ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Grace Moore Payne ( 2011 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11-00137-CV
ETC TEXAS PIPLINE, LTD,
Appellant
v.
GRACE MOORE PAYNE,
Appellee
From the 85th District Court
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court No. 09-002381-CV-85
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this declaratory-judgment action, appellant, ETC Texas Pipeline, Ltd. (“ETC”),
complains about the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellee, Grace Moore Payne. In
three issues, ETC argues that: (1) the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
underlying agreement, which described the easement at issue in this case; (2) the
evidence supporting the trial court’s interpretation of the agreement is legally and
factually insufficient; and (3) the trial court improperly reformed the agreement without
the appropriate pleadings to require ETC to remove the pipeline on Moore’s property
and to essentially grant a permanent injunction in Moore’s favor without “the
appropriate pleading or evidentiary requirements.” We affirm, in part, and reverse and
render, in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 23, 1995, Tom J. Moore Farms, a partnership and predecessor-in-
interest to Payne, conveyed a right-of-way and easement to Ferguson Burleson County
Gas Gathering System (“Ferguson”), the predecessor-in-interest to ETC. The agreement
allowed Ferguson and subsequently ETC “to construct, maintain, operate, repair, alter,
replace, change the size of and remove pipelines and appurtenant facilities for the
transportation of oil, gas, petroleum products or any other liquids, gases or substances
which can be transported through a pipeline across, under and upon” Payne’s land.
The agreement also included the following habendum clause: “TO HAVE AND HOLD
unto GRANTEE [Ferguson and later ETC], its successors and assigns, so long as the
rights and easements herein granted, or any one of them shall be used by, or useful to,
GRANTEE for the purpose herein granted . . . .” In addition, the agreement specifically
stated that, “[i]n the event of continuous non-use of said pipeline by grantee, its
successors or assigns, for a period of 18 months, this easement shall be considered to be
abandoned and shall revert to Grantor . . . .”
In 1996, a four-inch, high-pressure pipeline approximately 1.25 miles long was
installed from the UPRC Glover #1 well (the “Glover well”) to a ten-inch pipeline at
White Switch Road. A segment of this pipeline runs across Payne’s land. On or about
November 20, 2002, the pipeline was converted from a high-pressure line to a low-
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 2
pressure line. In doing so, ETC connected the pipeline to a Duke/DCP pipeline at a
point approximately halfway between the Glover well and the tap at the White Switch
Road station. This connection is not on Payne’s land and re-routed gas away from the
portion of the pipeline situated on Payne’s land. In fact, witnesses testified that gas had
not traveled through the pipeline on Payne’s land since the pipeline had been re-routed.
ETC also removed an above-ground spool piece and capped the pipeline on Payne’s
land, which resulted in a gap in the original pipeline. ETC alleges that this alteration is
not permanent and can be reinstalled at any time to allow the gas to flow once again
directly from the Glover well to the White Switch Road station.
Believing that ETC had abandoned the easement, Payne filed a declaratory-
judgment action to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the
agreement. Payne alleged that the right-of-way and easement agreement had
terminated due to alleged non-use by ETC and, in her first amended petition, requested
that, among other things, the trial court order ETC to remove the pipeline on her
property and restore the property to its original condition.
On January 14, 2011, the trial court conducted a bench trial on this matter. The
trial court concluded that the agreement had terminated due to non-use and required
ETC to remove the pipeline from Payne’s property within six months and return
Payne’s property to its original condition. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law. ETC subsequently filed a motion for new trial,
which was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). This appeal
followed.
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Declaratory judgments are reviewed under the same standards as all other
judgments. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.010 (West 2008); see In re Schiwetz,
102 S.W.3d 355, 365 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). We look to the
procedure used to resolve the issue at trial to determine the standard of review on
appeal. Guthery v. Taylor, 112 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.); Roberts v. Squyres, 4 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied).
Here, the trial court determined the declaratory-judgment issues after a bench trial;
thus, we apply a sufficiency of the evidence review to the trial court’s factual findings
and review its conclusions of law de novo. See Montfort v. Trek Res., Inc., 198 S.W.3d
344, 354 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (citing Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686,
691 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)).
A trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial “have the same force and dignity as
the jury’s verdict upon questions.” Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794
(Tex. 1991). Further, “[w]hen the trial court acts as a fact[-]finder, its findings are
reviewed under legal and factual sufficiency standards.” In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253
(Tex. 2000).
