Matt D. Baker v. State ( 2011 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00049-CR
MATT D. BAKER,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 19th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009-0456-C1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Matt Baker was convicted of the offense of murder and sentenced to sixty-five
years in prison. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2008). Baker complains that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the evidence was insufficient to establish
the corpus delicti, that the evidence of guilt was legally and factually insufficient, and
that the trial court’s conduct throughout the trial rendered his trial unfair. Because we
find no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Baker complains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel did not object to the presence of an alternate juror in the jury room during
deliberations, which was statutorily prohibited. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
36.22 (West 2009). At the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the trial
court ordered the alternate juror to go into the jury room for deliberations but
instructed that juror not to participate in the deliberations in any manner. Baker’s trial
counsel stated that they had no objection to this. Baker filed a motion for new trial
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to object to the inclusion of the
alternate juror in deliberations and a hearing was conducted, during which Baker’s trial
attorneys and two jurors testified.1
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, Baker must prove (1) counsels’
representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsels’ deficiency, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. Ex parte Ellis, 233 S.W.3d 324, 330-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
1 The motion for new trial also complained of a violation of Article V, Section 13 of the Texas
Constitution; however, after the date of the motion for new trial hearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals
issued its opinion in Trinidad v. State, in which the Court held that the inclusion of alternate jurors does
not violate the Texas Constitution absent evidence of that alternate juror’s participation in the voting
during deliberations. See Trinidad v. State, 312 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The Court
specifically did not address whether there was a statutory violation because that issue was not properly
preserved at the trial court. Id. at 29.
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It is not necessary for us to address whether or not there was a violation of article
36.22 because Baker has not met the requirements of the second prong of Strickland; that
is, he has not proven that the outcome would have been different or that the verdict was
affected in any way by the presence of the alternate juror. The trial court gave strict
instructions to the entire panel, including the alternate juror that the alternate juror was
not to participate in any way during deliberations. The foreperson and one other juror
testified that the alternate juror did not participate in the deliberations and did not
make any facial gestures or other reaction. The foreperson testified that the alternate
started to speak in the guilt-innocence deliberations, but that she told the alternate not
to participate. There is no evidence that the jury did not follow the trial court’s
instructions. Because Baker has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland, we find
that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsels’ failure to
object to the presence of the alternate juror during jury deliberations. We overrule issue
one.
Legal Sufficiency
Baker complains that the State did not establish the corpus delicti, that is, that
other than his out-of-court confession, there was insufficient evidence that the death of
his wife was caused by a criminal act perpetrated by him, and that the evidence was
legally insufficient.
Corpus Delicti
In a murder case, the corpus delicti is (a) the death of a human being that is (b)
caused by the criminal act of another. Fisher v. State, 851 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex. Crim.
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Ohio App. 1993); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under the
corpus delicti rule, a defendant’s own extrajudicial confession is insufficient to sustain his
conviction for an offense unless it is corroborated by independent evidence tending to
establish the fact that the offense in question has been committed by someone. Salazar
v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The independent, corroborating
evidence need only make the fact of the crime more probable than it would otherwise
be. See Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). It is not required that the
independent, corroborating evidence meet the legal sufficiency test announced in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See id.
Once the fact that the offense was committed by someone is corroborated by
independent evidence, a defendant’s own extrajudicial confession, even standing alone,
is sufficient to tie him to that crime. See Salazar, 86 S.W.3d at 644 (“the corpus delicti rule
. . . does not also require any independent evidence that the defendant was the criminal
culprit”) (emphasis omitted).
Legal Sufficiency
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61
L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality
op.). We defer to the jury’s determinations of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight
to be given their testimony because the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Brooks,
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323 S.W.3d at 899. Because we are conducting a legal sufficiency review, our discussion
of the facts below is in a light most favorable to the prosecution.
Facts
On Friday, April 7, 2006, law enforcement was summoned to the residence of
Baker and his wife, Kari. Baker had called 9-1-1 claiming that he had returned home to
find Kari lying in a fetal position on their bed in a state of undress. Baker claimed that
he had moved Kari to the floor, partially dressed her, and attempted to resuscitate her
during the approximately four minutes until assistance arrived, all while on the phone
with the 9-1-1 dispatcher. Medical personnel were unable to revive Kari. At the scene,
an open bottle of Unisom was found on the nightstand with one pill inside the bottle
and two on the nightstand next to the bottle. Additionally, two empty wine cooler
bottles, two ink pens, and a typed, unsigned suicide note purportedly written by Kari
were found on the nightstand next to the bed. A justice of the peace declared Kari dead
and ruled the cause to be suicide over the phone without visiting the scene. No autopsy
was ordered.
