Juan Becerra v. State ( 2014 )

Opinion issued June 10, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-13-00807-CR
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JUAN BECERRA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 185th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1366900
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Juan Becerra of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
and assessed punishment at three years’ confinement. 1 In two issues, Becerra
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West Supp. 2013) (criminalizing
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another); see also
contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict,
and (2) there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We construe Becerra’s claims as a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence. We affirm.
Background
One evening, Huver Rodriguez and his wife, Daisy Alva, went to a local
nightclub. According to Daisy, sometime after midnight, she and Rodriguez were
dancing when a man walked up behind Rodriguez and hit Rodriguez on the back of
the head with a beer bottle. Upon impact, Rodriguez fell to the ground. The man
who hit him looked down at Rodriguez and apologized, saying that he had
confused Rodriguez for a man who “took his girl away from him.” Daisy and a
family member helped Rodriguez to his feet and the nightclub security guard took
Daisy, Rodriguez, and his assailant outside.
While they were standing outside, one of the security guards noticed that
Rodriguez had a “big cut” on the left side of his neck and told Daisy to take him to
the emergency room. Daisy’s friend drove Daisy and Rodriguez to the hospital; the
assailant rode with them and sat in the front seat of the car. At the hospital, medical
staff checked Rodriguez’s vital signs and treated his neck wound. Meanwhile,
Daisy watched as the assailant approached hospital staff and attempted to pay
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (West 2011) (defining assault with deadly
weapon as using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during commission of assault).
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Rodriguez’s medical bills. According to Daisy, the medical staff did not accept
payment and told him to sit and wait. The assailant was with Daisy and Rodriguez
the entire time—he was present at the time of the assault at the club, during the
ride to the hospital, and while Rodriquez received medical treatment at the
hospital.
While Rodriguez was being treated, Daisy saw Houston Police Officer
J. Nelson talking to the man who had ridden with them to the hospital. Daisy
testified that she told Officer Nelson that the man with whom he was talking was
the man who had hit Rodriguez. Officer Nelson testified that he asked the man to
come towards him and the man said “[I]t’s okay, it’s okay, it was an accident.”
According to Nelson, the man was “sorry for what he did.” Officer Nelson then
handcuffed and arrested him.
At trial, Officer Nelson testified that Becerra was the man whom he had
arrested and that Daisy had positively identified him while they were still at the
hospital. He also confirmed that Becerra had taken responsibility for the assault.
Daisy and Rodriguez, however, did not recognize Becerra at trial.
At the close of the State’s case, Becerra moved for a directed verdict
because “there [was] no testimony that link[ed] Juan [Becerra] in any way to
Huver [Rodriguez’s] injury.” The trial court denied Becerra’s motion.
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The jury found Becerra guilty of aggravated assault and assessed
punishment at three years’ confinement.
Becerra timely appealed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Becerra challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
Specifically, he contends that there was not sufficient evidence identifying him as
the person who had “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury”
to Rodriguez using a deadly weapon.
A. Standard of review
A challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is
actually a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the
conviction. Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We
review Becerra’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–20, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788–89
(1979). See Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 52–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).
Under the Jackson standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if,
considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, no
rational factfinder could have found that each essential element of the charged
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offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 317–19, 99 S. Ct. at
2788–89; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
We consider direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable
inferences in support of the verdict that may be drawn from the evidence in making
our determination. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Under Jackson, evidence is insufficient in four circumstances: (1) the record
contains no evidence probative of an element of the offense; (2) the record contains
a mere “modicum” of evidence probative of an element of the offense; (3) the
evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt; or (4) the acts alleged do not
constitute the criminal offense charged. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 & n.11,
320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786, 2789 & n.11; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518; Williams v. State,
235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The Jackson standard defers to the factfinder to resolve any conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton,
235 S.W.3d at 778. An appellate court presumes the factfinder resolved any
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict and defers to that resolution,
provided that the resolution is rational. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at
2793. If an appellate court finds the evidence insufficient under this standard, it
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must reverse the judgment and enter an order of acquittal. See Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 40–41, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217–18 (1982).