In reviewing for legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s finding. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d
588, 592 (Tex. 2008). The test for legal sufficiency “must always be whether the
evidence at trial would enable [a] reasonable and fair-minded [fact-finder] to reach the
[conclusion] under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 4
must credit favorable evidence if a reasonable fact-finder could, and disregard contrary
evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. Id. The fact-finder is the sole judge
of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be assigned to their testimony. Id.
at 819.
In a factual sufficiency review, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence in
a neutral light. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). The
evidence is factually insufficient only if we conclude “that the verdict is so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, regardless
of whether the record contains some evidence of probative force in support of the
verdict.” Id. Fact findings are not conclusive when, as in this case, a complete
reporter’s record appears in the record if the contrary is established as a matter of law
or if there is no evidence to support the finding. Material P’ships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102
S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. See BMC Software Belg.,
N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). Conclusions of law are upheld if the
judgment can be sustained on any legal theory the evidence supports. See Stable Energy,
L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 547 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied); see also
Fulgham v. Fischer, No. 05-10-00097-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5865, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Dallas July 29, 2011, no pet. h.). Thus, incorrect conclusions of law do not require
reversal if the controlling findings of fact support the judgment under a correct legal
theory. See Westech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1992, no writ); see also Fulgham, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5865, at *6.
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 5
Moreover, conclusions of law may not be reversed unless they are erroneous as a matter
of law. Westech Eng’g, Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 196.
III. THE AGREEMENT AND CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
In its first issue, ETC challenges the trial court’s first three conclusions of law,
arguing that the trial court’s interpretation of the contract is erroneous and fails to
adhere to applicable law regarding contract construction. In particular, ETC asserts that
the easement remains valid and effective because it is still being used by ETC and it
remains useful to ETC.
A. Applicable Law
An easement is an interest in land and carries with it some right to use, or benefit
from, the land for a specified purpose. Gollinger v. State, 834 S.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). Easement agreements are interpreted
according to the rules of contract construction and interpretation. Kothmann v. Rothwell,
280 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (citing Boland v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of Am., 816 S.W.2d 843 844 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ)). In
construing a written agreement, we must ascertain and give effect to the parties’
intentions as expressed in the agreement. Frost Nat’l Bank v. L&F Distribs., Ltd., 165
S.W.3d 310, 311-12 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Carbona v. CH Med., Inc., 266 S.W.3d 675,
680 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). We discern intent from the agreement itself and
the agreement must be enforced as written. Deep Nines, Inc. v. McAfee, Inc., 246 S.W.3d
842, 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). We consider the entire writing and attempt
to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract by analyzing the
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 6
provisions with reference to the whole agreement. Frost Nat’l Bank, 165 S.W.3d at 312.
This consideration comes “’from a utilitarian standpoint bearing in mind the particular
business activity sought to be served,’” and we will “’avoid when possible and proper a
construction which is unreasonable, inequitable, and oppressive.’” Id. (quoting Reilly v.
Rangers Mgmt., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1987)). Further, “all writings that pertain
to the same transaction will be considered together, even if they were executed at
different times and do not expressly refer to one another.” DeWitt County Elec. Coop.,
Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Tex. 1999).
Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide
by looking at the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances existing at the time
the contract was entered. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983); Ganske v.
Spence, 129 S.W.3d 701, 707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.). An ambiguity does not
arise simply because the parties interpret the contract differently. Seagull Energy E & P,
Inc. v. Eland Energy, 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006); Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed,
L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2000). A contract is ambiguous when its meaning is
uncertain and doubtful or is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.
Eland Energy, 207 S.W.3d at 345. If the agreement can be given a certain or definite legal
meaning or interpretation, it is not ambiguous, and we will construe it as a matter of
law. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393.
Here, neither the parties nor the trial court found this agreement to be
ambiguous, and we likewise agree that it is not. Therefore, we construe the agreement’s
meaning as a question of law. Id. at 394; see J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 7
223, 227 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a
question of law for the court to decide). “The intent of the parties must be taken from
the agreement itself, not from the parties’ present interpretation, and the agreement
must be enforced as written.” Calpine Producer Servs., L.P. v. Wiser Oil Co., 169 S.W.3d
783, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). A court will not change a contract merely
because the court or one of the parties comes to dislike its provisions or thinks that
something else is needed. Id.
“A proper construction of the terms of a grant, considered in the light of
attending circumstances, determines the purpose or extent of the right of use of an
easement.” Kothmann, 280 S.W.3d at 880; Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1993, writ denied); Kearney & Son v. Fancher, 401 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Fort Worth 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In addition, if a term in a conveyance is not
specifically defined, that term is given its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted
meaning. See Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996).