After Kari’s parents became suspicious of the circumstances surrounding her
death, the justice of the peace that had ruled her death a suicide conducted a formal
inquisition as to her death. Kari’s body was exhumed and an autopsy was performed.
The autopsy did not establish a cause of death because of the passage of time and the
embalming of the body, both of which made it difficult to conclusively determine what
substances were in Kari’s body at the time of her death or the cause of her death.
Baker v. State Page 5
However, the cause of death was changed from “suicide” to “undetermined” following
the inquest.
Kari’s parents filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Baker, and during those
proceedings and throughout the investigation of the criminal case against him, Baker
gave a deposition and made several statements as to what he contended had occurred.
He did not testify at the trial.
Baker contended that he had left the residence at approximately 11:00 p.m. to get
gasoline and to rent a movie that Kari had requested him to go rent at that time. Baker
arrived home approximately 45 minutes later to find the master bedroom door locked.
Baker had to pry the door open, where he discovered Kari’s body on their bed. The
Bakers’ two children were asleep in their bedrooms when he left and there is no
indication that they were ever awake while emergency and law enforcement personnel
were present after Kari’s death. Baker claimed that Kari had been severely depressed
since the death of their daughter approximately seven years prior. Law enforcement
discovered an opened bottle of Unisom with only a few pills remaining,
Kari was buried on Monday following her death. At the visitation prior to the
funeral, Kari’s counselor approached Baker and she stated that Baker asked her if Kari
had said anything about him trying to kill her (Kari). Baker did not appear to be
behaving in a manner consistent with a grieving person.
Approximately two weeks later, Baker’s daughter had a birthday party where
Baker’s paramour, Vanessa Bulls, was present. The photos of Kari in the house had
been removed and at least partially replaced with photos of Bulls and her child. Bulls
Baker v. State Page 6
spent the night at the house that night, although Bulls had given inconsistent statements
as to which bedroom in the house she had stayed and what transpired during the night.
Additionally, Baker and Bulls were seen together shopping for engagement rings with
the Bakers’ children shortly after Kari’s death.
Baker and Bulls began having an extra-marital affair in March of 2006, which was
the month prior to Kari’s death. Baker, who was then a pastor, was counseling Bulls
regarding her failed marriage when the affair began. It did not appear that Kari was
aware of the relationship between Baker and Bulls, however, she and Baker were
having marital problems and Kari was concerned that perhaps Baker was having an
affair. Earlier the day of Kari’s death, she had interviewed for a transfer to teach junior
high at a new school and was excited about her future prospects. In the early evening
of her death, Baker and Kari were at a swim lesson of one of their daughters, and Kari
was visibly upset, although why she was upset was unknown.
Kari had been diagnosed shortly before her death with anxiety and depression,
although she denied being depressed and repeatedly denied any suicidal ideations. She
had made an appointment to see the counselor that had treated her after her daughter’s
death in 1999 from cancer at the age of one. At that appointment, Kari indicated that
she was fearful that Baker might intend to harm her, but later stated that she did not
believe that he would harm her. Kari had discovered crushed pills in Baker’s briefcase
one time although Baker claimed that they had been placed there by a child at the Waco
Center for Youth because they do not like to take their medication sometimes.
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During the relevant times leading up to and subsequent to Kari’s death, Baker
was also employed at the Waco Center for Youth. It was discovered on the Center’s
server that Baker had visited several websites relating to the purchase of Ambien (as
opposed to research about Ambien) and had also done internet searches on overdosing
on sleeping pills. However, there was no evidence that Baker had actually purchased
Ambien.
In the week following Kari’s death, Baker gave Kari’s cell phone to Bulls to use.
This phone was paid for by Kari’s parents, who became suspicious when they
determined that Kari’s phone was being used shortly after her death, with many calls
between Baker and Bulls.
