Memorial Hermann Hospital System D/B/A Memorial Hermann Southwest Hospital v. Jewell Hayden ( 2014 )

Opinion issued June 17, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-13-00154-CV
———————————
MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPITAL SYSTEM D/B/A MEMORIAL
HERMANN SOUTHWEST HOSPITAL, Appellant
V.
JEWELL HAYDEN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 333rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-24879
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, 1 Memorial Hermann Hospital System d/b/a
Memorial Hermann Southwest Hospital appeals a trial court’s order denying its
1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (West Supp. 2013).
motion to dismiss Jewell Hayden’s slip-and-fall claim arising out of an injury she
suffered while she was assisting a patient at the hospital. The trial court held that
Memorial Hermann waived its right to seek dismissal based on Hayden’s failure to
file an expert report as required for a health care liability claim. 2 Memorial
Hermann contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding waiver and
by denying its motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Background
In April 2010, Jewell Hayden filed this lawsuit against Memorial Hermann,
alleging she was seriously injured at the hospital as a result of its failure to
properly treat her “very weak and sick” friend whom she had brought there.
Hayden maintained that her friend “became violently ill while . . . in the
Emergency Room” and the hospital failed to provide her friend with necessary
“physical help and medical attention,” because it “did not have anyone to assist”
her friend. Despite having seen a doctor and several nurses coming in and out of
2
In 2013, the legislature amended section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code to require each health care liability claimant to serve an expert
report “not later than the 120th day after each defendant’s original answer is
filed.” See Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg. R.S., ch. 870, § 2 (emphasis added).
The new provision applies to all suits filed after September 1, 2013. Hayden filed
her claims in 2010 and, therefore, the former section 74.351 still applies. See Act
of May 18, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 635, §1, 2005 TEX. GEN. LAWS 1590
(amended 2013) (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351
(West Supp. 2013)). Under the earlier version, health care liability claimants must
serve an expert report on each health care provider defendant no later than 120
days after filing their initial petition. Id.
2
the friend’s waiting room, Hayden was forced to help her friend to the public
restroom, where the friend fell on her. Memorial Hermann moved to dismiss,
arguing that Hayden had asserted a health care liability claim but had failed to
provide an expert report as required by section 74.351 of the Texas Medical
Liability Act (TMLA).
In October 2010, while Memorial Hermann’s motion to dismiss was
pending, Hayden amended her petition. She continued to allege the same
background facts; however, she abandoned her original complaint that her friend
fell on her and that the hospital breached its duty by failing to provide medical and
physical assistance to her friend. Instead, she alleged that “[w]hile attempting to
assist” her friend in the restroom in the hospital emergency room, they both slipped
and fell. Hayden asserted that the hospital failed to provide “adequate maintenance
to ensure the premises was free from slip hazards as a reasonable premises owner
would provide,” to clean the floor of the premises, or to provide anti-slip mats or
rugs “in an area that was known to be wet.” She further alleged that the hospital
failed to “provide adequate staffing resources” to ensure a safe environment.
Hayden simultaneously filed a response to Memorial Hermann’s pending motion
to dismiss, arguing that her amended claim did not constitute a health care liability
claim. Relying on Marks v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 319 S.W.3d 658, 664
(Tex. 2010) and Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 854
3
(Tex. 2005), Hayden insisted that Memorial Hermann’s acts and omissions did not
constitute a health care liability claim because they were not inseparably related to
the rendition of health care services. Memorial Hermann’s pending motion had
already been set for the trial court to rule on it, but Memorial Hermann passed on
the hearing.