B. Discussion
In its first three conclusions of law, the trial court found:
(1) “The easement in question expressly states and the facts and circumstances
substantiates [sic] that the only purpose and the only rights granted by the
easement was—‘to construct—pipelines—for the transportation of oil, gas—
across—the lands of Grantor [Payne].’”
(2) “The easement in question expressly states that the Grantee [ETC] was to
have and to hold said easement ‘so long as—‘ the easement was—‘used by or
useful to, Grantee for the purpose herein granted—.‘“
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(3) “The easement has terminated because the easement in question has not been
used for the purpose it was granted for, i.e. transportation of oil, gas—
across—the lands of Grantor since November, 2002.”
(Emphasis in original).
1. The Trial Court’s First Conclusion of Law
With respect to the trial court’s first conclusion of law, ETC argues that the trial
court’s interpretation constrained it to only constructing pipelines on Payne’s land
rather than maintaining, operating, repairing, altering, replacing, changing the size of,
and removing pipelines, as the agreement states. ETC also asserts that, unlike the trial
court’s interpretation, the purposes under the agreement “are not limited to
transportation of materials across, under and upon the lands of the grantor.” ETC
further contends that the trial court’s interpretation of the agreement improperly
imposed a limitation which excluded “most solid materials such as coal, lignite, or
similar minerals and making the easement subject to liquid and gaseous substances.”
When considering the attending circumstances, as we must do, we find that the
purpose for obtaining the easement was to facilitate the construction of a pipeline from
the Glover well to the White Switch Road station for the transportation of gas along the
pipeline. See Kothmann, 280 S.W.3d at 880; Jones, 856 S.W.2d at 603; Fancher, 401 S.W.2d
at 905. The pipeline that was constructed ran across Payne’s land and transported gas,
which demonstrates ETC’s need for the easement agreement.1 This is especially true
given the fact that Exhibit A, which was incorporated as part of the agreement,
1 The record contains no evidence that the pipeline was used to transport anything other than
natural gas.
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repeatedly references the specifics of constructing a pipeline on Payne’s land. See Parks,
1 S.W.3d at 102. Essentially, our reading of the agreement yields a finding that the
parties’ intent behind the agreement was for the right to construct a pipeline along a
portion of Payne’s land for the transportation of gas. See Frost Nat’l Bank, 165 S.W.3d at
311-12; Carbona, 266 S.W.3d at 680; Deep Nines, Inc., 246 S.W.3d at 846. Therefore, we
disagree with ETC’s assertions that the trial court’s first conclusion of law is erroneous
and somehow altered the meaning of the agreement. See Stable Energy, L.P., 999 S.W.2d
at 547; see also Fulgham, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5865, at *6.
1. The Trial Court’s Second and Third Conclusions of Law
ETC’s complaints about the trial court’s second and third conclusions of law are
substantially similar to the arguments made in its second issue on appeal and center on
the habendum clause and whether the easement was in use. According to ETC, the
language in the habendum clause, which states that the agreement remains effective “so
long as the rights and easements herein granted, or any one of them shall be used by, or
useful to GRANTEE for the purpose herein granted,” undermines the trial court’s
conclusion that the easement terminated. Specifically, ETC notes that the “evidence
conclusively establishes that ETC has continuously used its right to maintain the
Pipeline by cathodically protecting and pressurizing the Pipeline to ensure that it
remain effective to transport the natural gas contained within.” In making these
contentions, ETC relies heavily on the decision in Stephenson v. Vastar Resources, Inc., 89
S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
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In Stephenson, a pipeline operator deactivated and purged gas from a 16.5-mile
section of a pipeline that was subject to a two-year non-use termination clause. Id. at
793. Though gas was purged from the pipeline and the pipeline was deactivated, the
operator continued to use the pipeline by “maintaining, use of cathodic protection,
inspection (by walking and aerial), mowing, cutting and keeping up the pipeline and
right-of-way.” Id. The Stephenson court agreed that the actions taken by the operator
constituted “use” of the pipeline, and thus, the two-year non-use termination clause
was not applicable. Id. at 794.