In mid-June of 2006, Baker reported that a computer had been taken from the
office next to his at the Waco Center for Youth. Further investigation established that
the computer that had formerly been in that office had been removed and placed in
Baker’s office and that Baker’s computer was actually the one missing. A label that had
been placed on Baker’s original computer had been removed and placed on the one
taken from the adjacent office, which was then located in Baker’s office. Baker’s
computer was never recovered. Additionally, Baker had disposed of his home
computer at some time after Kari’s death.
Bulls agreed to testify in exchange for testimonial immunity. She had given
several statements prior to the trial, including testifying before the grand jury. None of
Bulls’ statements were entirely consistent with each other or with her trial testimony.
She admitted that she had been untruthful or not fully truthful in her earlier statements.
Baker v. State Page 8
Bulls claimed that before Kari’s death, Baker had told Bulls that he wanted to kill Kari
and to make it look like a suicide. He told Bulls that he had attempted to kill her
approximately two weeks prior to her actual death by crushing pills and mixing them
in a milkshake, but that Kari didn’t like the taste of it and didn’t drink it. Baker told
Bulls that on the night of Kari’s death he had taken several sexual stimulant capsules,
emptied them, and refilled them with crushed Ambien, which Kari then took. After she
fell asleep, Baker told Bulls that he had placed a pillow over her face and smothered
her. He had typed and printed out a suicide note, which he ran Kari’s fingers over prior
to placing it next to the bed. Baker told Bulls that because she knew what was going to
happen before he did it and then knew how he did it, Bulls was as guilty as Baker was
for her death, but that God would forgive them. Bulls ultimately broke up with Baker
later in 2006, but stated that she did not admit to the affair or to knowing about how
Baker had killed Kari because she was afraid of what Baker might do to her and because
she feared being held responsible for Kari’s death. Bulls stated that she knew that her
testimony would likely result in her losing her job as a teacher so she had no reason to
make up her testimony.
The only physical evidence that indicated that a crime had occurred was an
abrasion on Kari’s nose that a forensic pathologist observed on photographs taken of
Kari during the autopsy, but that abrasion was only observed by that one individual. It
was impossible to determine if Kari’s DNA was on anything because a sample could
not be retrieved from her body after it was exhumed. Additionally, because law
Baker v. State Page 9
enforcement initially believed it was a suicide, the suicide note and the Unisom bottle
were handled without gloves by multiple persons.
Analysis
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that
the evidence independent of Baker’s extrajudicial confession to Bulls makes the
commission of Kari’s murder more probable than it would have been without the
independent evidence, which satisfies the corpus delicti corroboration requirement.
Additionally, we find that the totality of the evidence, including Bulls’s testimony
regarding Baker’s confession to her, is sufficient for a reasonable juror to have found
Baker guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the evidence is
legally sufficient. We overrule issue two.
Factual Sufficiency
Baker complains that the evidence was factually insufficient to sustain his
conviction. Baker further contends that since Clewis v. State was overruled by only a
plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Brooks v. State, it has no precedential effect
and therefore a factual sufficiency analysis is required. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). While Baker is correct that the decision in
Brooks was a plurality opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals has since affirmed the
elimination of factual sufficiency review with an outright majority. See Howard v. State,
333 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (unanimous op.) (“we have abolished factual-
sufficiency review”); Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
Baker v. State Page 10
(Meyers, J. dissented); Wirth v. State, 327 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(Meyers, J. dissented). We overrule issue three regarding factual sufficiency.
Conduct of the Trial Court
Baker complains that the trial court made comments and interrupted the
proceedings to benefit the State, and that this conduct rendered his trial unfair because
the trial court’s actions demonstrated a bias in favor of the State. Specifically, he
complains of the following:
WITNESS: I did not notice any. We checked for lividity and we
checked for a pulse and checked for breathing. I did
not notice any.
STATE: Okay. And –
THE COURT: Mr. Long, you might get him to explain what lividity
is.
STATE: What is lividity?
WITNESS: Lividity is pooling of the blood in the body to the
lowest point. If I was sitting in a chair right now, for
an example, if I was to die, my blood would pool in
my lower back and in my feet area is what it would
do.
---
STATE: State’s Exhibit 24. Can you read that note?
WITNESS: “Matt, I am so sorry. I am so tired –“
THE COURT: Blow it up a little bit.
---
STATE: Your Honor, at this time we’re going to play Exhibits
10, 13, and 11, in that order.
Baker v. State Page 11
THE COURT: All right. And these are what?
STATE: These are, again, excerpts from interviews that the
defendant has given and depositions.