For the next 22 months, Memorial Hermann did not reset its motion to
dismiss. Instead, both parties conducted discovery and prepared for trial. As part of
that discovery, Memorial Hermann “propounded multiple sets of written
discovery” and “participated in ten fact and expert witness depositions.” During a
July 2011 deposition, Hayden testified that she accompanied her friend to the
emergency room where the friend was seen by the doctor and a nurse and that the
nurse was told that the friend was unable to use a bed pan. According to Hayden,
the friend was “extremely weak” and had to get up from the room in which he was
waiting and “walk past the nurses’ station” to get to the public bathroom. Hayden’s
friend walked by himself to the bathroom at least three times and lost control of his
bowels in the hallway before he reached the bathroom. During his third trip to the
bathroom, Hayden noticed that her friend was in the bathroom “too long,” and she
knocked on the door to ask whether he needed help. When he did not answer,
Hayden entered the bathroom and recalled seeing feces on the floor around the
toilet stall occupied by her friend. Hayden was reaching to get some paper towels
4
when she slipped and fell. Hayden, who was seventy years old, fell and broke both
of her legs. One month after Hayden’s deposition, Memorial Hermann moved for
summary judgment on Hayden’s premises liability claim. As part of its motion,
Memorial Hermann noted that Hayden had simply “recast” her health care liability
claim “as a premises liability lawsuit.” The trial court denied summary judgment.
Memorial Hermann did not reset its motion to dismiss for hearing.
Approximately one year later, on June 29, 2012, the Texas Supreme Court
issued Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, holding that a hospital
employee who sued the hospital for the hospital’s failure to provide a safe work
environment after the employee was assaulted by a patient was required to comply
with the expert-report requirement of TMLA section 74.351. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 74.351; Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171,
175 (Tex. 2012). Six weeks later, which was four days before the trial court
actually called the case to trial, Memorial Hermann filed a second motion to
dismiss Hayden’s suit, contending that under Williams Hayden was required—but
failed—to serve a section 74.351 expert report.
In response, Hayden argued that there was “no commonality of fact”
between Williams and her claims. Hayden further contended that Memorial
Hermann’s delay in pursuing its second motion to dismiss and its extensive trial
preparation waived any right to dismissal.
5
Memorial Hermann excused its failure to pursue its motion based on its pre-
Williams good faith belief that Hayden’s amended petition did not state a health
care liability claim subject to the expert report requirement. Hayden does not
dispute that statement. Indeed, the parties later stipulated that Memorial Hermann
“believed based on the case law at that time, that [the amended p]etition did not
assert a health care liability claim and, therefore a motion to dismiss for failure to
file an expert report was groundless.”
The trial court found, however, that Memorial Hermann had waived its right
to seek dismissal for failure to file an expert report and denied Memorial
Hermann’s motion to dismiss. The trial court also found that Hayden’s claim
constitutes a health care liability claim, a determination that Hayden does not
contest.3
Memorial Hermann filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s
interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(10) (West Supp. 2013).
3
In Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, the court of appeals held that a premises
liability slip-and-fall claim against a hospital is a “health care liability claim” to
which the expert-report requirement applies. No. 14–12–00885–CV, 2013 WL
1136613 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
6
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a health care liability
lawsuit pursuant to chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for
an abuse of discretion. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. AND REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351; see
also Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875
(Tex. 2001) (reviewing dismissal under section 74 predecessor statute for abuse of
discretion); Runcie v. Foley, 274 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2008, no pet.) (reviewing chapter 74 dismissal for abuse of discretion). We defer
to a trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by evidence, but where there
is no factual dispute, only the legal question of whether the conduct constitutes
waiver remains. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs., 46 S.W.3d at 875; Crosstex
Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., No. 12–0251, 2014 WL 1258307, at *8 (Tex.
Mar. 28, 2014) (“Generally, waiver presents a question of fact, but ‘when the facts
and circumstances are admitted or clearly established, the question [of waiver]
becomes one of law.’”) (citation omitted); Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153,
156–57 (Tex. 2003) (“[W]hen the surrounding facts and circumstances are
undisputed, the question [of waiver] becomes one of law.”). When a reviewing
court conducts an abuse-of-discretion review, the issue of whether a party waived
certain procedural rights—which requires a balancing of “a multitude of potential
factors”—constitutes “a question of law for the court, and we do not defer to the
7
trial court on questions of law.” Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 598 (Tex.
2008). Neither party disputes Memorial Hermann’s conduct or the surrounding
factual circumstances. Therefore, whether Memorial Hermann waived its right to
seek dismissal is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Crosstex
Energy, 2014 WL 1258307, at *8; Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 598 n.102;
Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156–57.
