in the Interest of M.S.F. and M.S.F., Children ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                       NO. 07-12-0082-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL C
    OCTOBER 2, 2012
    ______________________________
    DARRELL YOUNG, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2009422933; HONORABLE JOHN J. MCCLENDON III, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Darrell Young, was convicted by a jury
    of burglary of a habitation, 1 enhanced. Punishment was assessed at forty-five years
    confinement. By a sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
    sustain the $5,295 assessed for court-appointed attorney’s fees. We modify the trial
    1
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(C)(2) (W EST 2011).
    court’s judgment to delete the special finding of $5,295 owed as part of court costs and
    as modified, affirm.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    It is well established that in order to assess court-appointed attorney's fees in a
    judgment, a trial court must determine that the defendant has financial resources that
    enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of legal services provided. See TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (W EST SUPP. 2012). See also Mayer v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 552
    , 555-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010); Armstrong v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 759
    , 755-56
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (holding that a "defendant's financial resources and ability to pay
    are explicit critical elements in the trial court's determination of the propriety of ordering
    reimbursement of costs and fees"). Furthermore, not only must the trial court make a
    determination regarding the defendant's ability to pay, the record must reflect some
    factual basis to support that determination. Barrera v. State, 
    291 S.W.3d 515
    , 518
    (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2009, no pet.); Perez v. State, 
    280 S.W.3d 886
    , 887 (Tex.App.--
    Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
    ANALYSIS
    Here, the clerk's record reflects the trial court found Appellant to be indigent and
    appointed counsel to represent him. 2              Unless a material change in his financial
    resources occurs, once a criminal defendant has been found to be indigent, he is
    presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings. TEX. CODE CRIM.
    2
    Although the record reflects that Appellant wished to have a different attorney represent him and stated
    he would hire his own attorney, the trial court ordered that Charles Chambers remain as his court-
    appointed counsel.
    PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p) (W EST SUPP. 2012).              There is evidence of record
    demonstrating that Appellant was indigent immediately prior to the award of attorney's
    fees.
    In its brief, the State concedes the trial court erred in ordering reimbursement of
    court-appointed attorney’s fees without first making a determination of ability to pay.
    We agree and sustain Appellant’s sole issue.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is modified to delete the special finding of $5,295 owed
    for court-appointed attorney’s fees and as modified, the judgment is affirmed.
    Patrick A. Pirtle
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-11-00367-CV

Filed Date: 10/2/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015