W M Roberson v. Aaron Chevalier ( 2014 )

Opinion issued July 15, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-13-00307-CV
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W.M. ROBERSON, Appellant
V.
AARON CHEVALIER, Appellee
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 1
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1027595
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an eviction case. The county court at law, in an appeal from the
justice court, determined that Aaron Chevalier had a superior right to possession of
a residence. W.M. Roberson appeals the county court’s take-nothing judgment in
Chevalier’s favor, contending that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support it. Roberson also complains that Chevalier failed to comply with the
service rules and that the county court erred by failing to file findings of fact and
conclusions of law. We affirm.
Background
In 2011, Chevalier lived in a single-family residence located in northwest
Houston. According to Chevalier, he resided at the property as its caretaker at the
behest of Ronald Curtis, the grandson and sole heir to the estate of the now-
deceased record title owner, Ella Francis Townsend. Chevalier recounted that
Roberson appeared on the property in May 2012 and told Chevalier that he was
taking the property from Curtis “due to a misplacement of the deceased owner’s
will.” Initially believing him, Chevalier executed a written rental agreement with
Roberson. In June 2012, Chevalier paid Roberson $1,025 for the deposit and the
first month’s rent. After contacting Roberson to repair storm damage to the
carport, Chevalier discovered that Roberson did not have insurance on the
property. Roberson’s lack of insurance made Chevalier suspicious of Roberson’s
claim of ownership. Chevalier learned through a search of the Harris County
Appraisal District (HCAD) website that the estate of Ella Francis Townsend—not
Roberson—was listed as the property owner.
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Chevalier stopped paying rent in November 2012, whereupon Roberson
petitioned for forcible entry and detainer in the justice court. In the justice court,
Chevalier denied that Roberson owned the property or represented the property’s
owner. The justice court ruled that Roberson was entitled to possession of the
premises. The justice court’s judgment did not assess delinquent rent, but it
ordered Chevalier to pay Roberson $550 monthly during the pendency of the
appeal.
Chevalier appealed the ruling to the county civil court at law. The county
court conducted a bench trial, and the court reporter has certified that no record
was made of the proceedings. After the trial de novo, the county civil court at law
signed a take-nothing judgment in Chevalier’s favor.
Forcible Detainer
A landlord may file a forcible detainer action to reclaim possession of
property when a tenant refuses to surrender possession of the subject property on
demand. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a) (West 2000). A forcible detainer
action is dependent on proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. Rice v. Pinney, 51
S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). The only issue to be
determined in a forcible detainer action is the entitlement to actual and immediate
possession of real property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d
782, 787 (Tex. 2006). A determination of title, however, “shall not be
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adjudicated.” Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 364–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, no pet.); accord Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925,
927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“To maintain simplicity, the applicable
rule of procedure provides that ‘the only issue shall be as to the right to actual
possession; and the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated.’” (quoting TEX. R.
CIV. P. 746)); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (West Supp. 2013)
(declaring that “[a] justice court does not have jurisdiction of . . . a suit for trial of
title to land”); Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557
(Tex. App—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (noting justice courts are
without jurisdiction to adjudicate title to land). A forcible detainer action is
cumulative of any other legal remedy that a party may have. See Bruce v. Fed.
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 352 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied);
Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708.
Evidentiary sufficiency
Roberson appeals the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s judgment. The court reporter has certified that no reporter’s record
exists of the county court bench trial. An appellant has the burden to bring forward
a sufficient record to show the trial court’s claimed error. Nicholson v. Fifth Third
Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). When
a party raises an issue on appeal relying on evidence presented to the trial court—
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as Roberson does here, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence—we must
presume the trial court had before it and determined all facts necessary in support
of the judgment absent any record of what evidence the trial court considered. See
Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (“‘The court
of appeals was correct in holding that, absent a complete record on appeal, it must
presume the omitted items supported the trial court’s judgment.’” (quoting
Gallagher v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 950 S.W.2d 370, 370–71 (Tex. 1997)); see also
Onwubuche v. Olowolayemo, No. 01-10-00945-CV, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding, in
Craddock review of default judgment, that because “Onwubuche did not file a
reporter’s record as part of his record on appeal,” the court “must presume that the
reporter’s record contains evidence to support the trial court’s rulings on all issues
of fact”). Accordingly, we presume the trial court found the necessary facts to
establish that Chevalier had the superior claim to immediate possession of the
property. Public, Inc. v. County of Galveston, 264 S.W.3d 338, 341–42 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). We therefore reject Roberson’s
evidentiary-sufficiency challenges.
Notice and compliance with Rule 21a
Roberson also complains that Chevalier failed to comply with the service
rules when he filed his answer, exhibits, and notice of pauper status in the county
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court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that
Roberson raised these complaints before the trial court. Roberson did not move to
continue the trial, nor does he present any argument or discussion with respect to
how the trial court’s consideration of the purportedly belated filings probably
caused rendition of an improper judgment on his claims. See TEX. R. APP. P.
44.1(a)(1). In particular, Roberson does not explain whether any of the filings or
exhibits in the trial de novo differed so greatly from those presented in the justice
court that they constituted an unfair surprise. We hold that Roberson has failed to
demonstrate that any of the service issues he challenges provides a basis for
reversing the county court’s judgment.
Absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law
Roberson contends the trial court erred by failing to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, when a party
makes a proper and timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and
the trial court fails to comply, harm is presumed unless the record affirmatively
shows that the requesting party was not harmed by their absence. TEX. R. CIV. P.
296; Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Haut v. Green
Cafe Mgmt., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 171, 182 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no
pet.).
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Rule 296 requires a party to make a written request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law within twenty days after judgment is signed. TEX. R. CIV. P.
296. If the court does not file its findings and conclusions within twenty days after
a timely request, the party making the request “shall, within thirty days after filing
the original request, file with the clerk and serve on all other parties . . . a ‘Notice
of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 297.
Roberson filed his request for findings of fact and conclusion of law on May
3, 2013, one day before the county court signed the final judgment. Rule 306c
provides that premature requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law shall
be deemed filed on the date of, but subsequent to, the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 306c; Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, writ
denied). Roberson timely filed a notice of past due findings of fact and
conclusions of law on May 30, 2013. We therefore consider whether the record
affirmatively shows that Roberson was not harmed by the absence of findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
The clerk’s record contains controverted evidence over the single issue of
whether Roberson was entitled to actual and immediate possession of the property.
Roberson presented a lease agreement signed by Chevalier and an affidavit
Roberson filed in the real property records claiming that he had adversely
possessed the property. Chevalier, for his part, provided the title to the property
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and a letter from the deceased record property owner’s putative heir explaining that
Chevalier had his permission to reside on the property as its caretaker. Chevalier
also provided a written statement explaining that Roberson fraudulently induced
him to sign the lease. The clerk’s record affirmatively shows that the possession
issue came down to a credibility determination, which the trial court necessarily
made in favor of Chevalier and to which we owe deference on appellate review.
See Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406–07 (Tex. 1998); Dyer
v. Cotton, 333 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
Because the only issue in the case is the right of possession of the property, and
Roberson failed to include a reporter’s record, the trial court’s judgment
determining possession is self-explanatory; we thus conclude that Roberson was
not harmed by the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the county court at law.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Brown.
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