Waiver
Memorial Hermann contends that it did not relinquish a known right by
waiting until August 16, 2012—over 670 days after Hayden amended her petition
to raise a slip-and-fall claim—to move for dismissal for failure to serve a
section 74.351(b) expert report.
A. Waiver defined
Section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires a
party who alleges a health care liability claim to serve an expert report on every
physician or health care provider against whom liability is asserted. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351; see Heriberto Sedeno, P.A. v. Mijares, 333
S.W.3d 815, 822–23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The plaintiff
must file the expert report within 120 days of filing the initial petition. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a). If a timely expert report is not filed, the
affected health care provider may file a motion to dismiss, and the court must
8
dismiss the claim with prejudice. Id. § 74.351(b). A defendant can waive his right
to seek dismissal for failure to file an expert report. Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional
conduct inconsistent with claiming that right. Id. at 156–57; see also Crosstex
Energy, 2014 WL 1258307, at *6. “The elements of waiver include (1) an existing
right, benefit, or advantage held by a party; (2) the party’s actual knowledge of its
existence; and (3) the party’s actual intent to relinquish the right or intentional
conduct inconsistent with the right.” Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262
S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008); see also Alli v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 01–11–
00800–CV, 2013 WL 772946, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); TeleResource Corp. v. Accor N. Am., Inc., No. 02–12–
00475–CV, 2014 WL 975736, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2014, pet.
filed); In re Estate of Lynch, 395 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012,
pet. denied).4
4
This court and others have stated that the second element may be satisfied by
constructive knowledge. See, e.g., Forged Components, Inc. v. Guzman, 409
S.W.3d 91, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); In re C.H.C., 396
S.W.3d 33, 43 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); Nash v. Beckett, 365 S.W.3d
131, 144 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied); Furmanite Worldwide, Inc. v.
NextCorp, Ltd., 339 S.W.3d 326, 334 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ); see also Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 602–3 (Johnson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating elements of waiver include “an
existing right, benefit, or advantage held by a party . . . and the party’s actual or
constructive knowledge of its existence . . . .”). “Constructive knowledge is a
substitute in the law for actual knowledge.” CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15
9
In Jernigan, a medical malpractice case involving a late-filed challenge to
the adequacy of an expert report, the Court considered whether the defendant had
waived his right to seek dismissal. Whether a party has waived his rights largely
depends on the party’s intent; an implied intent to waive through a party’s actions
“must be clearly demonstrated by the surrounding facts and circumstances.”
Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156. When the party charged with waiver says or does
nothing inconsistent with the intent to rely on a right, there is no waiver. Id.
However, inaction may establish waiver if it is for so long a period that it shows an
intent to yield a known right. Id. at 157.
There is no deadline to file a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve
section 74.351 expert reports. Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156; see also Heriberto
Sedeno, P.A., 333 S.W.3d at 823–24; Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v.
McCoy, 283 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
Thus, Memorial Hermann’s more than 670-day delay in pursuing it motion to
dismiss did not, based upon timing alone, waive its right to dismissal. See
Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 157; Heriberto Sedeno, P.A., 333 S.W.3d at 823, 825
(delaying 912 days held not waiver). Waiver cannot be “based solely on the length
of delay”; rather, waiver occurs when a party acts in such a way that it
S.W.3d 97, 102 (Tex. 2000). Constructive knowledge is “knowledge that one
using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by
law to a given person.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (9th ed. 2004).
10
intentionally relinquishes a right or intentionally is not claiming it. In re Universal
Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d 404, 408 (Tex. 2011) (considering waiver for failure to
invoke arbitration clause); see Crosstex, 2014 WL 1258307, at *8 (“We will not
find waiver where a person ‘says or does nothing inconsistent with an intent to rely
upon such right.’” (quoting Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156)). “In other words, while
the time period may be instructive in interpreting the parties’ intentions, it alone is
not the standard by which courts determine” whether waiver has occurred. In re
Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 408. Before we address whether Memorial
Hermann’s conduct, in addition to its 670-day delay, was inconsistent with
claiming a known right, we consider Memorial Hermann’s contention that it did
not have a known right to obtain dismissal and that such a pleading would have
been groundless before Williams was decided.
