Ex Parte Carlton L. Williams III ( 2010 )


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  •                                   IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00344-CR
    No. 10-09-00345-CR
    No. 10-09-00346-CR
    No. 10-09-00347-CR
    EX PARTE CARLTON L. WILLIAMS III
    From the 52nd District Court
    Coryell County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. FR-09-19950, FR-09-19951,
    FR-09-19952 and FR-09-19953
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Carlton L. Williams, III was indicted in separate indictments for four aggravated
    robberies. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §29.03 (Vernon 2003). His bail was originally set at
    $100,000 per indictment, but was reduced at a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus hearing at
    which time his bail was set at $ 50,000 per indictment, for a total of $200,000. Williams
    filed a second application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking another reduction
    in his bail, which was denied. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the
    trial court's order denying Williams's application for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
    Applicable Law
    Generally, a writ applicant has the burden of proving the facts which would
    entitle the applicant to relief. Ex parte Kimes, 
    872 S.W.2d 700
    , 703 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1993). The same holds true for an applicant in a bail reduction proceeding. See Ex parte
    Charlesworth, 
    600 S.W.2d 316
    , 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex parte Plumb, 
    595 S.W.2d 544
    , 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). We review a trial court's decision in a bail reduction
    proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Holliman v. State, 
    485 S.W.2d 912
    , 914 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1972).
    In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we are guided by
    Article 17.15 as to the rules for fixing bail. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15
    (Vernon 2005). See also Ex parte Pemberton, 
    577 S.W.2d 266
    , 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
    The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be
    considered and this necessarily involves the punishment permitted by law. 
    Holliman, 485 S.W.2d at 914
    . Also, the applicant's indigency is a circumstance to be considered,
    but it is neither a controlling circumstance nor the sole criterion in determining the
    amount of bail. Ex parte Vasquez, 
    558 S.W.2d 477
    , 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Other
    factors to be considered in determining the amount of bail, as interpreted previously by
    this Court, include family and community ties, work history, length of residence in the
    county, prior criminal record, conformity with conditions of prior bail, and any
    aggravating circumstances of the offense. Ex parte Davis, 
    147 S.W.3d 546
    , 548 (Tex.
    App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see Ex parte Rubac, 
    611 S.W.2d 848
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
    Ex parte Williams                                                                  Page 2
    Williams did not testify at the hearing before the trial court. His mother testified
    that Williams was seventeen years old; that she was willing to loan him $10,000 to post
    bail; and that Williams would live in her home in Copperas Cove, Coryell County,
    Texas until the cases were resolved. She would ensure that Williams appeared at any
    court dates. A bond agent testified that her company was willing to write bonds for
    $25,000 per indictment for a $10,000 payment to her company and that based on her
    conversations with the family, she did not feel that Williams posed a flight risk,
    although she had never met Williams personally.           A copy of each of the four
    indictments with the probable cause affidavits were admitted into evidence which
    showed that each indictment arose out of one criminal episode, but with four victims.
    The trial court took judicial notice of the testimony from the first writ hearing
    from a detective with the Copperas Cove police department. The officer testified that
    six or seven males wearing red bandanas approached a front porch of a residence. One
    of the males hit an individual standing on the porch with a firearm and they then forced
    their way inside the residence. Another individual in the residence was hit over the
    head with a firearm as well. The residents of the home were forced to strip, and items
    were stolen from them and the residence. The individual that witnessed the first assault
    called 911 and while he was retrieving the license plate number from the getaway
    vehicle, shots were fired at him from a passenger in the vehicle as it left the scene. The
    vehicle was driven by Williams and was titled in his mother’s name. Later, the victims
    identified Williams by name as one of the perpetrators. Williams held an aluminum
    baseball bat, which he abandoned at the residence where the robberies took place.
    Ex parte Williams                                                                    Page 3
    None of the other males involved in the aggravated robberies had been arrested
    at the time of the first writ hearing and no firearm had been recovered. Williams
    refused to tell police the identities of the others who committed the offense with him,
    although he had told his mother their names. The detective testified that she was
    concerned for the safety of Williams if released as well as the potential for Williams to
    commit other violent offenses with the other perpetrators.
    Williams had been charged with an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
    and other drug offenses as a juvenile. There is no testimony in the record before us of
    Williams’s ties to the community, the length of time he had been in the community, or
    any work or school history. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of
    law at Williams’s request. The trial court based its decision to deny the second writ on
    the seriousness of the offense, the use of weapons to commit the offense, and the
    welfare of the community.
    Considering all of the factors, the burden of proof, and the record before us, we
    cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Williams’s second writ
    of habeas corpus. Accordingly, Williams’s sole issue is overruled.
    Conclusion
    Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Ex parte Williams                                                                  Page 4
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Reyna, and
    Justice Davis
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed March 3, 2010
    Do not publish
    [CV06]
    Ex parte Williams                           Page 5