K2m3, LLC and Cocoon Data, Llc v. Cocoon Data Holdings Pty Ltd Acn 127 993 300 and Cocoon Data Pty Ltd Acn 127 993 284 ( 2012 )

NUMBER 13-11-00194-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
K2M3, LLC AND COCOON DATA, LLC , Appellants,
v.
COCOON DATA HOLDING PTY. LTD.
ACN 127 993 300 AND COCOON DATA
PTY LTD ACN 127 993 284, Appellees.
On appeal from the 152nd District Court
of Harris County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of a lawsuit filed by appellants,
K2M3, LLC (“K2M3”) and Cocoon Data, LLC (“Cocoon US”), on grounds of forum non
conveniens. By three issues, appellants contend that the trial court erred in: (1) failing
to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) dismissing the suit because there
was no evidence that an adequate alternative forum existed; and (3) dismissing the suit
because there is insufficient evidence that balancing the parties’ interests favors
dismissal. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
Appellees, Cocoon Data Holdings Pty. Ltd. ACN 127 993 300 and Cocoon Data
Pty. Ltd. ACN 127 993 284 (collectively, “Cocoon Australia”) are Australian corporations
with principal offices in Australia. K2M3 and Cocoon US are both Colorado limited
liability companies. On August 5, 2009, K2M3 and Cocoon Australia entered into a
Joint Development Agreement (“the Agreement”) for the purpose of exploiting and
selling, in North America, proprietary software encryption technology owned by Cocoon
Australia. To facilitate the parties’ business relationship, the Agreement established
Military Resources Limited (“MR”), a new British Virgin Islands corporation, owned
equally by K2M3 and Cocoon Australia. Under the Agreement, Cocoon Australia
agreed to fund MR and granted it the exclusive license to sell the encryption technology
in North America. K2M3 agreed to market the technology through MR and guaranteed
specified sales revenues.
By February 2010, various disputes had developed between the parties. For
example, Cocoon Australia claimed that K2M3 failed to provide an accounting for the
funds paid by Cocoon Australia. It also claimed that, without authority or Cocoon
Australia’s consent, Mathew Tinley, K2M3’s manager, had unilaterally “substituted” a
new company—Cocoon US—for MR in the Agreement. K2M3 claimed that Cocoon
1
This case is before this Court on transfer from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston
pursuant to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West
2005).
2
Australia failed to make required payments under the Agreement.
On May 17, 2010, Cocoon Australia sued K2M3 for breach of the Agreement in
Australia. On September 21, 2010, K2M3 made a general appearance before the
Australian court. On November 10, 2010, K2M3 filed a “defence,” in which it asserted
affirmative defenses and a counterclaim that Cocoon Australia had breached the
Agreement.2 K2M3 asserted that the Agreement was governed by Texas law, but did
not challenge the Australian court’s jurisdiction.
On September 23, 2010—two days after its appearance in the Australian court—
K2M3 and Cocoon US filed suit in Harris County, asserting that Cocoon Australia had
breached the Agreement. K2M3 and Cocoon US’s petition also requested a temporary
restraining order and injunctive relief enjoining Cocoon Australia from attempting to
license the encryption technology to any other North American company.
On September 28, 2010, the Australian court issued a restraining order enjoining
K2M3 from seeking a temporary restraining order in the Harris County lawsuit until
October 14, 2010. On October 14, 2010, the Australian court issued a second order
prohibiting K2M3 from seeking a restraining order in the Harris County suit. Despite
these orders, K2M3 and Cocoon US filed an amended petition on October 21, 2010 in
the Harris County suit, in which they requested a hearing on their application for a
2
K2M3’s “defence” responds to Cocoon Australia’s allegations and asserts counterclaims. For
example, the “defence” asserted:
In answer to paragraph 6(a), the Defendant denies that the Plaintiff made the
payments as described and says that the Plaintiffs is [sic] in breach of clause 8.1 of the
Agreement which provided that the Plaintiffs were to make payments totaling US$1million
by 30 October 2010.
Particulars
The Plaintiffs only paid US$167,000 and therefore owe US$833,000.
3
temporary injunction. The trial court held the temporary injunction hearing on November
12, 2010; counsel for appellants and Cocoon Australia appeared. K2M3 presented the
testimony of Tinley. Both sides introduced exhibits.
On cross-examination, Tinley admitted that Cocoon Australia had sued K2M3
first in Australian court and that K2M3 had answered, but that K2M3 had not challenged
the Australian court’s jurisdiction. The Australian court’s September 28 and October 14
restraining orders were introduced into evidence. On November 22, 2010, the trial court
denied appellants’ request for a temporary injunction.