B. Memorial Hermann had a known right to seek dismissal
Memorial Hermann contends that before Williams “the law did not subject
slip and falls by a hospital visitor to the [expert report] requirements of Chapter
74.” Therefore, before Williams, Memorial Hermann believed it had, at most, only
“a potential, theoretical, or arguable right,” but not a known right to obtain a
dismissal for Hayden’s failure to file an expert report in a slip-and-fall case.
Hayden responds that the Court’s holding in Williams “did not change” the law; it
11
merely “clarified its interpretation” of a statute that had existed since 2003, “long
before . . . Hayden filed her claim.”
A party cannot waive a hypothetical right—it must be a “right actually
known.” Ulico, 262 S.W.3d at 778. Stated differently, a party cannot waive a right
that does not exist at the time. Discovery Operating, Inc. v. Baskin, 855 S.W.2d
884, 887 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ).
But Memorial Hermann had more than a hypothetical right before Williams;
regardless of whether it anticipated that it would prevail on its motion to dismiss, it
had a right to seek dismissal. Memorial Hermann not only had that right, it
exercised that right before passing on a hearing on its motion. To limit the rights
that may be waived only to those where the law clearly establishes an ability to
prevail is to demand too much.
A party has a right to pursue various legal strategies and in choosing one
over another, the party must still bear the consequences of his decision. For
example, the enforceability of an arbitration clause, forum-selection clause, or
appraisal clause may not be clearly established, but the party may nonetheless
waive its right to invoke those clauses. See, e.g., Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 593–
94 (concluding waiver of right to arbitration); In re Universal Underwriters, 345
S.W.3d at 411 (considering waiver of appraisal clause); In re ADM Investor Servs.,
Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2010) (“A party waives a forum-selection clause
12
by substantially invoking the judicial process to the other party’s detriment or
prejudice.”).
Memorial Hermann contends that it should not be penalized for not asserting
a defense it subjectively believed had no basis under the law at the time. But
Memorial Hermann’s subjective beliefs about the status of the law before the
Williams holding is not the issue. Rather, the issue is whether it would have had a
reasonable basis—that is, one that would not have been groundless—for seeking
dismissal of Hayden’s claims at the time.
Memorial Hermann argues, based on Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital,
that the Williams result could not have been reasonably anticipated. No. 14–12–
00885–CV, 2013 WL 1136613, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19,
2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Ross likely never imagined that, under the Texas
Supreme Court’s construction . . . the Texas Medical Liability Act would swallow
her garden-variety slip and fall case. But it has.”). This objective-sounding
argument is closer to the mark. But, to be more precise, the issue is whether a
motion asserting that the law required dismissal of Hayden’s slip-and-fall claim
would have been groundless before Williams, not whether it reasonably could have
been expected to prevail. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Groundlessness is an objective inquiry
that examines whether such a motion would have had “no basis in law or fact” and
was “not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
13
reversal of existing law.” Id. (defining groundless and permitting counsel to file
pleading when she believes “after reasonable inquiry the [pleading] is not
groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for purpose of
harassment.”); Harrison v. Harrison, 363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, no. pet.) (“To determine if a pleading was groundless, the trial
court uses an objective standard: did the party and counsel make a reasonable
inquiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim?” (citation omitted)).5 Cf. Tex.
Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.01, cmt. 1, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (noting
law is never static and that advocates must account for “the law’s ambiguities and
potential for change”).
The law before Williams—which Memorial Hermann was presumed to
know 6—did not dictate that an amended motion to dismiss would be groundless.
Two months before Hayden amended her original petition, the hospital defendant
5
In contrast, whether a pleading is brought in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment involves a subjective inquiry. Parker v. Walton, 233 S.W.3d 535, 540
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Thielemann v. Kethan,
371 S.W.3d 286, 294 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
6
See Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 n.3 (Tex.
