Justin M. Williams v. State ( 2013 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00154-CR
JUSTIN M. WILLIAMS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Justin M. Williams appeals his jury-assessed sentence of sixty
years‘ confinement stemming from his conviction for aggravated robbery while
using a deadly weapon.2 In one point, Williams contends that the trial court erred
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011).
by denying his motion to suppress a video recording of an interrogation in which
he detailed his involvement in three aggravated robberies conducted over a ten-
day period, culminating in the aggravated robbery which led to the conviction that
is the basis of the sentence he now appeals. The video was played for the jury
during the punishment phase at trial. We will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Williams and an accomplice named Devaughn Bryant became the focus of
Fort Worth Police Detective Sandra Castillo‘s investigation into reports of two
men involved in a spree of ―five or six‖ armed robberies during May 2010.
Castillo wrote ―at least four‖ arrest warrants for Williams. Closely following his
arrest under these warrants on May 26, 2010, Castillo interrogated Williams
specifically about an additional armed robbery of a Whataburger in Fort Worth
that occurred on May 20, 2010. A video camera captured this interview.
At the first in a series of three suppression hearings, Castillo testified that
Williams was ―[v]ery cooperative‖ during her interview. According to Castillo, she
and Williams ―had a good rapport with each other.‖ Castillo averred that after
she and Williams read the Fort Worth Police Department‘s standard Miranda
―form‖ aloud together, Williams waived his rights and agreed to her interview.
From there, Castillo interrogated Williams for nearly an hour regarding his
involvement in the Whataburger robbery, as well as ―several [other] offenses,‖
before Williams requested a bathroom break. Castillo obliged. Castillo said that
at no time did Williams request an attorney or otherwise ask to terminate the
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interrogation. After the bathroom break, Fort Worth Detective Danny Payne
joined Castillo in interrogating Williams.
Castillo recalled that when Payne entered the room, Williams ―kind of
clammed up a little bit . . . I could tell he just wasn‘t comfortable at first.‖ Castillo
said, however, that ―after talking a few minutes [with Payne], he seemed to be
okay talking again.‖ Castillo said that at no time during this portion of the
interview did Williams indicate that he wished to terminate the interview.
According to Castillo, if Williams had indicated at all that he wished to terminate
the interview, ―I would have stopped.‖ In the second portion of the interview,
Williams confessed more details pertaining to multiple armed robberies.
At the initial pretrial hearing, the State introduced a video of the complete
interview, which included Castillo‘s individual interview of Williams, a twelve-
minute break, and then Castillo and Payne‘s dual interview of Williams. In a
later-held suppression hearing, the trial court allowed Williams to offer a
forensically audio-enhanced version of the interview in evidence. Ultimately, the
trial court found that Williams never asked to terminate the interview. The trial
court further found that the twelve-minute break did not result in two separate
interviews; rather, the trial court found that the police conducted one, continual
interrogation. The trial court overruled William‘s motion to suppress the video,
and it was played for the jury at the punishment phase of trial. The jury assessed
punishment at sixty years‘ confinement. This appeal followed.
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III. DISCUSSION
In his sole point, Williams argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress the portion of his interview in which Payne participated.
Given the statutes and caselaw cited in his brief, Williams‘s overall argument
seems to be that any statements he made in Payne‘s presence should have
been suppressed because he invoked his right to silence when Castillo returned
with Payne after a twelve-minute break from when Castillo interviewed Williams
individually. Even though Williams claims that he ―presents a sole point of error,‖
he argues the ―collateral issue‖ that Castillo and Payne ―deliberately attempted to
circumvent his Miranda warnings.‖ He further argues that subsumed in his sole
point is the complaint that ―Payne‘s version of the warnings‖ to Williams when
Payne joined the interrogation ―actually missed one of the basic five components
of the warning.‖
Because Williams cited Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22 in
his objection to the trial court and because he begins his discussion in his brief
by citing the same, we will analyze his complaints under the standards dictated in
Article 38.22, rather than relying solely on federal law concerning the invocation
and waiver of these related rights. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22,
§ 2 (West Supp. 2013); see also Mayfield v. State, 828 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref‘d) (―There are some differences
between the warnings required under article 38.22 and the Miranda warnings.‖);
see also Knowles v. State, No. 13-09-00170-CR, 2010 WL 3279396, at *6 (Tex.
