal was not the basis of any of these
    motions, nor was it mentioned during the suppression hearing. Furthermore, during
    trial, when the State offered evidence of the blood test, Rosser objected based on the
    objections/matters raised during the suppression hearing. He did not object to the
    evidence based on the contention he now urges on appeal.
    Rosser v. State                                                                        Page 2
    The first time Rosser raised the contention he now urges on appeal was at the
    hearing on his motion for new trial. Rosser had filed a motion for new trial, stating only
    that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and (2) the verdict was
    contrary to the law and the evidence. At the hearing on the motion, Rosser then
    attempted to “reoffer all of the testimony, exhibits, objections, and arguments of
    Counsel from the Suppression Hearing.” This was met with some resistance by the
    State, and the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Rosser then asked to make a
    “Bill of Exception.” At that time, Rosser, for the first time, argued that the search
    warrant for his blood was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. At the close
    of his argument, he stated, “And that’s all we ever wanted in this Motion for New Trial,
    to make sure that that was very, very clear that we’re going after that ground, in
    addition to the other grounds that [Rosser’s trial counsel] preserved for appellate
    review, Your Honor.” The trial court replied, “Overruled.”
    This argument by Rosser was untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX. R. EVID.
    103(a)(1); 
    Roberts, 545 S.W.2d at 158
    ; 
    Ratliff, 320 S.W.3d at 860-61
    ; 
    Thomas, 884 S.W.2d at 216-17
    . Furthermore, he offered no legitimate reason to justify his delay in raising the
    complaint. See Lagrone v. State, 
    942 S.W.2d 602
    , 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We thus
    conclude that Rosser has failed to preserve his complaint for our review. See Mayfield v.
    State, 
    800 S.W.2d 932
    , 935-36 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.). We overrule
    Rosser’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Rosser v. State                                                                      Page 3
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed September 28, 2011
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Rosser v. State                                             Page 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-09-00328-CR

Filed Date: 9/28/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015