On November 19, 2010, Cocoon Australia filed a motion to dismiss the Harris
County suit for forum non conveniens. Cocoon Australia argued, among other things,
that: (1) an alternate forum existed in Australia, a lawsuit litigating the same issue
(breach of the Agreement) was pending in the Australian court, and K2M3 had
appeared and asserted a claim for breach of the Agreement in that suit; (2) none of the
parties were Texas residents and allowing duplicate litigation would result in
unnecessary costs; (3) duplicate litigation could result in conflicting rulings; and (4)
appellants had filed the Harris County suit “in brazen disregard” of the Australian court’s
orders. Appellants filed a response to Cocoon Australia’s motion to dismiss in which
they argued that: (1) they were required to bring their claims in Texas pursuant to a
forum selection clause in the Agreement3; (2) any additional costs and risks to Cocoon
3
The disputed clause in the Agreement states:
5.3 Governing Law
This Agreement is governed by and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of
Texas, United States of America, and each party unconditionally and irrevocably submits
to the exclusive jurisdiction of federal and state courts of Texas, United States of
America. This Agreement is governed by and shall be construed in accordance with the
laws of Texas and each party unconditionally and irrevocably submits to the exclusive
4
Australia as a result of the Harris County suit were “bargained for” when the parties
signed the Agreement; and (3) the Harris County suit is not a “duplicate lawsuit”
because appellants sought enforcement of the Agreement, whereas Cocoon Australia’s
Australia lawsuit sought termination of the Agreement.4
On December 10, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on Cocoon Australia’s
forum non conveniens motion. At the hearing, the trial court judge stated that he was
“concerned about these claims being filed in two forums and parallel proceedings going
on.” He stated he was “not going to preside over a trial if there is a trial that has already
taken place in Australia, and [was] sure the Justice down in Australia doesn’t wish to
preside over a trial where a trial’s already taken place here in Texas.” The trial court
observed that, contrary to appellants’ arguments, he was “not viewing [clause 5.3 in the
Agreement] as a mandatory-forum selection clause.” The court questioned the parties
about the status of the Australian suit. Cocoon Australia’s counsel stated that there was
a pending hearing regarding appellants’ repeated violations of the Australian court’s
restraining orders. The trial court repeatedly questioned appellants’ counsel regarding
the parties’ relationship to Texas. Appellants’ counsel responded that the contract “was
performable” in Texas and the parties had agreed Texas was an appropriate forum. On
jurisdiction of federal and state courts of:
(a) in respect of any Court proceedings of any claims by [Cocoon Australia or MR] under
or pursuant to this Agreement, Victoria, Australia, subject to paragraph (c) of this
clause 5.3;
(b) in respect of Court proceedings of any claims by K2M3 under or pursuant to this
agreement, Texas, United States of America, subject to paragraph (c) of this clause
5.3; and
We note that despite separate references in “(a)” and “(b)” to “paragraph (c) of this clause 5.3,”
there is no “paragraph (c)” in clause 5.3. Neither side acknowledges or explains this anomaly.
4
The parties filed several additional replies and supplemental replies.
5
December 15, 2010, the trial court dismissed the case for forum non conveniens.
Appellants filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law.
Appellants also timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a
notice of past due findings, but no findings of fact or conclusions of law were issued.5
II. FAILURE TO FILE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By their first issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to file
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants timely filed a request for findings of
fact and conclusions of law and a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of
law with respect to the trial court's decision to grant Cocoon Australia’s motion to
dismiss for forum non conveniens. Appellants cite Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296
and 297. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 297.6 Rule 296 provides that “in any case tried in the
district or county court without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing
its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. The term “tried” for the
purposes of rule 296 includes the disposition of a case rendered after an evidentiary
hearing before the trial court upon conflicting evidence. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973
5
On August 29, 2011, Cocoon Australia filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot. Cocoon
Australia attached to its motion a copy of the Australian court’s July 29, 2011 judgment. The judgment
assessed money damages against K2M3 in the amount of $250,960.73, plus costs; it also declared that
the Agreement was validly terminated on May 17, 2010.