THE COURT: In the civil cases?
STATE: And interviews regarding this case.
(Video began playing)
THE COURT: Hold it a second. Do you-all have any kind of—for
the jury’s understanding any kind of timeline when
this was all done?
STATE: What we did was we took admissible excerpts from a
variety of interviews and depositions that the
defendant had done, and we put them together in
topical areas.
THE COURT: All right. I understand. I’m just trying to give the
jury some idea of when this occurred so they can
understand the continuity of it.
---
STATE: If you’ll move it forward, we can see Monday the
30th, March 30th at 2:06 a.m., Matt calls the Bulls
residence. And then go to the 31st. That’s Matt’s cell
phone to the Bulls residence, 20 minutes. Then go to
April 3rd.
THE COURT: Wait just a minute. So the jury is not confused, this is
not phone calls made to Kari’s phone that we talked
about earlier.
---
THE COURT: Mr. Henry –
WITNESS: The general –
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THE COURT: Hold on a minute. During our break I had a
conversation with one of the camera people –
WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: And he said, “You know what I’d like to know about
things is if I turn on the faucet, am I going to get
water,” you know, not how it got there.
---
THE COURT: Mr. Henry, can you just tell us if the person – what
did – the person that clicked onto this, what did they
do? Can you tell us?
WITNESS: Sure.
THE COURT: Okay. That’s what we’re trying to get at.
---
THE COURT: Mr. Henry, hold it, hold it.
WITNESS: I’m sorry.
THE COURT: Did the person who did this buy 50 tablets of
Ambien?
WITNESS: Correct.
---
STATE: Then March 31st, if you’ll just – they can look at it as
it goes by – 3:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., Matt’s cell to the
Bulls residence. Take it to, then, April 6th, Matt’s cell
to the Bulls residence, two calls. Then Friday, April
17th—7th—pardon me—Matt’s cell to the Bulls
residence, one minute. Then we go to April 8th,
which is the day of Kari’s death.
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Go back. I’m not sure everybody can
see that. Okay. All right.
Baker v. State Page 13
In addition, Baker complains of the following actions by the trial court:
1. The trial court interrupts the State’s direct examination to emphasize the “point”
the State is “trying to make.”
2. The trial court sua sponte questioned a witness concerning the physical layout of
the former offices used by Baker.
3. The trial court explained to the State that they had not offered some photos into
evidence.
4. The trial court intervened suggesting that the State “zoom in” on its evidence
being projected onto a screen.
5. In punishment, the trial court interrupted the State’s direct examination to
“clarify” a time frame of an incident.
No objection was made to any of the trial court’s comments. Generally, a timely,
specific objection at trial must be made or the right to have the appeals court address
the complaint on appeal is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Griggs v. State, 213
S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is well established that nearly every right
may be waived by a party’s failure to timely object during trial. See Saldano v. State, 70
S.W.3d 873, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Despite the law’s general requirement of a timely trial objection, we note that the
Court of Criminal Appeals, in a plurality opinion, previously found that a trial court’s
comments “which tainted [the defendant’s] presumption of innocence . . . were
fundamental error of constitutional dimension and required no objection.” Blue v. State,
41 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In Blue, the trial court, while apologizing to
the venire for a long delay, explained that the delay had been caused by the defendant’s
Baker v. State Page 14
inability to decide whether to accept a plea bargain; and then, the trial court expressed
its preference that the defendant enter a guilty plea. Id. at 130.
Since deciding Blue, the Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified the types of
statements that trial courts can make without violating Blue. See Jasper v. State, 61
S.W.3d 413, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In Jasper, the Court recognized that several
types of comments do not rise to the level of fundamental error unless the comments
bear upon the presumption of innocence or vitiate the impartiality of the jury. Id.
Examples of such comments include those made to correct a misstatement or
misrepresentation of previously admitted testimony, to maintain control and expedite
the trial, or to clear up a point of confusion, as well as comments revealing irritation at
counsel. Id. We find that each of the trial court’s comments fit within these categories
as set forth in Jasper, and therefore, do not rise to the level of fundamental error. As
such, an objection was necessary in order to preserve error. Because there was no
objection, Baker’s complaint was not preserved. We overrule issue four.
Conclusion
Having overruled Baker’s issues in this appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed June 8, 2011
Do not publish
[CRPM]
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