1990); Stewart v. Tex. Lottery Com’n, 975 S.W.2d 732, 735–36 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Gabaldon v. Gen. Motors Corp., 876 S.W.2d 367,
369 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ).
14
in Williams made this argument, 7 which Memorial Hermann later adopted, and no
one suggested that the Williams health care provider’s argument was groundless.8
7
See Petition for Review at *3, Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d
171 (Tex. 2012) (No. 10–0603); see also Reply to Response to Petition for Review
at *1–7, Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012) (No.
10–0603).
8
We note that it is still unsettled whether Williams mandates that all slip-and-fall
claims be treated as health care liability claims. While Memorial Hermann argues
that pre-Williams, “the law did not subject slip and falls by a hospital visitor to the
requirements of Chapter 74,” case law following Williams reflects courts’ abiding
disagreement about whether slip-and-fall claims at a medical facility constitute
health care liability claims. Compare Methodist Healthcare Sys. v. Dewey, 423
S.W.3d 516, 520 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet filed.) (concluding patient
visitor’s claim that hospital’s electronic doors malfunctioned and caused him to
fall and break his hip was straightforward premises-liability claim and not health
care claim because it was “completely untethered from health care”), and
Weatherford Tex. Hosp. Co. v. Smart, 423 S.W.3d 462, 467–68 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2014, pet. filed) (holding hospital patient visitor claim that he slipped and
fell on puddle in lobby not health care claim because “gravamen of Smart’s claim
[was] a slip-and-fall, implicating the question of whether there should be a
difference between a safety claim occurring in the lobby of a department store,
bakery, or lawyer’s office and a safety claim occurring in the lobby of a health
care provider when health care services are not involved” and “totally unrelated to
the provision of health care services.”), with Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys. v.
Galvan, No. 14–13–00120–CV, 2014 WL 295166, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 2014, no pet. h.) (holding that premises liability claim by
hospital visitor arising from slip and fall on water coming from men’s restroom
constituted health care liability claim because, under Williams, claims based on
alleged departure from accepted safety standards for protection from danger, harm,
or loss are sufficient to constitute health care liability claim and departure need not
be directly or indirectly related to health care), and Ross, 2013 WL 1136613, at *1
(holding slip-and-fall premises claim by patient visitor constituted health care
liability claim because under Williams, “a connection between the act or omission
and health care is unnecessary” and “[a]n allegation pertaining to safety, standing
alone and broadly defined, is sufficient.”). These cases demonstrate that claims
arising from a slip-and-fall at a hospital may or may not be treated as a health care
liability claim. Yet the right to pursue that result is clear, as it was pre-Williams.
The test for being a “known legal right” cannot be whether a motion will succeed,
but whether a motion would be groundless. Cf. Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l
15
Memorial Hermann could have argued—as the health care provider did in
Williams—that health care liability claims include any claims of departure from
safety standards, including claims brought by a non-patient. See Williams, 371
S.W.3d at 186.9
Memorial Hermann’s initial motion to dismiss would not have been legally
groundless even after Hayden amended her petition. A court is not bound by the
legal theories in a plaintiff’s pleadings in determining whether a claim is a health
care liability claim. Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, 342 S.W.3d 525, 527
(Tex. 2011). The “focus in determining whether claims come under the TMLA is
not the status of the claimant, but the gravamen of the claim or claims against the
health care provider.” Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 178. The focus is “on the facts
underlying the claim, not the form of, or artfully-phrased language in, the
plaintiff’s pleadings describing the facts or legal theories asserted.” Loaisiga v.
Conduct R. 3.01, cmt. 1, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app.
A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (noting that “the law is not always
clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the scope of advocacy,
account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change.”).
Otherwise, Memorial Hermann could continue to not pursue a motion to dismiss
even after Williams given the current split in case law.
9
The health care provider in Williams was not alone in believing that the TMLA
might reach premises liability claims that did not directly involve patient care. See
Paula Sweeney, Medical Malpractice in Texas, 2010, State Bar of Tex. Prof. Dev.