We may take judicial notice of the records in another court when, as here, we are provided with
copies of those records. See San Pedro Impulsora de Inmuebles Especiales, S.A. de C.V. v. Villarreal,
330 S.W.3d 27, 43 n.12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.); Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 745, 750
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Because the Australian court’s judgment was not before the trial
court, however, we do not rely on it in our analysis of the issues before us. See Beard v. Comm'n for
Lawyer Discipline, 279 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (“It is axiomatic that an
appellate court reviews actions of a trial court based on the materials before the trial court at the time it
acted.”); Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Tall, 972 S.W.2d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no
pet.) (same). We therefore deny Cocoon Australia’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
6
Rule 297 specifies the timetable for filing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
procedure for filing a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law.
6
S.W.2d 701, 708 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (holding that, for
purposes of rule 296, a “case is ‘tried’ when there is an evidentiary hearing before the
court on conflicting evidence.”). When a judgment is rendered as a matter of law,
findings and conclusions have no purpose and should not be requested or considered
on appeal. IKB Indus. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1997).
Therefore, even when the trial court receives evidence, findings and conclusions are
only appropriate if the trial court is called upon to determine questions of fact upon
conflicting evidence. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Port Arthur Teachers Ass’n, 990
S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied); see Ford v. City of
Lubbock, 76 S.W.3d 795, 796–98 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (holding that,
although evidence was attached to the plea and to the response, findings and
conclusions could not properly be considered on appeal because no fact dispute
existed).
Here, no witnesses testified and no evidence was introduced at the forum non
conveniens hearing.7 At the hearing, the trial court stated that it was “trying to refocus
this discussion back to why [the lawsuit] is in Texas.” In response to the court’s
questions, appellants’ counsel admitted that appellants were both limited liability
companies formed in Colorado. The trial court asked appellants’ counsel to address
why the court should not dismiss the suit on forum non conveniens grounds because
the court “[saw] no relationship to the State of Texas.” Appellants’ counsel responded
that the Agreement “was performable in the State of Texas” and that the parties had
agreed that Texas was the appropriate forum. We conclude that the trial court’s
7
We note that testimony and evidence was introduced at the temporary injunction hearing, but
there were no disputed fact issues regarding the forum non conveniens analysis.
7
dismissal of appellants’ suit on grounds of forum non conveniens did not involve
disputed facts but was decided as a matter of law. See IKB Indus. (Nig.) Ltd., 938
S.W.2d at 443. Accordingly, findings of fact and conclusions of law were not required,
and the trial court did not err in failing to issue them. See Haddix v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co.,
253 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). We overrule appellant’s first
issue.
III. DISMISSAL FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS
By their second and third issues, appellants contend the trial court erred in
dismissing their lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds. Specifically, appellants
contend: (1) there is no evidence that an adequate alternate forum exists (second
issue); and (2) under common law forum non conveniens analysis, the balance of
private-interest and public-interest factors did not favor dismissal (third issue).
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The determination of whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of
the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Tex.
2010). The trial court’s decision is entitled to great deference and may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 31, 35.
Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine exercised by courts to prevent
the imposition of an inconvenient jurisdiction on a litigant. Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd. v.
Util. Trailers de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 336 S.W.3d 664 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, no pet.). A trial court will exercise the doctrine of forum non conveniens when it
determines that, for the convenience of the litigants and witnesses and in the interest of
8
justice, the action should be instituted in another forum. Id. at 672. “The ‘central focus
of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience.’” Quixtar, 315 S.W.3d at 33
(quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981)). In Vinmar, the Houston
First Court of Appeals stated the applicable analysis:
Building on its holding in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,[8] the Supreme
Court set out the framework for analyzing forum non conveniens in an
international context in Piper Aircraft. First, “the court must determine
whether there exists an alternative forum.” The court considers the
amenability of the defendant to service of process and availability of an
adequate remedy in the alternative forum. Second, the court must
determine which forum is best suited to the litigation. In performing this
second step, a court must consider whether certain private and public
interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal. A court must be mindful that
“the ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the
parties and the interests of justice.”
336 S.W.3d at 672 (citations omitted).
As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Quixtar:
The well-known Gulf Oil factors direct courts to consider both public and
private interest considerations in forum non conveniens dismissals.
Private considerations include: (1) the “relative ease of access to sources
of proof”; (2) the “availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses”; (3)
the “possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action”; (4) the “enforceability of a judgment” once obtained; and (5) “all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive.” Public considerations include: (1) “[a]dministrative
difficulties . . . for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers
instead of being handled at its origin”; (2) the burden of “jury duty . . . that
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no
relation to the litigation”; (3) “local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home”; and (4) avoiding conflicts of law issues.