Here, Charles Moody, formerly a construction foreman for ETC, testified that he
is familiar with the pipeline running from the Glover well to the White Switch Road
station. Moody noted that the Duke/DCP pipeline was not constructed on Payne’s
property and that the pipeline intersected with the main pipeline. In 2002, when the
Duke/DCP pipeline was connected to the main pipeline, a section of the main pipeline
that is on Payne’s property was removed. The remaining pipeline was capped so that
no materials would continue to flow towards the White Switch Road station. Moody
denied cathodically protecting the portion of the pipeline on Payne’s property, but he
alleged that Bennie Lloyd, the operations foreman for ETC, told him that the whole
pipeline had been cathodically protected. Moody stated that the pipeline had been
pressure-tested and maintained, though he later admitted that he did not have first-
hand knowledge of the tests or maintenance. Moody also stated that Jim McFarland, a
contract administrator for ETC, told him that the company planned to reconnect the
portion of the main pipeline on Payne’s land. When pressed for details about the
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 11
possible reconnection, Moody was unable to recall the entire conversation he had with
McFarland. Later, Moody admitted that it was impossible for gas to flow through the
pipeline from the Glover well to the White Switch Road station because of the removed
portion of the pipeline.
Lloyd also testified, and when asked about the process of cathodically protecting
the main gas pipeline, Lloyd admitted that he did not have anything to do with it and
that such protection would be the responsibility of another department. Lloyd had no
knowledge of the pipeline ever being cathodically protected. Lloyd acknowledged that
ETC had not pressure-tested the portion of the pipeline on Payne’s land since 2002 and
that he did not have any knowledge of maintenance being performed on that segment
of the pipeline since the pipeline had been capped. Lloyd also admitted that ETC
records showed that no gas had flowed through the pipeline on Payne’s property since
November 2002, and that no ETC employees had “stepped foot” on Payne’s property
after November 2002.
Considering the attending circumstances pertaining to the easement, we note
that ETC has not proffered any evidence to show that the portion of the pipeline on
Payne’s property had been maintained, cathodically protected, or inspected since it had
been deactivated in November 2002. It does not appear as if the pipeline had been used
by ETC since November 2002. In fact, Lloyd admitted that no ETC employees had even
“stepped foot” on Payne’s property to service the pipeline since November 2002. Given
the absence of evidence demonstrating ETC’s continuous usage of the pipeline, we find
that the Stephenson decision is inapplicable in this case. Furthermore, it is important to
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 12
note that the easement in Stephenson did not define “use,” whereas the habendum
clause in this case limits ETC’s “use” of the easement “for the purpose herein granted,”
which, as we described above, was for the construction of a pipeline for the
transportation of gas.
Moreover, while we recognize that “[e]very easement carries with it the right to
do whatever is reasonably necessary for full enjoyment of the rights granted,” ETC’s
interpretation of the habendum clause to mean that the easement is still in effect
because it may still be useful to ETC does not comport with the terms of the agreement.
Whaley v. Cent. Church of Christ, 227 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, no pet.). If we were to adopt ETC’s interpretation of the agreement, the term of
the agreement likely would be perpetual and we would ostensibly eviscerate the
eighteen-month non-use termination clause. See Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 712
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.) (“Yet, while not revocable at will, easements do not
necessarily run in perpetuity. A determinable easement may be created that will
terminate on the happening of a particular event.”) (citing Sentell v. Williamson County,
801 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ)); see also Coleman v. Forister, 514
S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. 1974) (“Without pleadings and evidence of surrounding
circumstances, [grantees] are entitled to the rights granted by the instrument, and no
more.”). When construing a written agreement, we are to harmonize all of the
provisions of the agreement so as to not render any provision meaningless. See Frost
Nat’l Bank, 165 S.W.3d at 312. Because ETC’s interpretation would render the eighteen-
month non-use termination clause meaningless, we cannot adopt ETC’s interpretation.
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 13
See id. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court’s second and third
conclusions of law are erroneous. See Stable Energy, L.P., 999 S.W.2d at 547; see also
Fulgham, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5865, at *6. We overrule ETC’s first issue.
IV. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT
In its second issue, ETC argues that the evidence demonstrates that the easement
has been used continuously for the purpose for which it was granted; thus, the trial
court’s twelfth finding of fact is not supported by legally and factually sufficient
evidence. ETC further argues that: (1) it regularly maintains, pressurizes, cathodically
protects the pipeline, and at least partially uses the pipeline to transport gas; and (2) the
possibility of reconnecting the pipeline demonstrates that the pipeline is still useful to
ETC.