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App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 19, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding an objection citing Miranda was sufficient to preserve error
under Article 38.22 because the trial court considered the objection in the context
of Article 38.22).
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In reviewing the trial court‘s decision, we do not engage in our own factual
review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v.
State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial
judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000),
modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court‘s rulings on
(1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court‘s determination of those facts
was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-
of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility
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and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court‘s rulings on those
questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d
604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court‘s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court‘s ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court‘s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19.
We then review the trial court‘s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact
findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling.
Id. at 818.
We must uphold the trial court‘s ruling if it is supported by the record and
correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave
the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).
B. Payne’s Warnings and Participation in the Interrogation
Williams concedes that there were no constitutional or statutory violations
of his rights concerning Castillo‘s interviewing him individually, and he also
concedes that he waived those rights. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.22, § 2; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1636
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(1966). But part of Williams‘s complaint is that when Payne entered the
interrogation with Castillo after the twelve-minute break, it was incumbent upon
Payne to again properly advise Williams of his rights under Article 38.22 and that
again Williams would have needed to waive those rights in order for the portion
of the interrogation in which Payne participated to be introduced against him.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 2. Williams also argues that
Payne‘s reminder to him of Castillo‘s earlier proper warnings coupled with a
summary of those rights was insufficient to advise him properly because Payne
did not express that statements made by him could be used against him at trial.
See id.
The trial court rejected Williams‘s argument that what occurred in this case
were two distinct and separate interrogations. Instead, the trial court specifically
found that Castillo‘s individual interview of Williams, the twelve-minute break, and
the joint interview by Payne and Castillo that followed the break were all part of
one ―continual interrogation.‖ Nonetheless, Williams invites us to treat this series
of events as two distinct interrogations. Williams does not provide any authority
supporting this position.
1. Castillo’s Credibility
In an apparent attempt to challenge the trial court‘s finding that a single
interrogation occurred, Williams spends several pages in his brief assailing
Castillo‘s veracity concerning her testimony at the pretrial suppression hearings
and at trial as to why Payne joined the interrogation after the break. Williams
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claims that ―Castillo‘s credibility in general is highly questionable,‖ that her ―real
motivation‖ for taking a break in the interview and returning with Payne was to
―intimidate‖ him into a confession, and that Castillo‘s testimony as to why she
brought Payne into the interview ―was arguably concocted for the benefit of the
trial court.‖ Williams even accuses Castillo of ―retrofit[ting]‖ her testimony at the
suppression hearing, because she realized ―Payne‘s sudden unexplained
appearance on the tape . . . could compromise the second half of‖ the
interrogation. Williams also suggests that Castillo‘s testimony is questionable
because Castillo was ―perhaps attempt[ing] to attenuate the taint associated with
Payne‘s failure to complete [a] second set of Miranda warnings about a different
offense.‖
We conclude that Williams‘s antagonism toward Castillo‘s credibility is an
attempt to ask this court to ignore that the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony
during a suppression hearing. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24–25 (―An appellate
court reviewing a trial judge‘s ruling on a motion to suppress ‗must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s ruling.‘ Trial judges, unlike
their appellate court counterparts, are uniquely situated to ‗observe[ ] first hand
the demeanor and appearance of a witness[.]‘‖). We overrule Williams‘s point to
the extent that he invites us to hold that the trial court could not have found
Castillo‘s testimony credible.
