Doe 1, Doe 2, Doe 3 v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA ( 2012 )

NO. 07-11-0251-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
MARCH 30, 2012
_____________________________
DOE #1, DOE #2, DOE #3,
Appellants
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF PITTSBURGH, PA,
Appellee
_____________________________
FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 98,575-E; HONORABLE DOUGLAS WOODBURN, PRESIDING
_____________________________
Memorandum Opinion
_____________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellants DOE #1, DOE #2, and DOE #31 (hereinafter collectively referred to as
DOE) appeal from a summary judgment in which the trial court denied DOE’s right to
recovery under four insurance policies issued by appellee National Union Fire Insurance
Company of Pittsburgh, PA (National Union). We reverse the judgment for the simple
1
Appellants are affiliated religious entities.
reason that National Union did not carry its burden of proof, even assuming that its
interpretation of the contract was accurate.
The dispute before us involves a coverage question. The insurance contract at
issue is a commercial general liability policy with accompanying endorsements. One
endorsement, entitled “Clergy Counseling Professional Liability Coverage,” stated that
“[t]he Exclusions are replaced by the following: [t]his insurance does not apply to . . .
liability resulting from any actual or alleged conduct of [sic] sexual nature . . . .”
According to National Union, that provision freed it from providing DOE a defense or
coverage against several claims. Furthermore, it moved for summary judgment on that
ground, which motion the trial court granted.2
The problem we encounter arises from the tenor of the summary judgment
record. The parties allude to claims being made against DOE and to the conduct of
individuals (i.e., Mares and Kelley) which, we assume for purposes of this appeal, is of a
sexual nature undertaken by them. Yet, no one cites us to any evidence or stipulations
revealing who asserted claims against DOE or the nature of or factual basis underlying
the supposed claims. Nor does anyone cite us to evidence suggesting that Mares or
Kelley were representatives, agents, or employees of DOE or whether DOE had any
type of responsibility for their actions. Nor did our own review of the record uncover any
such evidence. That it was missing was also mentioned by DOE in its brief.
Simply put, and assuming arguendo that National Union’s interpretation of the
endorsement is correct, it failed to prove, as a matter of law, that the claims underlying
the contractual dispute between National Union and DOE concerned liability resulting
2
DOE responded to the motion for summary judgment by contending that the endorsement
applied only to conduct undertaken by clergy.
2
from conduct of a sexual nature. So, summary judgment was improper. See Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003) (stating that
summary judgment is proper when the movant establishes its entitlement to same as a
matter of law).
Accordingly, the summary judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is
remanded.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
3