In its twelfth finding of fact, the trial court specifically noted that: “The pipeline
in question has not been used to transport gas across Plaintiff’s property since
November, 2002 or five (5) times the eighteen (18) months [sic] period stated by
Paragraph 11 to be considered abandonment.” As noted earlier, ETC’s second appellate
issue is similar in substance to the arguments made with respect to the trial court’s
second and third conclusions of law. We have already detailed the testimony of Moody
and Lloyd and found no evidence that ETC “used” the portion of the pipeline existing
on Payne’s property since November 2002, a term exceeding the eighteen months
required for the abandonment provision to apply. Furthermore, with respect to ETC’s
argument that the pipeline still could be used because of the possibility of reconnection,
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 14
we note that Moody could not recall any details from a six-month-old conversation with
McFarland as to when the pipeline will be re-connected to transport gas to the White
Switch Road station and that adopting such an interpretation of the agreement likely
would lead to a perpetual easement in favor of ETC. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable fact-finder
could have concluded that the easement had terminated pursuant to paragraph 11 of
the agreement; thus, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding. See Reyes, 272 S.W.3d at 592; City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
Additionally, when viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say that the trial
court’s finding is “against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be
manifestly unjust”; as such, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 761.
Accordingly, we overrule ETC’s second issue.
V. REMOVAL OF THE PIPELINE FROM PAYNE’S LAND
In its third issue, ETC contends that the trial court erred in ordering ETC to
remove the pipeline from Payne’s land and restore the property to its original condition
because such action constitutes “an improper reformation of the Agreement” and
because the order constitutes “permanent injunctive relief that is without sufficient
pleadings or evidentiary support.”
Despite its arguments pertaining to Payne’s alleged insufficient pleadings, ETC
acknowledges that Payne’s live pleading explicitly asked the trial court for a
“declaration that the easement has terminated and that the Defendant [ETC] be ordered
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to remove the pipeline and to restore Plaintiff’s [Payne] property following the
removal.” However, the Texas Supreme Court has held that:
[A] declaratory[-]judgment action is not necessarily an action for
affirmative relief. The Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that the
Texas Declaratory Judgment Act is “remedial” only. That act serves only
to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights, status, and other legal relations.[ 2] The purpose of the
[declaratory[-]judgment statute], as evidenced by its own terms, is to
declare existing rights, status, or other legal relations. The statute cannot
be invoked as an affirmative ground for recovery to revise or alter such
rights or legal relations.
Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex. 1993) (internal citations & quotations
omitted); see Dallas County Tax Collector v. Andolina, 303 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“A declaratory judgment is appropriate to settle and afford relief
regarding existing rights, status, and other legal relations.”) (emphasis added).
Even though Payne included in her live pleading a request to have the pipeline
removed from her property, we note that the agreement is silent regarding the possible
removal of the pipeline in the event of non-use.3 We further note that the character of
Payne’s live pleading is that of a declaratory-judgment action. And as such, we
2 In particular, subsection 37.003(a) of the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act does state that: “A
court of record within its jurisdiction has power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.003(a) (West
2008).
3 In response to ETC’s contentions, Payne argues, without citing any relevant authority, that
pipelines filled with natural gas are inherently dangerous and that she was not required to proffer formal
proof of how dangerous the pipeline is because it is a matter of common knowledge. This contention,
however, is dubious considering the evidence demonstrated that no gas flowed through the pipeline that
is on Payne’s property and that a portion of the pipeline on her property had been removed and capped.
In fact, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating Payne’s right to the affirmative relief requested.
See Gonzalez v. Razi, 338 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (citing Pace Corp.
v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340, 350 (1955) (holding that a party seeking affirmative relief bears
the burden of proof)).
ETC Texas Pipline, LTD v. Payne Page 16
consider her request for the removal of the pipeline, an act not referenced in the
agreement, to be an unauthorized request for affirmative relief that alters the rights of
the parties. See Davis, 856 S.W.2d at 164. Essentially, by requiring ETC to remove the
pipeline from her property, Payne sought to include a provision in the agreement that
was not originally there. Or, in other words, by granting the request, the trial court
ostensibly reformed the agreement to include a provision regarding the removal of the
pipeline in the event of non-use, though there is no evidence of a mutual mistake made
by the parties; this reformation does not reflect the intent of the parties as expressed in
the agreement. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1987)
(“The underlying objective of reformation is to correct a mutual mistake made in
preparing a written instrument, so that the instrument reflects the original agreement of
the parties.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, based on the current state of the record,
we conclude that the trial court was not authorized to order the removal of the pipeline
from Payne’s property pursuant to Payne’s declaratory-judgment action.4 Accordingly,
we sustain ETC’s third issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
With regard to the portion of the trial court’s judgment ordering the removal of
ETC’s pipeline from Payne’s property, we reverse and render judgment in favor of ETC.
We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
4 We do recognize that the decision to grant an equitable remedy is within the discretion of the
trial court, see Nelson v. Najm, 127 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied);
however, for the reasons stated above, we do not believe that the trial court was authorized to grant the
relief requested.
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AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed, in part, reversed and rendered, in part
Opinion delivered and filed August 31, 2011
[CV06]
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