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2. One Continual Interview
Whether a subsequent interview constitutes a continuation of an earlier
interview, and thus a single interview, has been addressed on several occasions
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234,
242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (―Under these circumstances, we find that the two
sessions were part of a single interview for the purpose of Article 38.22 and
Miranda.‖); Ex parte Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (―[T]he
express written warning given petitioner some 6 to 8 hours previous to the
complained of confession . . . satisfied the dictates of Miranda.‖).
We have examined the record against the caselaw, and we conclude that
there is no evidence in the record contrary to the trial court‘s finding that the
twelve-minute break after the first interview conducted by Castillo, followed by
Payne joining Castillo for a joint interview of Williams, constituted a single
continual interrogation. See Stallings v. State, No. 09-09-00200-CR, 2010 WL
2347244, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 9, 2010, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (―Although Stallings was not reminded of these
warnings when the joint interview began, only a matter of minutes passed
between Stallings‘s individual and joint interviews.‖); see also Hayes v. State, No.
05-11-00260-CR, 2013 WL 1614108 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 19, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (―[L]ess than ninety minutes elapsed
between the time appellant was initially read his rights and his confession.
Although different officers conducted the two interviews, and the crimes they
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inquired about were different, the duration of the break in questioning was less
than thirty minutes, and Harrison verified that appellant had been read his rights
before he began his interview. Moreover, the evidence indicates that appellant
remained in custody and in the same interview room throughout the two sessions
of questioning and the intervening break.‖). We hold that under these
circumstances, neither Castillo nor Payne were required to give Williams
additional admonishments before continuing with the joint portion of the
interview. We overrule this portion of Williams‘s sole point.
C. Williams Did Not Invoke His Right to Silence
In the remainder of his sole point, Williams argues that he had ―clear[ly]‖
terminated the interrogation when Payne arrived by stating, ―I really just don‘t
know, and for . . . to say anything else,‖ and that his ―continued attempts to
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights were literally and figuratively drowned out by
the interrogating detectives.‖ We disagree.
1. The Right to Terminate Questioning
The right to terminate questioning is among the procedural safeguards that
Miranda and Article 38.22 establish to protect the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. See Williams v. State, 257 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tex. App.—Austin
2008, pet ref‘d). This right requires police officers to immediately terminate
questioning when a suspect ―indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent.‖ Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d
410, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74, 86 S. Ct.
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at 1627). The suspect is not required to use any particular phraseology to invoke
the right to remain silent. Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418. Any declaration of a
desire to terminate the questioning should suffice. Id. A law enforcement officer
may not continue to question the suspect in an attempt to persuade the suspect
to change his mind and talk. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996).
But an interrogating officer is not required to terminate his questioning
unless the suspect‘s invocation of his rights is unambiguous. Ramos, 245
S.W.3d at 418 (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 257). ―If the suspect‘s statement is
not an unambiguous or unequivocal request [to terminate the interview or to
invoke the right to silence], the officers have no obligation to stop questioning
him.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356
(1994). A police officer is permitted, but not required, to clarify a suspect‘s
wishes when faced with an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent.
Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Davis, 512
U.S. at 461–62, 114 S. Ct. at 2356). In determining whether the right to remain
silent was unambiguously invoked, courts look at the totality of the
circumstances. Williams, 257 S.W.3d at 433. Ambiguity exists when the
suspect‘s statement is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation under
the circumstances. Id. at 433–34.
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2. Williams’s Alleged Attempt to Terminate the Interrogation
Williams argues that he was ―as clear as he could be‖ that he wanted to
terminate the interview with Payne when he stated, ―I really just don‘t know, and
for . . . to say anything else.‖ But the statement, ―I really just don‘t know, and
for . . . to say anything else,‖ was not in itself a clear and unambiguous statement
of Williams‘s refusal to talk to Payne. When the phrases ―I was like good to talk
to her, but like since you came in here, you know‖ and ―because you know‖ were
added to qualify that statement, Williams further signaled indecision or
ambivalence toward waiving his rights, but he did not unambiguously express a
desire to remain silent in these statements. See Mayes v. State, 8 S.W.3d 354,
359 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (holding that statement made by
defendant that she did ―not know if she wanted to talk‖ expressed ambivalence
toward waiving her rights and was not an unambiguous assertion of right to
remain silent); see also Baez v. State, No. 14-07-00426-CR, 2008 WL 4915682,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 18, 2008, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (holding that defendant‘s inquiry of ―do I have to say‖
expressed ambivalence toward waiving his rights but did not unambiguously or
clearly express definite desire to invoke right to remain silent).
