in Re EOG Resources, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  •                           COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-13-00440-CV
    IN RE EOG RESOURCES, INC.                                               RELATOR
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    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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    Relator EOG Resources, Inc. filed this petition for writ of mandamus
    seeking to vacate the trial court’s order requiring it to produce privileged trade
    secret information during pretrial discovery.
    David and Shelly Richey sued EOG alleging that after they had entered
    into an oil and gas lease with EOG, it improperly failed to include their land in a
    pooled unit with similarly-located leases and that EOG improperly drained oil and
    gas from underneath their property. In discovery, the Richeys sought EOG’s
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4, 52.8(d).
    geologic and seismic data for their property and any property located within one
    mile of their property.    EOG objected to the Richeys’ request for production
    claiming, among other things, that the information sought is “confidential,
    business, and/or proprietary information.”        The Richeys moved to compel
    production of the information, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.
    At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the information sought is
    privileged trade secret information. Following the hearing, the trial court signed
    an order compelling production of the information to the Richeys. In its order, the
    trial court found that the Richeys had met their burden to show that the trade
    secret information sought in their request for production is necessary for a fair
    adjudication of their claims. EOG then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
    this court challenging the trial court’s order.
    Texas Rule of Evidence 507 provides,
    A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by the person
    or the person’s agent or employee, to refuse to disclose and to
    prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by the
    person, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud
    or otherwise work injustice. When disclosure is directed, the judge
    shall take such protective measure as the interests of the holder of
    the privilege and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may
    require.
    Tex. R. Evid. 507.        After a party resisting discovery establishes that the
    information is a trade secret, the burden shifts to the requesting party to establish
    that the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of its claims. E.g., In re
    Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 
    979 S.W.2d 609
    , 613 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). “[A]
    2
    party seeking such information cannot merely assert unfairness but must
    demonstrate with specificity exactly how the lack of the information will impair the
    presentation of the case on the merits to the point that an unjust result is a real,
    rather than a merely possible, threat.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
    106 S.W.3d 730
    , 733 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
    The Richeys’ expert testified generally that the trade secret information
    sought was “pertinent,” “helpful,” and “essential” to the Richeys’ claims and that
    the request was “reasonable” and “necessary.” But he never articulated any
    reason why discovery of the information was necessary other than that the only
    evidence the Richeys had to support their claims is the proximity of the wellbores
    on neighboring properties to their property. The Richeys’ expert admitted that
    the Richeys could have obtained the information on their own but for “cost and
    [lack of] expertise,” but he also testified that it “probably” would not do them any
    good to spend their own money on obtaining such information.
    We conclude and hold that the Richeys did not meet their burden to show
    with specificity how their failure to obtain the trade secret information sought
    would so impair the presentation of the case that the result would be unjust; thus,
    the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of the trade secrets.
    See, e.g., id.; see also HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 
    982 S.W.2d 881
    , 886 (Tex.
    1998) (noting that royalty owners should determine whether a common reservoir
    underlies their leases because of the potential for drainage by surrounding wells
    and also noting that records about operations in a common reservoir are
    3
    generally available from the former Railroad Commission). There is no adequate
    remedy by appeal when a trial court orders a party to produce privileged trade
    secrets absent a showing of necessity. See, e.g., In re Union Pac. R.R., 
    294 S.W.3d 589
    , 593 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In re Bass, 
    113 S.W.3d 735
    , 745
    (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
    Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief. We order the trial
    court to withdraw its order compelling EOG to respond to the Richeys’ request for
    production number 10 seeking geologic and seismic data for the property and
    surrounding areas. We are confident that the trial court will promptly comply, and
    a writ will issue only if it does not.
    /s/ Terrie Livingston
    TERRIE LIVINGSTON
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and WALKER, JJ.
    DELIVERED: February 12, 2014
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-13-00440-CV

Filed Date: 2/12/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015