Program, Advanced Medical Malpractice Course, 130–31 (2010) (asserting “that
virtually all conduct occurring on the premises of a health care provider, or
involving health care defendants, equates to health care” and observing that “[a]
host of attempts to evade 4590i have failed.”).
16
Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 2012) (citing Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d
192, 196–97 (Tex. 2010)) (emphasis added); see Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847,
854.
Hayden did not allege that she fell while walking through a waiting room or
a common area. The “gravamen” of her claim is different than a slip-and-fall
“occurring in the lobby of a department store, bakery, or lawyer’s office,” and is
different than a “safety claim occurring in the lobby of a health care provider when
health care services are not involved.” Weatherford Tex. Hosp. Co. v. Smart, 423
S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. filed) (construing Williams).
Hayden fell while attempting to physically assist a “violently ill” and “very weak”
patient to a bathroom while he was undergoing health care treatment in the
emergency room of a hospital. She even alleged that the hospital failed to “provide
adequate staffing resources” to ensure a safe environment—a not uncommon
medical malpractice claim. Hayden’s allegations asserted a causal link between
Hayden’s injury and the level of competence of the hospital staff, implying that
understaffing compromised her safety while visiting the hospital. See, e.g.,
Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 845 (concluding that complaint, among others, that
health care provider failed “to budget for, hire, and train a sufficient number of
qualified direct health care staff” was health care claim). These assertions are not
17
“totally unrelated to the provision of health care services.” Weatherford, 423
S.W.3d at 468.
The legislative history of chapter 74 and related caselaw further support the
conclusion that a motion to dismiss Hayden’s claims would not have been
groundless before Williams. Article 4590i, the predecessor statute of Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, defined a health care liability claim as a
“cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of
treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care or
health care or safety which proximately results in injury or death of the
patient . . . .” Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 140, § 1, sec. 13.01(d), (e),
1995 TEX. GEN. LAWS 985, 986, repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R. S.,
ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 TEX. GEN. LAWS 847, 884. Under article 4590i, the term
“safety” was not defined, but the claim had to stem from injury or death to a
patient. See id. § 1.03; see also Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855 (noting statute did
not define “safety”).
In 2003, when article 4590i section 1.03 was recodified as Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 74.001, the Legislature defined a health care liability claim
as a claim against a health care provider for “treatment, lack of treatment, or other
claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or
safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care,
18
which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the
claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). The term
“safety” remained undefined, but the statute was broadened to include injury to a
“claimant.” See id. The term “claimant” is defined as “a person” who seeks
recovery or damages in a health care liability claim. See id. § 74.001 (a)(2) (West
Supp. 2013).
Two years later, the Texas Supreme Court explained in Diversicare that
former article 4590i “did not define” the term “safety,” as it related to the
definition of a health care liability claim, and the Court applied the “commonly
understood meaning of safety” as “the condition of being ‘untouched by danger . . .
harm or loss.’” Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1336 (6th ed. 1990)). The Court recognized that the “Legislature’s inclusion within
the scope of [4590i] claims based on breaches of accepted standards of safety
expand[ed] the scope of the statute beyond what it would be if it only covered
medical and health care.” Id. Diversicare was decided seven years before Williams.
In Williams, the Court noted that the term “safety” remained undefined in
section 74.001, and, accordingly, applied the definition used in Diversicare.
Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 183–84 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855 (applying
the “commonly understood meaning of safety” as “the condition of being
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‘untouched by danger . . . harm or loss.’”)). The Williams Court again recognized
that the Legislature’s “inclusion of safety ‘expanded the scope of the statute
beyond what it would be if it only covered medical and health care.’” Id. at 184. It
also held that “the safety component of [health care liability claims] need not be
directly related to the provision of health care . . . .” Id. at 186. Additionally, the
plaintiff’s status as an injured employee, instead of a patient, did not determine the
nature of the claim. Id. at 188–89. Under Williams, the focus shifted to whether the
hospital’s alleged misconduct involved a departure from accepted standards of
safety. Id. at 179, 185.