Further, when taking an even broader look at the interview and the
circumstances surrounding Williams‘s statements—even considering the lengthy
colloquy taken from the interview and transcribed in Williams‘s own brief—a
reasonable interpretation of Williams‘s statements is that he was considering
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whether talking to Payne would make him look bad to his accomplice. Indeed,
the second session began with Payne explaining to Williams that he had already
obtained the statement of Williams‘s accomplice. Payne also discussed with
Williams that he wanted Williams to ―get [his] side of the story out,‖ a notion that
Williams‘s affirmatively agreed to multiple times at the beginning of Payne‘s
portion of the interview.
Additionally, and during the conversation that included his alleged
invocation of the right to terminate the interview, both Payne and Castillo
reminded Williams that Castillo had warned Williams of his rights, and they both
inquired whether he still wanted to continue the interview. Considering the
totality of the circumstances, we hold that Williams‘s statement, ―I really just don‘t
know, and for . . . to say anything else‖ was not a clear and unambiguous
invocation of his right to remain silent. See Kupferer v. State, 408 S.W.3d 485,
489–90 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref‘d) (defendant‘s statement
that ―To tell you the truth, I really don't want to talk about it, but I mean . . .‖ was
not unambiguous invocation of right to remain silent). We overrule this portion of
Williams‘s point.
3. The Record Does Not Support That Castillo and Payne
Interfered With Williams’s Alleged Repeated Attempts to
Terminate the Interview
Williams argues that he repeatedly attempted to terminate the interview but
that Castillo and Payne ―drowned out‖ his attempts by interrupting him and
talking over him. To this, Williams alleges that his ―videotape[d confession] is
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replete with examples of both detectives cutting off or ignoring [his] responses.‖
In support of his position, Williams provides this court with what he calls a
transcript of the interview. This transcript was not introduced into evidence at
trial and is not a part of the appellate record. Thus we cannot consider it in our
review. See Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982). We do note, however, that of the multiple
instances in the transcript in which Williams claims he was interrupted by police
and prevented from invoking his rights, the only statement that even comes close
to being an invocation-type statement is the one discussed above that we have
held was not an unambiguous statement that he wished to terminate the
interview.
Williams also attaches to a statement by the trial court made during the
first pretrial suppression hearing, where the trial court seemed to be inclined to
make a finding that Williams had attempted to invoke his right to terminate the
interview but that he was interrupted. But after the trial court conducted two
more suppression hearings during which it considered multiple oral and written
arguments by both parties, and an agreed-to, audio-enhanced version of the
videotaped confession, the trial court specifically found that, ―At no time during
the interview did [Williams] ask for an attorney or to terminate the interview or
invoke his rights to terminate or any of the other rights contained in the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 38.22, or his . . . Fifth Amendment rights.‖
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When determining whether police officers violated a defendant‘s rights by
continuing to question, the threshold question is whether the suspect invoked his
rights. Luna v. State, 301 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.).
Williams has not pointed to any evidence in the record that undermines the trial
court‘s finding that he never attempted to invoke his rights. In fact, Williams does
not even address this specific finding by the trial court. We have reviewed the
record, including watching all versions of the interview that were provided to the
trial court during the suppression hearings, and we hold that when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s finding, Williams never
invoked any of his statutory or constitutional protections. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at
818–19. We overrule the remainder of Williams‘s sole point.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Williams‘s sole point in its entirety, we affirm the trial
court‘s judgment.
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 5, 2013
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