315 S.W.3d at 33–34.
“A defendant seeking forum non conveniens dismissal ‘ordinarily bears a heavy
burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum.’” Quixtar, 315 S.W.3d at 31 (quoting
8
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
9
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)),
However, when, as here, the appellants are not Texas residents, “a nonresident
plaintiff’s forum choice does not require ‘the same balancing of interests’ as a resident
plaintiff’s.” Id. at 32 (quoting In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 680 (Tex. 2007)
(Willett, J. concurring)). Thus, the presumption that appellants filed in Texas as a
matter of convenience “applies with less force and deserves ‘substantially less
deference’” than it would if appellants were Texas residents. See id. at 33 (quoting
Pirelli, 247 S.W.3d at 675). Here, Cocoon Australia had the burden of proof, but
because appellants are not Texas residents, its burden of proof is less stringent than if
appellants were Texas residents. See id.
B. Analysis
1. Australia as an Alternative Forum
We begin by addressing appellants’ complaint that there is no evidence that an
adequate alternative forum exists. Appellants assert that “Australia is inadequate
because K2M3 is unlikely to be allowed to pursue a cause of action there because
K2M3 is required by [the Agreement] to bring suit in Texas.” In other words, appellants
argue that they are contractually “obligated to bring lawsuits stemming from [the
Agreement] in Texas courts.” Appellants concede that they have never asserted “that
Australia is an inadequate forum to hear cases of this nature.” They argue only that
clause 5.3(b) of the Agreement bars K2M3 from maintaining any claim in Australia.
Appellants thus assert that they have “no adequate remedy” if forced to file suit in
Australia because an Australian court would “take one look at the [Agreement] before
throwing the case out pursuant to [clause] 5.3.” In their reply brief, appellants further
10
argue that, because the Australian court has rendered judgment against them and
declared that the Agreement is terminated, they “have been left with no legal course of
action by the Australian court.”
Cocoon Australia characterizes the issue as “whether the trial court abused its
discretion in not considering K2M3’s fear that an Australian court will sua sponte invoke
the forum selection clause and dismiss K2M3’s suit, denying it a forum.” Cocoon
Australia argues that: (1) because appellants did not raise the issue that an Australian
court would reject any attempt by K2M3 to bring suit in Australia in either their response
to the motion to dismiss or in their reply to Cocoon Australia’s supplemental reply to the
motion, they waived the issue; and (2) appellants’ argument lacks merit because after
appellants appeared in the Australian court and filed a counterclaim, the Australian
court did not dismiss their claim, but attempted to compel K2M3’s continued
participation in the Australian suit.
We note that, in their response to Cocoon Australia’s motion to dismiss,
appellants argued: “Given the restrictions of the [Agreement], [appellants] had no
‘choice’ of forum at all; they were bound to the terms of the contract they signed.” We
need not decide, however, whether appellants preserved their issue that an Australian
court would sua sponte dismiss any claim that K2M3 brought in Australia, because we
conclude it is without merit.9 Attached to Cocoon Australia’s motion to dismiss, among
other documents, were copies of the Australian lawsuit, the notice of K2M3’s
9
See Vinmar Trade Fin., Ltd. v. Util. Trailers de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 336 S.W.3d 664, 674 n.1
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“Because the substance of Vinmar’s arguments are
without merit, we need not determine whether the arguments were timely raised.”).
11
appearance, K2M3’s answer and counterclaim, and the Australian court’s restraining
orders.
“An alternative forum exists when it is both available and adequate.” Vinmar, 336
S.W.3d at 674; see RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686, 710 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2010, no pet.); Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991,
writ denied). “A ‘foreign forum is available when the entire case and all the parties can
come within the jurisdiction of that forum.’” Vinmar, 336 S.W.3d at 674 (quoting
Sarieddine, 820 S.W.2d at 841). “A forum is ‘adequate’ if the parties will not be
deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly.” RSR Corp., 309 S.W.3d at 710. “If the
defendant demonstrates another available forum exists, the plaintiff must then prove the
available forum is inadequate.” Id.
Appellants concede that they have never asserted “that Australia is an
inadequate forum to hear cases of this nature.” We thus focus on whether, at the time
of the trial court’s decision, Cocoon Australia established that Australia was an available
forum.10 We conclude that Cocoon Australia met its burden. Both Cocoon Australia
parties are Australian corporations. K2M3’s appearance and counterclaim in the
Australian court established that it consented to jurisdiction there. See Sarieddine, 820
S.W.2d at 842 (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 242 (holding that a defendant is
amenable to process for purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis where the
defendant agreed to “submit to the jurisdiction statutes of the Scottish courts.”)). With
regard to Cocoon US, it was not a party to the Australian suit and did not consent to
jurisdiction there. However, Australia was an available forum for Cocoon US because
10
See Beard, 279 S.W.3d at 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (“It is axiomatic that an
appellate court reviews actions of a trial court based on the materials before the trial court at the time it
acted.”).
