David Michael Martin v. State ( 2014 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00483-CR
David Michael MARTIN,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 54th Judicial District Court, McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-59-C2
The Honorable Matt Johnson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 18, 2014
AFFIRMED
David Martin was involved in a two-vehicle collision that resulted in the death of a child
passenger in the other vehicle. A blood specimen taken from Martin shortly after the collision
showed that his blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) was .32 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters
of blood. The State charged Martin with intoxication manslaughter. The indictment alleged Martin
operated a vehicle in a public place while intoxicated by not having the normal use of his physical
and mental faculties and thereby caused the death of another. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 49.01(2)(A) (West 2011). A jury convicted him and assessed punishment at fifteen years’
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imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, Martin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction and the trial court’s admission of evidence. We affirm.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Martin contends there was no evidence before the jury that his intoxication caused the
collision resulting in the victim’s death and that “[i]t appears from the record that, despite
Appellant’s intoxication, the collision in this case was simply an accident that would have occurred
regardless of [Martin’s] intoxication.”
In conducting a sufficiency review, we do not sit as a “thirteenth juror” by reevaluating the
weight and credibility of the evidence in the record. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). Instead, we view the evidence that was before the jury in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. Runningwolf v. State, 360 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The State had the burden to prove that Martin’s intoxication caused the collision and thus the
victim’s death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08(a)(2) (West 2011) (“A person commits an
offense if the person . . . is intoxicated and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another
by accident or mistake.”); Hale v. State, 194 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
It did not have to prove, however, that Martin’s intoxication was the sole cause of the collision.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04 (West 2011); Hale, 194 S.W.3d at 42. “The existence or
nonexistence of such a causal connection is normally a question for the jury’s determination.”
Hale, 194 S.W.3d at 42.
The traffic collision between Martin and the other vehicle occurred at an intersection in
Waco, Texas. Although he was speeding at the time, the evidence showed that Martin had the
green light as he approached the intersection. He then struck the victim’s vehicle, whose driver
was attempting to turn right on a red light. Martin’s theory at trial was that his intoxication could
not have “caused” the victim’s death because his expert accident reconstructionist testified that the
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collision would have been unavoidable due to the other driver’s actions. The State’s expert
accident reconstructionists testified that Martin’s level of intoxication would have impaired his
reflexes to such a degree that his intoxication was a cause of the collision.
When the State presented evidence that Martin was speeding while intoxicated with a BAC
of .32, the State introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to find his intoxication caused the
collision, even if the other driver’s actions also in some way caused the collision. See Kuciemba
v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Being intoxicated at the scene of the
traffic accident in which the actor was a driver is some circumstantial evidence that the actor’s
intoxication caused the accident . . . .”); Martinez v. State, 66 S.W.3d 467, 468-69 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet ref’d) (holding that evidence showing defendant was speeding, was
intoxicated, and had lost control of his vehicle at time of collision was sufficient to support
conviction). The fact that Martin’s expert witness testified to the contrary does not render the
State’s evidence of causation insufficient. See Martinez, 66 S.W.3d at 469–70; Sturgis v. State,
No. 05-04-01632-CR, 2006 WL 1624431, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 13, 2006, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
Martin also argues that his expert witness was more credible than the State’s witnesses
because his expert was more qualified. Martin’s argument asks us to dismiss the jury’s implied
finding that the State’s experts were more credible than his own expert. We cannot do so, tasked
as we are with viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Isassi, 330
S.W.3d at 638.
We overrule Martin’s first point of error. 1
1
As part of his sufficiency argument, Martin complains that the indictment did not allege any “driving facts.” Martin
did not object to the indictment before trial, and he cites no authority supporting his implied argument that the State
should have alleged those facts.
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ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
In his second point of error, Martin contends that the trial court erred by allowing one of
the State’s experts to testify about the results of his blood test and by admitting her report into
evidence. He contends her testimony and the report were inadmissible as irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial because the indictment against him alleged that he was intoxicated on the theory that
he had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties (the “impairment theory” of
intoxication), but did not allege that he was intoxicated on the theory that his BAC was greater
than .08 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (the “per se theory” of intoxication).
