Texas Department of Public Safety v. Stephanie Wyn Randolph ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00025-CV
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC APPELLANT
SAFETY
V.
STEPHANIE WYN RANDOLPH APPELLEE
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF PARKER COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) determined that because a
court had previously ordered mental health services for Stephanie Wyn
Randolph, she was therefore not qualified to purchase a firearm under federal
law, and that because she was not qualified under federal law, she was ineligible
under Texas law to renew her concealed handgun license. Accordingly, DPS
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
denied her renewal application. The trial court ordered DPS to issue Randolph a
license, and DPS now appeals. Because we hold that the evidence was legally
sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.
Background
On July 24, 2008, a county court in Howard County, Texas, found that
Randolph was mentally ill and therefore was likely to cause serious harm to
herself; was suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical
distress; was unable to provide for her basic needs; and was unable to make a
rational and informed decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment. The
court ordered temporary mental health services in a state hospital for a period
not to exceed ninety days. Randolph was allowed to leave the hospital before
the ninety days had expired. Her doctor later determined that the most likely
cause of her symptoms was an autoimmune disorder rather than the bipolar
disorder with which she had previously been diagnosed.
When Randolph applied to renew her concealed handgun license, DPS
denied her application based on the Howard County court’s mental health
adjudication. After the justice court upheld DPS’s determination, 2 Randolph filed
2
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.180(a) (West 2012) (providing that when
DPS denies an application for a concealed handgun license, the applicant may
request a hearing in the justice court, with the court acting as an administrative
hearing officer).
2
a petition for review in the county court at law in Parker County. 3 After a trial de
novo, the county court at law signed a judgment finding that Randolph was
qualified under state and federal law to have a firearm and ordering DPS to
“issue or cause to be issued to [Randolph] a concealed handgun license.”
Analysis
In its sole issue on appeal, DPS argues that that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment and that the trial court erred by
finding that a letter from Randolph’s doctor was sufficient to make Randolph
qualified under federal and state law for a concealed handgun license following a
court-ordered commitment to a mental hospital. In response, Randolph asserts
that under federal law, because she was discharged from court-ordered mental
health services, her commitment was deemed to have never occurred, and she is
therefore not disqualified from purchasing a firearm. In its reply brief, DPS
asserts that Randolph’s early discharge from the order of commitment did not
work to relieve Randolph of federal disqualification, and it merely ended the
court’s jurisdiction to require a return for commitment without a new order.
Our analysis turns on various federal and state statutes relating to eligibility
to purchase a firearm and to obtain a concealed handgun license. We review
3
See id. § 411.180(e) (providing that an applicant may appeal the justice
court’s determination by filing a petition in the county court for a trial de novo).
3
issues of statutory construction under a de novo standard. 4 Our primary
objective in statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, and
to that end, we “construe the statute’s words according to their plain and
common meaning, unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context or
unless such a construction leads to absurd results.” 5
The Texas statute governing eligibility for a concealed handgun license is
government code section 411.172. 6 The section includes a list of requirements
for eligibility, two of which the parties discussed and relied on in the trial court,
and which we discuss here:
(a) A person is eligible for a license to carry a concealed handgun if
the person:
...
(7) is not incapable of exercising sound judgment with respect
to the proper use and storage of a handgun;
. . . [and]
(9) is fully qualified under applicable federal and state law to
purchase a handgun. 7
DPS based its denial of Randolph’s application on the ground that
Randolph was ineligible for a license under subsection (a)(9) because under
4
Chesser v. LifeCare Mgmt. Svcs., L.L.C., 356 S.W.3d 613, 619–20 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
5
Id.
6
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.172 (West 2012).
7
Id.
4
federal law, she was not qualified to purchase a handgun. Specifically, DPS
decided that Randolph was disqualified by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which provides
that a person who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective” may not
“possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition” or “receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.” 8
Federal regulations define “adjudicated as a mental defective” as “[a]
determination by a court . . . or other lawful authority that a person, as a result of
. . . mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a danger to himself
or to others; or (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs.” 9 Thus, under federal law, Randolph had been adjudicated as a mental
defective because a court had determined that, as a result of a mental illness or
condition, Randolph was a danger to herself and lacked the mental capacity to
manage her own affairs. Because she had been adjudicated as a mental
defective, under federal law she could not purchase a firearm. And because she
could not purchase a firearm under federal law, she could not meet the
government code section 411.172(a)(9) eligibility requirement and therefore was
not eligible for a handgun license.
