in the Interest of J.M.R., J.E.R., and E.M.R., Children ( 2012 )


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  •                             NUMBER 13-11-00760-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    IN THE INTEREST OF J.M.R., J.E.R., AND E.M.R., CHILDREN
    On appeal from the 377th District Court
    of Victoria County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
    This case involves the involuntary termination of parental rights. See TEX. FAM.
    CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2011) (providing for the termination of the parent-child
    relationship). By her sole issue, appellant R.M.G. contends that her parental rights
    should not have been terminated because her drug use and other problems as a parent
    did not prevent her from caring adequately for her children, J.M.R., J.E.R., and E.M.R.,
    and because she learned through a program to avoid drugs in the future. We construe
    this issue as an evidentiary challenge to the following section 161.001(1) findings: (1)
    R.M.G. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or
    surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being; (2) R.M.G.
    engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in
    conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and (3)
    R.M.G. used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of
    the children and either failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment
    program or after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program
    continued to abuse a controlled substance. See 
    id. §§ 161.001(1)(D),
    (E) & (P). We
    affirm.
    I. Background1
    R.M.G. is the mother of J.M.R., J.E.R., and E.M.R., who, at the time of the
    termination hearing, were eight, six, and four years old, respectively. Following a trial to
    the bench, the court terminated R.M.G.'s parental rights to her children.2 In addition to
    the challenged 161.001(1) findings set out above, the trial court found by clear and
    convincing evidence3 that R.M.G.,
    failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
    established the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of the
    children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing
    1
    Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
    recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for
    it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    2
    The children's father is B.R. The trial court also terminated his parental rights over J.M.R.,
    J.E.R., and E.M.R. He has not appealed this decision.
    3
    In hearings regarding the termination of parental rights, due process requires that the State prove
    its case for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    , 263-64 (Tex. 2002)
    (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 769 (1982); In re G.M., 
    596 S.W.2d 846
    , 847 (Tex. 1980)); see
    TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2011). The clear and convincing standard is defined as the
    "measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to
    the truth of the allegations sought to be established." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2008).
    2
    conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not
    less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent
    under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children; [and]
    ....
    knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the
    mother's conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and
    inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the date of
    filing the petition[.]
    See 
    id. §§ 161.001(1)(L)
    & (O). The trial court also found by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between R.M.G. and her
    children was in the children's best interest. See 
    id. § 161.001(2).
    II. Discussion
    "Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a
    judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best
    interest." In re A.V., 
    113 S.W.3d 355
    , 362 (Tex. 2003). In this case, the trial court found
    that termination was in the best interest of the children, and R.M.G. does not challenge
    that finding. Moreover, while we construe R.M.G.'s issue as a challenge to a number of
    the trial court's findings under section 161.001(1), she clearly does not challenge all of
    the 161.001(1) findings, including that she failed to comply with provisions of a court order
    that established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of her children and that
    she knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in her conviction and
    imprisonment and her inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the
    date of filing the petition. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(L) & (O).
    When, as here, R.M.G. does not challenge the independent grounds that may,
    under the record presented, support the judgment she seeks to reverse, and has not
    3
    challenged the "best interest" finding, this Court has no choice but to overrule the
    challenges that R.M.G. has chosen to assert. See In re 
    A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361
    (holding
    that father's failure to challenge sufficiency of evidence to support finding under one
    subsection of section 161.001(1) made it unnecessary—when best interest finding had
    been made—to address father's challenges to other grounds for termination); Fletcher v.
    Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 
    277 S.W.3d 58
    , 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2009, no pet.) (holding that because mother's appeal challenged only three of the six
    grounds for termination found by the trial court, and because any of the unchallenged
    findings—along with the best interest finding—would support the order of termination, it
    was unnecessary to address mother's issues challenging only three of the grounds).
    Accordingly, we overrule R.M.G.'s sole issue.
    III. Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court's termination order.
    NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    14th day of June, 2012.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-11-00760-CV

Filed Date: 6/14/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015