12
the Agreement did not prohibit it from filing a claim in Australia, and it could have done
so. We overrule appellants’ second issue.
1. Analysis of Private and Public Factors
By their third issue, appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by
dismissing for forum non conveniens because the Gulf Oil factors do not support
dismissal. Cocoon Australia’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens asserted that
appellants’ breach of contract claim was “between non-Texas residents that have no
connection to Texas.” At the forum non conveniens hearing, counsel for Cocoon
Australia argued that: “Two of the board of directors of Military Resources are in
[11]
Australia. The only person here is Mr. Tinley and even he apparently lives in Los
Angeles. And the other board of director [sic], Mr. Kettler, is somewhere in Austin.
Texas has nothing to do with this.” The record reflects that Trent Telford is a director of
both Cocoon Australia corporations. The record also contains an affidavit from David
Dobbs, a member of the board of directors of MR, in which he states that he was not
asked to vote on the dissolution of MR. Cocoon Australia also submitted the affidavit of
Kevin Kettler, in which he states that his appointment as a director of MR was not
formalized and that he was never asked to vote on the dissolution of MR or on the
formation of a company to substitute for MR.
Cocoon Australia argues that: (1) “three of the four key witnesses with
knowledge of facts, including [a]ppellants’ Mr. Tinley, are not Texas residents”; (2)
11
Paragraph 10.1 of the Agreement provides that MR will be supervised by a board of directors,
initially composed of Mat Tinley, Kevin Kettler, David Dobbs, and Trent Telford. Although the record is
unclear, Cocoon’s counsel was presumably referring to Dobbs and Telford as the two directors of MR in
Australia. Telford executed the Agreement on behalf of Cocoon Australia. Richard Wilensky executed
the Agreement on behalf of MR and K2M3.
13
“[s]ince none of the companies are Texas entities, all pertinent records are located
outside of Texas”; and (3) permitting duplicate litigation causes delay, inefficiencies, and
increased costs. They further argue that the public factors favor dismissal because
when the trial court inquired about the relationship to Texas, appellants’ only response
was that some of the negotiations leading up to the Agreement occurred in Texas and
some of the potential customers were in Texas.
Appellants contend that they each maintain offices in Texas,12 and that crucial
fact witnesses Kevin Kettler and Richard Wilensky, a representative of K2M3, reside in
Texas.
None of the parties are Texas residents. “There is a connection to Texas when
one of the parties is a Texas resident and at least some justification for the burden to
Texans of providing judicial resources for the dispute.” Quixtar, 315 S.W.3d at 33. Of
the five witnesses with knowledge of the facts—Tinley, Kettler, Dobbs, Telford, and
Wilensky—only two (Kettler and Wilensky) are Texas residents. As the supreme court
noted in Quixtar, “[i]t is an ‘obvious conclusion’ that costs will increase when witnesses
travel great distances.” Id. at 35.
At the forum non conveniens hearing, in response to the trial court’s comment
that he “saw no relationship to the State of Texas,” appellants’ counsel responded that
the Agreement was performable in Texas (and in “all of North America”), and the parties
agreed that Texas was the appropriate forum. A forum-selection clause is considered
as a factor in determining whether the trial court erred by dismissing a case for forum
12
We note that the evidence supporting Cocoon US’s contention that it maintains an office in
Texas is dated October 28, 2010, after appellants filed suit in Texas. Appellants submitted the affidavit of
Tinley, dated December 14, 2010, after the forum non conveniens hearing and one day before the trial
court signed the dismissal order. Tinley’s affidavit stated that K2M3 and Cocoon US have principal
places of business in Dallas, Texas.
14
non conveniens. RSR Corp., 309 S.W.3d at 711 (citing Sarieddine, 820 S.W.2d at 839).
Even so, considering all of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion.
“[F]orum non conveniens dismissals are within the sound discretion of the trial
court and involve weighing various factors that may be difficult to quantify.” Quixtar, 315
S.W.3d at 35. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
claims under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Vinmar, 336 S.W.3d at 680.
We overrule appellants’ third issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of the trial court.
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
28th day of June, 2012.
15