Alex Christopher Williams v. State ( 2012 )


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  • NO. 07-11-00490-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL B
    SEPTEMBER 26, 2012
    _____________________________
    ALEX CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _____________________________
    FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
    NO. 21,641-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, PRESIDING
    _____________________________
    Memorandum Opinion
    _____________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
    Alex Christopher Williams appeals  his  conviction  for  possessing  a
    controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an amount of less  than  one  gram
    and contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant  his  motion  to
    suppress the evidence.  The evidence was discovered in his vehicle, and  the
    search was conducted without a warrant.  We affirm.
    Background
    On  June  8,  2010,  Sergeant  William  Cole  of  the  Randall  County
    Sheriff's Office  was  conducting  surveillance  on  appellant  pursuant  to
    information received from a reliable confidential informant  that  appellant
    was selling methamphetamine and had  the  substance  in  his  vehicle.   The
    vehicle was described as a white Lincoln Navigator, and Cole was also  given
    a location where appellant was living.   At  the  described  location,  Cole
    observed  appellant,  whose  picture  he  had,  get  into  a  white  Lincoln
    Navigator and drive off.  Cole followed appellant  and  saw  him  execute  a
    turn without using his turn signal.  Because Cole  was  working  undercover,
    he notified Corporal Victor  Bradic  of  the  traffic  violation  and  asked
    Bradic to arrest appellant.  He  continued  to  follow  appellant  until  he
    pulled into a self-serve Shell gas station.
    Bradic located appellant parked at the gas station.   Another  vehicle
    was also parked at  that  station.   Yet,  the  occupants  of  neither  were
    pumping any gas.  Nor was the second vehicle parked in a position to do  so.
    Bradic observed a man, Randall Woodard, get out of the  passenger  seat  of
    the Navigator.  Woodard began to walk to the  second  vehicle  but  appeared
    surprised when he noticed Bradic.  He then put his hands in his pockets  and
    walked back to the open passenger door of the Navigator  and  put  his  hand
    inside the door.  During this time, Bradic told Woodard  multiple  times  to
    stop but he refused to do so until after returning  to  the  Navigator.   It
    appeared to Bradic  that  Woodard  was  trying  to  hide  something  in  the
    Navigator.
    Bradic handcuffed Woodard for Bradic's protection  and  then  informed
    appellant he was being arrested for a traffic violation.  The Navigator  was
    searched.  Part of a plastic baggie was seen wedged in  the  crease  between
    the upper and lower portions of the front passenger seat.  When  the  baggie
    was pulled out, it contained a substance that the  officer  believed  to  be
    methamphetamine.   The vehicle  was  subsequently  towed  to  the  Sheriff's
    Department where the search of the vehicle was  completed.   At  that  time,
    officers found a yellow spray can with  a  false  bottom  that  contained  a
    spoon, two glass pipes, a large  package  of  clear  baggies,  and  a  clear
    baggie that contained a substance believed to be methamphetamine.
    Appellant moved to suppress the evidence discovered  in  his  vehicle.
    The trial court denied  the  motion  upon  concluding  that  a  vehicle  was
    involved and that probable  cause  existed  to  believe  that  it  contained
    contraband.
    Discussion
    The standard of  review  is  well  known  and  needs  no  reiteration.
    Instead, we refer the litigants to Ford  v.  State,  
    158 S.W.3d 488
     (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2005) for its explanation.  Next, and as  appellant  acknowledged
    in his brief, "'. . . a vehicle may be searched on  the  basis  of  probable
    cause to believe that it contains contraband although exigent  circumstances
    do not exist to justify a warrantless search.'"  Curry v. State, 
    228 S.W.3d 292
    , 295 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd).  The existence of such  probable
    cause "alone satisfies the automobile  exception  to  the  Fourth  Amendment
    warrant requirement."  Dixon v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 613
    , 619 n.25 (Tex.  Crim.
    App. 2006), quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
    518 U.S. 938
    ,  940,  
    116 S. Ct. 2485
    , 
    735 L. Ed. 2d 1031
    (1996).  And, in  assessing  whether  probable  cause
    exists, we look at the totality of the circumstances to determine  if  there
    is a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be  found.    Baldwin
    v.  State,  
    278 S.W.3d 367
    ,  371  (Tex.  Crim.  App.   2009).    Pertinent
    circumstances include, among other things, information personally  known  to
    law enforcement  officers  as  well  as  that  garnered  from  a  reasonably
    trustworthy source.   Wiede v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 17
    ,  24  (Tex.  Crim.  App.
    2007), citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 
    428 U.S. 364
    ,  
    96 S. Ct. 3092
    ,  
    49 L. Ed. 2d 1000
    (1976).  Moreover, the officer undertaking the search need  not
    be privy to all facts and circumstances giving rise to probable cause;  data
    known by law enforcement officials as a collective and because of which  the
    search ensued is also relevant.  
    Id. at 24.
          Here, Officer Bradic was directed to  stop  and  arrest  appellant  by
    Officer Cole.  When that directive  was  made,  Cole  had  been  told  by  a
    reliable informant that appellant dealt in drugs, was driving  a  particular
    vehicle, and  had  drugs  within  that  vehicle  at  the  time.   Cole  then
    conducted surveillance upon appellant and verified that he  (appellant)  was
    driving the vehicle described by the informant.  To that,  we  add  Bradic's
    own observations while arriving at the gas  station.   They  include  seeing
    the suspect vehicle apparently parked by a gas pump and another parked  away
    from a pump.  Instead of the occupants  in  either  vehicle  acquiring  gas,
    someone from the suspect vehicle left it, walked towards the other car,  saw
    Bradic approach in his squad car,  act  surprised,  return  to  the  suspect
    vehicle despite being told to stop by Bradic, and appear to place  something
    within that vehicle.  Bradic then saw the aforementioned plastic  baggie  in
    the suspect vehicle.  More importantly, the circumstances Bradic  personally
    witnessed occurred during a  time  when  he  was  authorized  to  conduct  a
    legitimate traffic stop of both the suspect vehicle and its occupants.   The
    totality of this evidence was enough to create a  fair  probability  that  a
    drug transaction was occurring when Bradic arrived on  the  scene  and  that
    drugs would be found in the vehicle ultimately searched.
    Because the trial court did not err in ruling as it did,  we  overrule
    the issue before us and affirm the trial court's judgment.
    Brian Quinn
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.