8
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(4) (West 2000).
9
See 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2013).
5
In the trial court, Randolph countered DPS’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 922
by pointing out that federal law had been amended so that it now provides that:
No department or agency of the Federal Government may provide to
the Attorney General any record of an adjudication related to the
mental health of a person or any commitment of a person to a
mental institution if—
(A) the adjudication or commitment, respectively, has been set aside
or expunged, or the person has otherwise been fully released or
discharged from all mandatory treatment, supervision, or monitoring.
...
In the case of an adjudication related to the mental health of a
person or a commitment of a person to a mental institution, a record
of which may not be provided to the Attorney General . . . the
adjudication or commitment, respectively, shall be deemed not to
have occurred for purposes of [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4]. 10
Randolph argued that because she had been discharged from court-ordered
supervision, by operation of law the adjudication of her mental health was
deemed to have never occurred.
The trial court admitted into evidence the order of the Howard County court
ordering temporary mental health services for Randolph. With this order, DPS
established that Randolph had been adjudicated as a mental defective under
federal law, which would serve to disqualify her from buying a firearm.
DPS argued that Randolph could again become eligible for the license by
obtaining a certificate of relief of disabilities under Texas Health and Safety Code
10
NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (18 U.S.C. § 922 note),
Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 101, 122 Stat. 2559 (emphasis added).
6
section 574.088. 11 That section provides a mechanism for a person who has
been discharged from court-ordered mental health services to petition the court
that entered the commitment order for an order stating that the person “qualifies
for relief from a firearms disability.” 12 At one time, a person disqualified under
federal law could apply to the Attorney General for the United States for relief
from a federal prohibition on purchasing a firearm, but since 1992, the United
States Congress has denied funding to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives to act on applications for relief from firearms disabilities. 13 In
2008, Congress passed an amendment—the same amendment that gives relief
for a person who has been discharged from mental health services—that allows
states to establish their own program to provide relief from firearms disabilities. 14
Texas has adopted such a program, and it appears in health and safety code
section 574.088.
To grant relief under that section, the court that issued the mental health
services order must find that “(1) the person is no longer likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety; and (2) removing the person’s disability to purchase a
11
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.088 (West 2010).
12
Id.
13
See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102–393, 106 Stat. 1729; Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-
523, 2013 WL 356851, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013) (discussing the options
for relief from the federal prohibition against purchasing a firearm).
14
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 note § 103(a)(1).
7
firearm is in the public interest.” 15 Thus, Randolph could request the Howard
County court that rendered the commitment order to enter an order stating that
she qualified for relief under section 574.088. DPS argued that this section
provides the only mechanism under the law for Randolph to remove her
disability.
Randolph countered that she was not required to use the procedure in the
health and safety code. Instead, she directed the trial court to a different part of
government code section 411.172: subsection (f). Subsection (f) allows an
applicant to provide a certificate from a doctor to establish that, despite any prior
mental health adjudication, the applicant is nevertheless eligible for a concealed
handgun license. 16 To that end, Randolph produced a letter from her doctor,
which stated that “[t]he most likely cause of her problem is an autoimmune
disorder, which led to a seizure disorder” and that “[h]er seizures have been well
controlled and with continued treatment her previous behavior is not likely to
develop at a future time.”
Subsection (f) specifically relates to the eligibility criterion in subsection
(a)(7), which requires an applicant to be capable of exercising sound judgment
with respect to the proper use and storage of a handgun. 17 Section 411.172(d)
15
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.088(c).
16
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.172(f).
17
Id. § 411.172(d), (f).
8
states that a person is not capable of exercising such judgment if the person has
been declared by a court to be incompetent to manage the person’s own
affairs. 18 But then subsection (f) provides that notwithstanding subsection (d), a
person’s psychiatric condition does not make the person incapable of exercising
sound judgment “if the person provides the department with a certificate from a
licensed physician whose primary practice is in the field of psychiatry stating that
the psychiatric disorder or condition is in remission and is not reasonably likely to
develop at a future time.” 19 DPS pointed out that the exception in subsection (f)
applies only to the eligibility criterion in subsection (a)(7) and does not apply to
excuse the eligibility criterion in subsection (a)(9), which requires an applicant to
be qualified to purchase a firearm under federal law. Thus, DPS argued, the
doctor’s letter was insufficient to establish eligibility.
