Andy Eugene Gomez v. State ( 2011 )

NUMBER 13-09-00039-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ANDY EUGENE GOMEZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 105th District Court
of Kleberg County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
A jury convicted appellant, Andy Eugene Gomez, of one count of aggravated
sexual assault of a child and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West 2003). In two issues,1 Gomez contends that: (1) the trial
1
Gomez initially presented three issues on appeal, but abandoned his second issue regarding jury
misconduct in his reply brief filed June 17, 2011.
court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the State offered
insufficient evidence of venue; and (2) he was harmed by the trial court’s erroneous
admission of opinion testimony regarding the truthfulness of the complainant’s
testimony. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2008, a Kleberg County grand jury indicted Gomez on three
counts of first-degree felony aggravated sexual assault of a child. See id. The
charges stem from three separate alleged acts of sexual assault on N.M. while Gomez
was married to and lived with N.M.’s mother and her children. N.M. is not Gomez’s
biological daughter. The first count of the indictment was sexual assault by penetration
of N.M.’s sexual organ by Gomez’s sexual organ; the second count was sexual assault
by penetration of N.M.’s sexual organ by Gomez’s finger; and the third count was sexual
assault by penetration of N.M.’s mouth by Gomez’s sexual organ. Gomez pled not
guilty to all three counts.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from various witnesses, including (1) N.M., (2)
N.M.’s brother, I.M., (3) N.M.’s mother, S.G., and (4) N.M.’s one-time foster mother, J.B.
After the State’s case-in-chief, Gomez moved for a directed verdict on two grounds: (1)
that there was no evidence presented of the date of the crime; and (2) the State failed to
prove venue. The trial court denied the motion. At the close of the case, the jury
acquitted Gomez of the first two counts of the indictment but convicted him of the third.
Gomez filed a motion for new trial, which was also denied. Gomez appeals on two
issues.
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Venue
In his first issue, Gomez argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
directed verdict because the State failed to offer any evidence that the offense occurred
in Kleberg County as set out in the indictment.
A challenge to a ruling on a motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. See Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d
683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc). We must consider all the evidence ―in the
light most favorable to the verdict.‖ Id. ―If the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
conviction, then the trial judge did not err in overruling appellant's motion.‖ Id.; see
Lemoine v. State, 85 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet ref’d).
―Venue is not an element of the offense.‖ Witt v. State, 237 S.W.3d 394, 399
(Tex. App.—Waco 2007) (citing Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1981); State v. Blankenship, 170 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005,
pet. ref'd)). Unless it is disputed, an appellate court must presume that venue was
proved in the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1). However, the State must
prove by a preponderance of direct or circumstantial evidence that the county where
prosecution takes place is proper. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.17 (West
2005); see also Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (noting the
standard for proving venue in criminal cases). More specifically, prosecution of a
sexual assault may be tried in the venue where the act is committed. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 13.15 (West 2005).
3
In the present case, the State offered testimony of the complainant’s biological
mother S.G., complainant’s brother I.M., and N.M to establish where they resided with
Gomez when the alleged sexual assaults took place and what specific acts took place.
The following colloquy took place with S.G. about where the family resided with
Gomez:
STATE: Where—As far as these living arrangements were,
where was this in particular?
S.G.: We resided here in Kingsville on 217 East Nettie.
STATE: And that’s here in Kleberg County?
S.G.: Yes, ma’am.
STATE: I’m sorry, Kleberg County, Texas?
S.G.: Yes, ma’am.
Furthermore, I.M. testified that before he was in foster care, he lived at home with
his mother, step-father (Gomez), and siblings, including N.M. I.M. told the jury that one
night he awoke at that residence to get a drink of water and witnessed Gomez put ―his
middle part . . . in [N.M.’s] mouth.‖ N.M. also testified that prior to foster care, she lived
with her mother S.G., step-father (Gomez), and siblings, when Gomez committed the
alleged wrongful conduct.
We hold that the State met its evidentiary burden to prove that Kleberg County
was the proper venue to prosecute this matter based on the testimony that established a
connection between the location of the residence where the foregoing alleged acts took
place and Kleberg County. See Black, 645 S.W.2d at 791. Accordingly, we overrule
Gomez’s first issue.
B. Admission of Testimony to Complainant’s Truthfulness
4
In his second issue, Gomez argues that the trial court erroneously admitted
opinion testimony by N.M’s one-time foster mother and State’s witness, J.B., about
N.M.’s truthfulness to the specific allegations. Further, Gomez contends this erroneous
admission caused him harm.
