Jeremy House v. State ( 2012 )

NO. 07-11-0383-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
JUNE 11, 2012
_____________________________
JEREMY HOUSE,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_____________________________
FROM THE 222ND DISTRICT COURT OF DEAF SMITH COUNTY;
NO. CR-11A-007; HONORABLE ROLAND SAUL, PRESIDING
_____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
_____________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Jeremy House (appellant) appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Appellant plead guilty without the benefit of an agreement and
punishment was tried to a jury. The jury assessed punishment at twelve years in prison
and a $5,000 fine. Appellant appealed.
Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw, together with an
Anders1 brief, wherein he certified that, after diligently searching the record, he
concluded that the appeal was without merit. Along with his brief, appellate counsel
filed a copy of a letter sent to appellant informing him of counsel’s belief that there was
no reversible error and of appellant’s right to file a response pro se. By letter dated April
23, 2012, this court notified appellant of his right to file his own brief or response by May
23, 2012, if he wished to do so. To date, no response has been filed.
In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel
discussed three potential areas for appeal. They included 1) the indictment, 2) pretrial
motions, and 3) ineffective assistance of counsel. However, counsel then proceeded to
explain why the issues were without merit.
In addition, we conducted our own review of the record to assess the accuracy of
appellate counsel’s conclusions and to uncover any arguable error pursuant to Stafford
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After doing so, we concur with
counsel’s conclusions.
However, the amount of $5,479.00 is handwritten on the judgment next to
defense counsel's name. Whether that evinces the trial court's intent to require
appellant to reimburse those fees is unclear. Nonetheless, the record does not contain
a determination by the trial court of appellant’s ability to pay attorney’s fees. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2011). Rather, it illustrates that appellate
counsel was appointed due to appellant's indigence. This means that appellant could
1
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct.1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
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not lawfully be ordered to reimburse the fees incurred or paid by Deaf Smith County in
his defense.
So, to avoid confusion, we modify the judgment to remove reference to the
$5,479.00 and thereby relieve appellant from any obligation to reimburse Deaf Smith
County or any other person or entity for that fee. As modified, the judgment is affirmed
and counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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