B. Sufficiency of evidence supporting conviction
Becerra’s contentions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence focus on the
evidence identifying him as Rodriguez’s assailant. Specifically, Becerra contends
that he was “unequivocally NOT recognized . . . by the only two eye-witnesses.” 2
A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another person. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West
Supp. 2013). A person commits aggravated assault if he uses or exhibits a deadly
weapon while committing the assault. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (West
2011). Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness or any impairment of
physical condition.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2013). A
“deadly weapon” is defined as “anything that in the manner of its use or intended
use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2013); Sullivan v. State, 248 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
The identity of the person committing the offense is an element of the crime
that must be proved. See Greene v. State, 124 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—
2
Becerra does not challenge or address any other elements of the crime of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
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Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (noting defendant’s identity can be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence and that eyewitness identification is not
necessary). We review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence that a defendant is the individual who committed the offense.
Rohlfing v. State, 612 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Identity may be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274,
285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Ford v. State, 852 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.). The testimony of one eyewitness is
sufficient to uphold a conviction. Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971); Shah v. State, 403 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. ref’d) (same). A positive, in-court identification of a defendant is
likewise sufficient to support a conviction. Jones v. State, 687 S.W.2d 430, 432
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.); see Johnson v. State, 176 S.W.3d
74, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding eyewitness
identification was sufficient to support conviction when complainant saw appellant
only on night that he robbed her, but complainant testified she recognized appellant
by his face and eyes); Walker v. State, 180 S.W.3d 829, 832–33 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding identification by only one
eyewitness was sufficient to support conviction when appellant robbed
complainant at gunpoint and robbery lasted less than one minute). Conflicting
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witness testimony does not preclude a factfinder from finding a defendant guilty.
See Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (upholding guilty
verdict even though victim misidentified defendant at trial but correctly identified
defendant at time of his arrest).
In Ford v. State, the court of appeals considered a defendant’s challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence of his identity as the person who had robbed a
convenience store. 852 S.W.2d at 642. Even though the owner of the store testified
at trial that she did not recognize the robber in the courtroom, she did positively
identify Ford in a photo lineup on the night of the robbery. Id. Based on the store
owner’s positive identification of Ford on the night of the robbery and other
witness testimony as to the robber’s identity, the court held there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding of guilt. Id. at 642–43.
Likewise, in Earls v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that there
was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s identity—despite eyewitness trial
testimony misidentifying a member of the jury as the man responsible for the
crime. 707 S.W.2d at 85. The Court determined that there was sufficient evidence
of Earls’s identity because an eyewitness testified that he and the perpetrator were
the only ones in the store during the robbery and that police arrested the perpetrator
of the offense. Id.
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Similarly, while Rodriguez did not see his assailant, and his wife, Daisy, did
not recognize Becerra at trial, there was evidence adduced at trial from which a
rational factfinder could have found that Becerra was the assailant. Officer Nelson
testified that Rodriquez’s wife pointed to Becerra in the hospital waiting room and
“very positive[ly]” identified Becerra as the man who had hit Rodriguez.
According to Nelson, after Daisy identified Becerra, Nelson flagged Becerra to
come toward him. Before Officer Nelson said anything, Becerra “just came out and
said something along the lines of: ‘it’s okay, it’s okay.’” Nelson then handcuffed
and arrested Becerra.
Daisy testified that the person whom Officer Nelson arrested was the man
who hit her husband and rode in the car with them from the nightclub to the
hospital. According to Daisy, the man apologized for hitting Rodriguez, explaining
that he had confused Rodriguez with another man he suspected “took his girl away
from him.” Daisy testified that while Rodriguez was still being treated at the
hospital, she saw Officer Nelson arrest her husband’s assailant. She also confirmed
that the man whom Nelson arrested had tried to pay Rodriguez’s hospital bills.
We defer to the jury’s determination regarding the weight evidence should
be given when it depends on a witness’s credibility or demeanor. Williams, 235
S.W.3d at 750. We presume the jury reconciled any inconsistencies within witness
testimony in favor of the conviction. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The jury could
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have relied upon Nelson’s in-court identification of Becerra, Daisy’s testimony that
Officer Nelson arrested the person in the hospital who was responsible for the
assault, evidence that the same person who was arrested also attempted to pay
Rodriguez’s hospital bills, and Nelson’s testimony regarding Becerra’s conduct
when he arrested him—specifically that Becerra appeared to take responsibility for
the assault.
We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Becerra’s
identification and, therefore, that the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction.
Conclusion
We affirm.
Harvey Brown
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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