Fort Worth Independent School District, Self-Insured v. Carol A. Seifert ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                                   IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00017-CV
    FORT WORTH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
    DISTRICT, SELF-INSURED,
    Appellant
    v.
    CAROL A. SEIFERT,
    Appellee
    From the 413th District Court
    Johnson County, Texas
    Trial Court No. C200400242
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The Fort Worth Independent School District appeals a jury finding that a stroke
    suffered by Carol Seifert is a compensable injury pursuant to the Texas Workers’
    Compensation Act. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §401.001 et seq. (Vernon 2006). The
    District complains that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient for the jury to
    have found that the stroke was a compensable injury and that the trial court erred by
    not admitting the full opinions from the Benefit Contested Case Hearing Office and the
    Appeals Panel. Because we find that the sufficiency issue was inadequately briefed and
    that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence, we affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    The Facts and Procedural Background
    Carol Seifert was a physical education teacher in the District when she suffered a
    knee injury, which was undisputedly a compensable injury. Treatment of the injury
    required four knee surgeries. During the fourth surgery, Seifert suffered a severe stroke
    which left her permanently disabled. After an administrative hearing, the hearing
    officer found that the stroke was not a compensable injury and the appeals panel
    affirmed that finding. Seifert filed this action in the district court to challenge those
    findings.
    A jury was charged solely with the question of whether the compensable knee
    injury extended to and included the stroke. The jury answered the question “yes,” and
    the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury finding. The trial court
    denied the District’s motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
    Legal and Factual Sufficiency
    The District complains in issue one that the evidence was legally and factually
    insufficient. More specifically, the District contends that because Seifert suffered from
    moyamoya1 that her stroke was not connected or was insufficiently connected to the
    1 Moyamoya is a rare disorder of the blood vessels in the brain known as internal carotid arteries. The
    condition is characterized by stenosis (narrowing) or occlusion (blockage) of one or both internal carotid
    arteries with subsequent formation of an abnormal network of blood vessels adjacent to the internal
    carotid arteries. The term “moyamoya,” a Japanese word that means "puff of smoke," describes the
    appearance of the abnormal vessels that form adjacent to the internal carotid arteries.
    Fort Worth ISD v. Seifert                                                                          Page 2
    surgery to be a compensable injury. Both the District and Seifert offered expert medical
    testimony regarding the causes of the stroke.
    However, the District provides no argument or authorities regarding the legal
    standard required to establish causation in cases such as this, nor do they give any
    citations to the record to assist in a sufficiency analysis.      Therefore, this issue is
    inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h) & (i). We
    overrule issue one.
    Improper Admission of Evidence
    The District next complains that the trial court erred by refusing to admit
    unredacted copies of the decision and order of the Benefit Contested Case Hearing
    Office and the decision of the appeals panel. Seifert objected to the admission of the
    exhibits on the basis of hearsay, lack of relevance, and unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. EVID.
    801, 802, 401, 402, & 403. The trial court reviewed the documents and admitted them
    after redacting portions of the report that contained the unstipulated factual findings
    from those proceedings. It is unclear on what basis the trial court sustained Seifert’s
    objections.
    Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
    discretion. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 
    239 S.W.3d 231
    , 234 (Tex. 2007);
    Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 
    972 S.W.2d 35
    , 43 (Tex. 1998). A trial court
    abuses its discretion if it acts without regard to guiding rules or principles. Owens-
    Corning Fiberglas 
    Corp., 972 S.W.2d at 43
    . We must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary
    Fort Worth ISD v. Seifert                                                             Page 3
    ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling. See 
    id. We will
    not reverse a trial
    court for an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused the rendition
    of an improper judgment or probably prevented an appellant from properly presenting
    their case to the court of appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); Owens-Corning Fiberglas
    
    Corp., 972 S.W.2d at 43
    .
    The Workers’ Compensation Act contains two provisions governing the
    admissibility of the Commission’s decision and record in a jury trial. First, the trial
    court is required to “inform” the jury of the Commission appeals panel “decision” in
    the court's charge. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.304(b) (Vernon 2006). This provision is
    mandatory. The jury, however, is not required to accord the decision any special
    weight. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 
    893 S.W.2d 504
    , 528 (Tex. 1995). In
    addition, section 410.306(b) allows the admission into evidence of the Commission’s
    “record.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.306(b) (Vernon 2006). The Commission’s record is
    comprised, in part, of the written opinion containing the commission appeals panel
    decision. ESIS, Inc. v. Johnson, 
    908 S.W.2d 554
    , 560 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, writ
    denied). However, the Texas Rules of Evidence govern the admission at trial of facts
    and evidence contained in the Commission’s record. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §410.306(b)
    (Vernon 2006); National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 
    15 S.W.3d 525
    , 529 (Tex. 2000).
    The District’s sole complaint regarding this issue is that the exhibits should have
    been admitted in their entirety because they fit within the exception from the hearsay
    rule as a public record or report pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8). See TEX. R.
    EVID. 803(8).     The redacted portions of the decision and opinion from the benefit
    Fort Worth ISD v. Seifert                                                                 Page 4
    contested case hearing and the decision of the appeals panel both contain a review of
    testimony about the causes of the stroke, including the substance of testimony of
    persons who did not later testify before the jury and documents that were admitted at
    the contested hearing but not admitted before the jury.         We will assume without
    deciding for purposes of this decision that the exhibits were admissible pursuant to rule
    803(8) as a public record.
    Our inquiry, however, does not end there. We must next determine if there is
    any legitimate basis for the ruling. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
    Corp., 972 S.W.2d at 43
    .
    Based on the content of the redacted portions of the exhibits, we conclude that the
    district court could have reasonably excluded those portions of the decision and
    opinion of the Benefit Contested Case Hearing Office and the appeals panel’s decision
    because they were in part irrelevant to the issue before the jury, and because they could
    have confused the jury and the resulting confusion would have substantially
    outweighed their probative value. See TEX. R. EVID. 401 & 403. The District made no
    effort either at trial or in this appeal to demonstrate the relevance or the probative value
    of the redacted portions of the exhibits. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the
    trial court’s decision to exclude the redacted portions of those documents. By admitting
    the redacted documents, the trial court informed the jury of the appeals panel’s
    conclusion as required, and thereby complied with section 410.304 of the Labor Code.
    See Tex. Prop. & Cas. Guar. Ass'n v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 
    208 S.W.3d 523
    , 546 (Tex. App.—
    Austin 2006, pet. denied) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
    Fort Worth ISD v. Seifert                                                             Page 5
    admission of decision of appeals panel in its entirety pursuant to rule 403.).        We
    overrule issue two.
    Conclusion
    We find that the issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence were
    inadequately briefed and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by redacting
    portions of exhibits offered at trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Reyna, and
    Justice Davis
    (Justice Reyna concurs in the judgment only and notes, when a party files a brief
    without proof of service, the Clerk notifies the party of the defect and he is given an
    opportunity to cure it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.3 (“A court of appeals must not affirm or
    reverse a judgment or dismiss an appeal for formal defects or irregularities in appellate
    procedure without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or
    irregularities.”). We should treat inadequately briefed issues in the same manner. I
    would either address the merits of Fort Worth ISD’s first issue (as appellee Seifert was
    able to do without difficulty) or notify Fort Worth ISD that its brief is inadequate and
    “allow[] a reasonable time to correct or amend” it.)
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed March 3, 2010
    [CV06]
    Fort Worth ISD v. Seifert                                                           Page 6