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401.
A defendant’s BAC near the time of a collision is relevant to whether the defendant had
lost the use of his normal physical and mental faculties at the time of the collision. See State v.
Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Mechler’s intoxilyzer results indicate
that Mechler had consumed alcohol. As a result, they tend to make it more probable that he was
intoxicated at the time of driving under both the per se and impairment definitions of
intoxication.”); Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000,
pet. ref’d) (“[A] blood alcohol level beyond the legal limit, such as appellant’s, is probative
evidence of a person’s loss of his or her faculties.”); Daricek v. State, 875 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref’d) (“Clearly, a test showing that blood had a 0.10 alcohol
concentration is probative evidence of a loss of faculties.”). Therefore, the evidence that Martin’s
BAC was .32 shortly after the collision was relevant because it tended to show that Martin had lost
the use of his normal physical and mental faculties as charged in the indictment. See Mechler, 153
S.W.3d at 440; Henderson, 29 S.W.3d at 622; Daricek, 875 S.W.2d at 773. His high BAC—four
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times the legal limit—close to the time of the accident also tended to show that his intoxication
caused the collision. See Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible, although it may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. TEX. R. EVID. 402, 403. “A
proper Rule 403 analysis includes, but is not limited to, four factors: (1) the probative value of the
evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way; (3) the time
needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Mechler, 153
S.W.3d at 440. We are mindful that “Rule 403 does not exclude all prejudicial evidence. It focuses
only on the danger of ‘unfair’ prejudice.” Id.
In State v. Mechler, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted a pretrial motion to suppress the results of the defendant’s intoxilyzer
test. Id. at 437, 442. Applying the 403 balancing test, the court reasoned that the first three factors
weighed in favor of admissibility. The Court reasoned that the defendant’s intoxilyzer results
indicated that he had consumed alcohol and were thus “probative of intoxication under both the
per se and impairment definitions of intoxication.” Id. at 440. The Court then reasoned that the
evidence “did not have a great potential to impress the jury in an irrational way” because “this
evidence relates directly to the charged offense.” Id. at 440–41. With respect to the time needed to
develop the evidence of the intoxilyzer results, the Court reasoned that “[b]ecause the intoxilyzer
results relate directly to the charged offense, a jury could not be distracted away from the charged
offense regardless of the required time to present the results.” Id. at 441. The court held that, even
though the fourth factor, the State’s need for the intoxilyzer results, weighed in favor of
suppression, the weight of the first three factors was sufficient to conclude the trial court abused
its discretion by suppressing the evidence. Id. at 441–42.
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Martin argues that evidence of his BAC did not “relate directly to the charged offense”
because the indictment against him only alleged the impairment theory of intoxication. He argues
that Mechler is distinguishable because the defendant in that case was charged under both
impairment and per se theories of intoxication. We reject his argument because Mechler’s analysis
does not suggest that, had the defendant been charged only under the impairment theory of
intoxication, his intoxilyzer results would not have “directly related to the charged offense.” On
the contrary, his argument contradicts Mechler’s explicit recognition that a defendant’s BAC is
probative evidence that he had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties. See id. at
440; see also Henderson, 29 S.W.3d at 622; Daricek, 875 S.W.2d at 773. Nor does it take into
account that his BAC was relevant to causation. See Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462. In our view,
Mechler compels the conclusion that Martin’s BAC was “directly related to the charged offense.”
See Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 440. Because it was “directly related to the charged offense,” that
evidence “did not have a great potential to impress the jury in an irrational way” and “a jury could
not be distracted away from the charged offense regardless of the required time to present the
results.” See id. at 440–41. And even if the State did not have a great need for evidence of Martin’s
BAC to prove its case, we conclude that the weight of the other factors requires us to hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Martin’s BAC into evidence. See id. at 441–
42.
We overrule Martin’s second point of error.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Do Not Publish
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