As a general rule, a lay witness’s testimony about another witness’s truthful
character is admissible, but only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 608. Direct
testimony by one witness as to another witness’s truthfulness in making specific
allegations is inadmissible. See Schutz v. State (Schutz I), 957 S.W.2d 52, 67 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (incorporating a South Dakota Supreme Court holding that
―one witness may not testify as to another witness’s credibility or truth-telling capacity
because such testimony would invade the exclusive province of the jury to determine the
credibility of a witness‖).
Here, the trial court denied Gomez’s objection and request to strike the following
re-direct examination of J.B. by the State regarding N.M.’s specific allegations of abuse:
STATE: Now—and on that basis of whether she was telling the
truth or not, when she spoke to you, in your opinion, was
she telling the truth?
....
J.B.: Yes.
....
STATE: [Gomez’s attorney] asked you that at the time that [N.M.]
outcried that either someone— someone or you did not
believe her and that’s why there was continuing
investigation, was that your testimony?
J.B.: Well, I believed her when she told me that she was
5
sexually abused.
The trial court denied Gomez’s request to strike the quoted testimony from the
record, despite Gomez’s argument that J.B. was not allowed to give an opinion on the
truthfulness of N.M.’s allegations. The State, however, argues that Gomez ―opened the
door‖ to the State’s line of questioning because Gomez asked J.B. about the truthfulness
of N.M.’s allegations first, and therefore, the State had a right on re-direct to clarify what
J.B. said, under Rule 608. In support, the State points to the following testimony on
cross examination:
DEFENSE: All right. Because in January, she had denied any
sexual abuse, isn’t that right?
J.B.: Yes.
DEFENSE: And either you or C.P.S. or somebody didn’t think that she
was telling you the whole truth?
J.B.: Correct, yes.
DEFENSE: So she was continually asked whether or not that was true
or not?
J.B.: Not by me.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the State. Gomez’s cross-examination
asked J.B. to testify with respect to N.M.’s truthfulness and invited the State to remedy
any misconception it may have caused to the jury. See Schutz I, 957 S.W.2d at 74.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by allowing it into evidence. Id.; see
TEX. R. EVID. 608; Rogers v. State, 815 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1991, no
pet.) (holding that ―[i]t is a long standing rule that questions may be asked on redirect
examination to produce explanation of answers on cross-examination from which wrong
inferences might be drawn by the jury‖).
6
Even if the trial court erred in allowing J.B.’s testimony, the error was harmless
and did not affect Gomez’s substantial rights. We review non-constitutional errors, after
examining the record as a whole, to determine whether the error had a ―substantial or
injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict‖ such that it requires reversal of the
conviction. Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see TEX.
R. APP. P. 44.2(b). When performing a rule 44.2(b) harm analysis, we must consider
everything in the record, including ―testimony and physical evidence, the nature of the
evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the error and its relationship to
other evidence‖ as well as instructions to the jury, theories of the case, and relevant voir
dire. Schutz v. State (Schutz II), 63 S.W.3d 442, 444–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
We first note that the jury acquitted Gomez on the first two counts of the
indictment. These acquittals lend themselves to the logical conclusion that the jury
believed some—but not all—of the complainant’s testimony. In light of the significance
of the two acquittals, the record does not support a finding that the jury allowed J.B.’s
testimony about N.M.’s truthfulness to the specific allegations to supplant its own
decisions. See id. at 445.
Furthermore, we reviewed the testimony of all of the witnesses and
evidence—including the medical report of N.M. prepared by a sexual assault nurse
examiner and two video interviews of N.M. by a social worker. We also reviewed the
voir dire proceedings, in which Gomez’s counsel asked two pertinent questions of the
panel. The first dealt with whether the prospective jurors agreed to hold their judgment
and decision until hearing all of the evidence, to which the panel agreed; and the second
dealt with whether they would believe a child on whatever s/he says, to which the entire
7
panel disagreed. In light of our review, even if the foster mother’s testimony on N.M.’s
truthfulness was inadmissible, it was but a small portion of a large amount of evidence
presented for consideration and assessment of N.M.’s credibility. See Schutz II, 63
S.W.3d at 446. Therefore, although we hold that the trial court did not err, if any error
did exist, it was harmless and should be disregarded. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). We
overrule Gomez’s second issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
8th day of December, 2011.
8