Based on Diversicare, the text of chapter 74, and Hayden’s claim of
inadequate staffing resources to ensure a safe environment, a motion to dismiss
that contended that Hayden’s claim was a health care liability claim because it was
“for . . . [a] claimed departure from accepted standards of . . . safety . . . which
proximately results in injury to . . . a claimant” would not have been groundless
before Williams. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (stating
elements of health care liability claim).
Notably, in its briefing to the trial court in support of its second motion to
dismiss, Memorial Hermann likened Hayden’s claims to Omaha Healthcare
Center v. Johnson, 344 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. 2011), which was issued the year
before Williams. In Omaha, a nursing home patient was bitten by a spider while at
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the nursing home and died. The patient’s family brought a premises liability claim,
alleging that the nursing home had failed to maintain its premises in a safe
condition. Memorial Hermann explained that the Omaha court found the plaintiff’s
claim was “directly related to health care” and “fell within the statutory definition
of a health care liability claim.” Id. at 395 (emphasis added). In its briefing,
Memorial Hermann likewise asserted, “[L]ike Ms. Hayden in this case, the claim
[in Omaha] was brought as a premises liability claim against the facility for failing
to keep the facility safe.” Memorial Hermann’s reliance on the Omaha case one
year before it set its own motion to dismiss for hearing further supports the
conclusion that Memorial Hermann had a known right to seek dismissal.
Further, a plaintiff cannot recast a health care liability claim as another cause
of action to avoid the statute. Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010).
Nevertheless, Memorial Hermann passed on the hearing on its motion to dismiss
and instead sought final judgment by filing a summary judgment motion, in which
it contended that Hayden had “recast the case as a premises liability lawsuit.” The
same argument would have supported its pending motion to dismiss.
We conclude that, even after Hayden amended her petition, Memorial
Hermann could have pursued its motion to dismiss and that the pleading would not
have been groundless before Williams. Accordingly, we hold that, before Williams,
Memorial Hermann had a known right to seek dismissal.
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C. Conduct inconsistent with the right to seek dismissal
Because Memorial Hermann had a known right to seek dismissal, we turn to
consider whether its conduct demonstrated that it waived that right. Memorial
Hermann argues that it did not engage in conduct inconsistent with a known right.
And we recognize that engaging in pretrial preparation, including conducting
discovery, by itself does not constitute waiver. See Crosstex Energy, 2014 WL
1258307, at *9 (citing Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 157) (holding that propounding
11,000 pages of discovery and filing answer “inconsequential” in determining
whether engagement of judicial process constitutes intent to waive rights). Hayden,
however, contends that Memorial Hermann did not just participate in the litigation
process, but it conducted itself in a manner inconsistent with pursuing dismissal
under section 74.351(b).
Before Memorial Hermann filed its second motion to dismissal for a failure
to file an expert report, the parties actively engaged in extensive trial preparations.
According to the parties’ stipulation, Memorial Hermann moved for summary
judgment (which was denied); “propounded multiple sets of written discovery to
[Hayden]”; participated “in ten fact and expert witness depositions” (the majority
of which Memorial Hermann initiated); moved for a trial setting in February 2012;
submitted trial preparation documents, including briefs, a jury charge, motion in
limine, facts witness lists, and exhibit lists; and announced ready for trial on two
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occasions. Hayden argues these facts, along with Memorial Hermann’s decision to
“abandon” its original motion to dismiss, demonstrate conduct inconsistent with
the right to seek dismissal and, therefore, resulted in waiver.
In Jernigan, the court of appeals found waiver of the right to dismissal based
on the health care provider’s (1) waiting 646 days after the lawsuit was filed, (2)
undertaking discovery, (3) filing a motion for summary judgment based on
charitable immunity, and (4) filing an amended answer that deleted language in the
original answer specifically referencing a failure to satisfy statutory prerequisites.