In summary, DPS argued that a mental health adjudication can negate two
different license eligibility requirements: the requirement that a person be
qualified to purchase a handgun under federal law, and the requirement that a
person be capable of exercising the necessary sound judgment. A person who
was the subject of a prior mental health adjudication can meet the latter eligibility
requirement with a certificate from a doctor and can meet the former by following
the procedure in the health and safety code.
18
Id. § 411.172(d).
19
Id. § 411.172(f).
9
Randolph alternatively relied on the amendment to the federal background
check law providing that discharge from mental health services causes that
mental health adjudication to be deemed to have never happened. 20 The order
of Randolph’s confinement, entered into evidence in the trial court, was for a
period of ninety days. Randolph’s husband testified at the hearing that she had
been discharged from the hospital prior to the expiration of the ninety days. No
evidence showed that she was still under court-ordered treatment, supervision,
or monitoring.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Randolph’s request
for relief. It entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, in which it found and
concluded that Randolph was qualified under federal and Texas law to have and
carry a firearm and that she should be issued a new concealed handgun license.
This case points out a gap in the overlay of federal and state law in this
area. At the time that the mental health services order was entered, Randolph
became disqualified under federal law from purchasing a firearm and thus
ineligible for a concealed handgun license under Texas law. But upon her
discharge, federal law deems Randolph’s mental health adjudication to have
never occurred, and she is therefore not disqualified from purchasing a handgun
under federal law. When Randolph applied for her license renewal, DPS was
compelled to deny her application because of the order for mental health
20
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 note § 101(c)(1)(A).
10
services. Unless a discharge is reported to DPS or otherwise made known to it,
DPS could have no knowledge that Randolph was no longer under mandatory
treatment, supervision, or monitoring. The law provides no mechanism by which
relevant government agencies are informed that a person is no longer
disqualified.
But unlike DPS when it received Randolph’s application, the trial court had
evidence before it showing that Randolph had been discharged from mental
health services and was no longer under mandatory treatment, supervision, or
monitoring. It therefore had evidence by which it could properly conclude that
under federal law, the mental health adjudication was deemed to have never
occurred and that Randolph was therefore not disqualified under federal law from
purchasing a handgun. DPS asserted no other ground for denying Randolph’s
application. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s
judgment.
DPS contended in oral argument that Randolph’s release from
confinement was not sufficient to show her eligibility because a discharge from
court-ordered mental health services under Texas law does not qualify as a
“discharge” as that term is used in federal law. We are unpersuaded by this
argument. We have found no case law interpreting this provision of federal law,
but we are compelled by the rules of statutory construction to give the word
11
“discharged” its plain and common meaning. 21 DPS directs us to no federal
statute or regulation giving “discharge” any definition other than its plain and
common meaning.
Under Texas law, a patient committed for court-ordered mental health
services may be discharged at any time before the expiration of the court order if
the “facility administrator or person determines that the patient no longer meets
the criteria for court-ordered mental health services.” 22 If Randolph was
discharged early, it is because an administrator determined that she no longer
met the criteria for court-ordered services. We are unclear how, if Randolph was
discharged under this section of the health and safety code, she was not
“discharged” within the meaning of the federal statute.
Furthermore the federal statute applies when the applicant has been either
“released or discharged from all mandatory treatment, supervision, or
monitoring.” 23 DPS makes no argument that Randolph was not released from
treatment, regardless of whether she was discharged within the meaning of
Texas law. And the evidence showed that Randolph is not under any mandatory
treatment, supervision, or monitoring. Although she is still under continuing
treatment by a doctor, it is for her autoimmune disorder, not a mental health
21
See Chesser, 356 S.W.3d at 619–20.
22
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.086(a), (c) (West 2010) (emphasis
added).
23
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 note § 101(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
12
disorder. The health and safety code provides that with respect to a patient
discharged from mental health services, “[t]he physician responsible for the
patient’s treatment shall prepare a continuing care plan for a patient who is
scheduled to be furloughed or discharged unless the patient does not require
continuing care.” 24 DPS produced no evidence and elicited no testimony from
Randolph or her husband that she was discharged with a continuing care plan.
Instead, all the evidence supported a finding that she was no longer in need of
mental health services and that there was no mandatory treatment, supervision,
or monitoring of Randolph.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Randolph was
not disqualified under federal law from purchasing a handgun based on a mental
health adjudication, and she therefore also established that she met the eligibility
requirement in government code section 411.172(a)(9). We overrule DPS’s
issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled DPS’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
ordering DPS to issue Randolph a concealed handgun license.
24
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.081(a) (West 2010).
13
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DELIVERED: January 9, 2014
14