Langley v. Jernigan, 76 S.W.3d 752, 756–57 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002), rev’d, 111
S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2003). The Supreme Court found this conduct insufficient to
constitute waiver. Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156–57. The Court reasoned that
“attempting to learn more about the case” by requesting documents and submitting
interrogatories is not inconsistent with moving for dismissal for failure to meet the
expert-report requirement and observed that most of the discovery was conducted
by the plaintiff. Id. at 157; see Crosstex Energy, 2014 WL 1258307, at *8–9
(applying same standard of waiver). Moving for summary judgment on other
grounds also did not waive the right to dismissal under section 74.351. Jernigan,
111 S.W.3d at 157; see also Seifert v. Price, No. 05–08–00655–CV, 2008 WL
5341045, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas, Dec. 23, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
“Waiver is largely a matter of intent.” Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156; see also
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Crosstex Energy, 2014 WL 1258307, at *8 (same). And the totality of the
circumstances in Jernigan did not “clearly demonstrate” an intent to not claim a
known right. Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156–57; see also Motor Vehicle Bd. of Tex.
Dept. of Transp. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 111
(Tex. 1999).
Hayden argues that the facts here are stronger than Jernigan and likens
Memorial Hermann’s conduct to that of the defendant health care provider in In re
Sheppard, 197 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding). In
Sheppard, the court of appeals held that “extensive participation in discovery”
along with a delay of 1,183 days were sufficient, without more, to demonstrate that
the defendant had waived the right to seek dismissal for failure to meet the expert-
report requirement. 197 S.W.3d at 801–02. The defendant sent discovery requests
after receiving the plaintiff’s expert report, designated its own experts, deposed the
plaintiff and her experts, allowed the plaintiff to depose its experts, and announced
ready for trial.10 Id. at 801–02. The court distinguished Jernigan on the ground that
this discovery involved “far more” than learning about the case and was not
initiated solely by the plaintiff. Id. at 802. Under the totality of the circumstances
10
The opinion does not indicate whether a hearing was held on the motion to
dismiss. It only states that the defendant health care provider permitted its experts
to be deposed after it had filed its motion to dismiss and before the trial court
granted the motion. See In re Sheppard, 197 S.W.3d 798, 801–2 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2006, orig. proceeding).
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of that case—where discovery had been completed and the defendant had
announced ready for trial—the health care provider had engaged in conduct
“inconsistent with an intent to rely upon the right to seek dismissal.” Id.; see also
Apodaca v. Miller, 281 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.)
(noting that implicit waiver is only inferred by Texas courts in extreme
circumstances, and identifying announcement of ready for trial as one of those
circumstances); cf. Martinez v. Lakshmikanth, 1 S.W.3d 144, 148–49 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (analyzing waiver under section 74 predecessor
statute, holding waiver of right to dismissal may be implied when health care
provider defendant delays moving for dismissal until after case is disposed of on
other grounds).
The totality of the circumstances in this case is stronger than those in
Sheppard. First, Memorial Hermann not only conducted most of the discovery—it
completed its discovery. But more importantly, Memorial Hermann announced that
it was ready for trial twice before pursuing its motion to dismiss, and it did not
move to dismiss the case again until “four days prior to the trial court actually
calling the case to trial.” Memorial Hermann had filed a motion to dismiss 22
months earlier and intentionally did not pursue it. Effectively, Memorial Hermann
strategically decided not to pursue its initial motion; instead, it attempted to obtain
a final judgment through other means. Cf. Spinks v. Brown, 211 S.W.3d 374, 379
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(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (holding health care provider waived
rights by “strategic[ally]” choosing not to pursue motion to dismiss).
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in denying “on the ground of waiver” Memorial’s motion to dismiss
Hayden’s health care liability claim for failure to file an expert report. See
Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at 156 (holding intent must be discerned by reviewing “the
surrounding facts and circumstances”); see also Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 591
(stating that “courts should look at the totality of the circumstances” in determining
whether there is waiver); cf. Murphy v. Gutierrez, 374 S.W.3d 627, 633, 635 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no. pet.) (stating that, in analyzing whether defendant
waives right to dismissal for failure to file expert reports for claims against
architects and similar professional engineers, court should examine totality of
circumstances).
Accordingly, we overrule Memorial Hermann’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s interlocutory order.
Harvey Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown.
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